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Abstract 
This thesis makes two claims: first, that conflict is constitutive of human agency, and 
second, that this understanding of agency in terms of conflict makes politics a problem 
about the will. I develop an argument to show how these two claims weave together to 
create the fabric of Kant’s account of political willing. From this Kantian approach to 
conflict and agency, the systematic question animating this thesis thereby arises: what 
are the conditions that make political willing possible? This thesis defends the notion of 
political willing as a placeholder for a number of inter-woven conditions that make 
political life in common possible. As a form of rightful interaction between free agents 
of choice, this form of willing emerges in Kant from the constitutive features of what it 
means to be an agent in a world with others agents. This relation between agents makes 
conflict unavoidable, a conflict which only a will that is public, omnilateral, and 
coercive, can rightfully resolve. I trace the development of this model of political 
willing in three spheres of Kant’s thought: (i) individual ethics, (ii) teleology, and (iii) 
politics.  I conclude that Kant’s view of politics is, in some ways, more Hobbesian than 
Hobbes’: for Kant, conflict cannot and should not be fully eradicated, if we are to take 
seriously equality between agents. Life under the state is not conflict-free, but rather it 
is a sphere made to preserve and to safeguard the boundaries of a shared political life, 
always prone to conflict. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is born from a commitment to two ideas: first, that individual freedom must 
be safeguarded under the limited power of the state, and, second, that living side by side 
with others means that this freedom must be limited by other individuals’ equal claim to 
it. I have endeavoured to understand the tension which arises between these two claims, 
and the questions which follow from this tension, namely: if equal freedom requires a 
form of limitation, who or what should take up this role?; and, if this is a legitimate 
question, how broad or narrow should the limits of this sphere of agency be, open to 
rightful coercion by an appropriate authority? From the perspective of these two 
concerns, I understand conflict as inherent to political life, and the root from which the 
necessity of political authority arises. My problem is therefore straightforward: how is 
political authority compatible with individual freedom? 
 
From the vast number of responses given to this fundamental question, it is 
Immanuel Kant’s answer which I have found most rewarding. It is the main thesis of 
this dissertation that, for Kant, establishing the limits of agency under a political 
authority requires that it be possible for individuals to will politically. My aim is to trace 
the conditions that make this form of political willing possible, from the perspective of 
Kant’s thought. 
 
Kant’s political philosophy begins with a very basic and intuitive set of ideas: 
that we are rational, interdependent, and forward-looking agents of choice. At the heart 
of Kant’s view, there is a requirement to explain how we can act in such a way that 
others can also express this equal right to choice, in a manner which is compatible with 
everyone else’s right. Kant conceives of this problem as necessitating an account of the 
relationship between will and universal law. This approach explains the sheer 
possibility of political life, in terms of the capacity of individuals to be determined by a 
universal law, via a model of public and external legislation. 
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In line with my commitments, this thesis rests upon two fundamental pillars: 
first, that conflict is constitutive of agency, and second, that this understanding of 
agency makes politics a problem about the will. I develop an argument to show how 
Kant weaves these two claims together to create the fabric of his account of political 
willing. In what follows, I trace the development of these ideas in three spheres of 
Kant’s thought: (i) individual ethics, (ii) teleology, and (iii) politics. Focusing on 
politics, I assume that Kant’s approach is not foundationalist, in the sense of following 
the logic carried by a commitment to certain fundamental principles about sovereignty 
and freedom. In studying Kant’s works, I instead discovered how the idea of political 
willing emerges from his understanding of what it means to be an agent embodied with 
a will, that is both a capacity for choice [Willkür] and reason as practical reason [Wille]. 
It is from this experience of political agency that Kant derives the requirements of a 
form of willing, which can appropriately limit the agency of individuals under a system 
of right.  
 
Kant attributes law-governedness to one source only: will as reason [Wille]. In 
doing so, I argue that he is committed to considering politics, and more specifically, to 
theorise the role and nature of political authority, in terms of a theory of the will. From 
this fundamental commitment, Kant develops an account of a form of willing, which I 
call political. This form of willing grounds the compatibility of individual freedom, 
under the authority of a will that is public, omnilateral, and with the power to coerce. 
From this Kantian approach to conflict and agency, the systematic question animating 
this thesis thereby arises: what are the conditions that make political willing possible? 
 
Thinking about the conditions of possibility of an experience, this question 
already suggests that political willing is not a programmatic definition ready-made in 
Kant’s corpus, rather it is an idea I extrapolate from his writings. Moreover, it should 
not be understood as a set of first principles from which the conditions of political 
interaction are, then, derived.  In contrast, my contribution in this thesis lies in showing 
how political willing is the placeholder for a complex series of inter-woven conditions, 
making up the fabric of political life. As a form of rightful interaction between free 
agents of choice, this form of willing emerges from the constitutive features of what it 
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means to be an agent in a world amongst other agents. What emerges is an unavoidable 
conflict, which only a will that is public, can rightfully resolve.  
 
In this sense, ‘political willing’ is a term of art in this thesis. This term stands for 
the conditions of human agency, and the unavoidable conflict that arises from the 
interaction between individuals, which in turn make political authority morally 
necessary. Kant names this form of political authority a ‘Public Will’. To be sure, the 
term political willing resonates strongly with other Kantian notions such as “the general 
will” and “the original contract”, yet there are systematic differences between them. For 
Kant, the original contract is an a priori idea, grounding the legitimate origin of the de 
facto states we find ourselves in.1 Politically, it is a measure to ensure the primacy of 
reform over radical change.2 The general will is the idea in accordance with which 
political authority ought to be exercised, as emanating from a “collective general 
(common) and powerful will” [DofR 6:256].3 Public Will, in contrast, is the authority 
that bears the required moral features to will in accordance with the idea of the general 
will, namely, it is an omnilateral and coercive will. The conjunction of these three a 
priori ideas on the one hand, and the requirements of agency on the other hand, are 
what make ‘political willing’ possible. 
   
Further to these clarifications, I want to explain the different usages of the 
notion of ‘will’ in this thesis. For Kant, the will involves two kinds of capacities: on the 
one hand, ‘Willkür’ refers to the capacity for choice, which each human being possesses 
by virtue of being an agent. I indicate this particular capacity when I refer to the ‘human 
will’, or the ‘will as choice’. This notion is better understood as the ‘executive office’ of 
the will, from which choices and actions emanate. On the other hand, the Kantian 
‘Wille’ refers to reason, as a universal capacity for lawgiving, with the power to 
prescribe law to the human will [Willkür]. When reason prescribes law independently of 
                                                
1 Kant appeals to this idea, as an argument against what he calls the “revolutionary fallacy”, namely 
the fallacy that people like Danton and other political revolutionaries incur in, when mistakenly 
2  Kant shares with Hobbes a preference for retaining the ‘now’ –with its limitations and 
imperfections– over the expectations of a ‘tomorrow’. As Hobbes says in Leviathan “The present 
ought alwaies to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best”. (Chap. 42) 
3 The general will is a “trias politico” consisting of three persons: the legislator, the ruler, and the 
judge. [Cf. DofR 6:313] 
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any other incentive to the human will, it does so as pure practical reason. This capacity 
bears the ‘legislative office’ from which laws and maxims arise [G 4:412; DofR 6:213]. 
 
However, these two different conceptions do not entail that there are two wills in 
Kant, but rather, that there exist two aspects of a single faculty, in their particular 
relation to law-determination. These notions, and the role I believe they play in the 
development of Kant’s account of political willing, are crucial for my argument. More 
systematically, ‘Wille’ as reason becomes embodied in the idea of Public Will, as 
Kant’s version of this will’s authority to subject the human will [Willkür] under 
universal law. Public Will relates to our will as choice, similar to the way a commander 
relates to his subjects.4  
 
To put these remarks into context, this thesis further scrutinises the role conflict 
plays in Kant’s political philosophy as a whole, and more specifically in his theory of 
the will. As Onora O’Neill explains, Kant stands in a lineage of philosophers “who 
argue that dissent and conflict can contribute to the emergence of order and justice”.5 
One way of understanding this claim involves focusing on the specific context of Kant’s 
articles for the advancement of domestic, international, and cosmopolitan peace, which 
suggest that, notwithstanding conflict between states, trade between nations will prove 
beneficial, coupled with the unintended consequences of these conflict-ridden 
interactions.6 I agree that dissent and conflict can be appeased by trade, thereby 
solidifying peace at home and abroad. Moreover, I agree that there is an even more 
systematic role for conflict to play in Kant’s commitment to the ideals of a perfect 
republic and of perpetual peace, as paradigms which our institutions should strive to 
resemble.7 
However, what these approaches overlook is a question regarding the nature of 
conflict itself. Understanding why this conflict is political in contradistinction with, for 
                                                
4 DofR 6:307. 
5 O’Neill (2015), p. 193. 
6 Cf. Fleischacker (1996) and Rosen (1993). For an opposing view see Caranti (2018). 
7 As Kant states, we must strive towards the “continual approximation of the highest political good, 
perpetual peace” [DofR 6:355]. This struggle must be carried out with enthusiasm, since “true 
enthusiasm is always directed exclusively towards the ideal”. Kant (2010), p. 182. On the systematic 
role of the ideal of perpetual peace in shaping our empirical, political solutions see Taylor (2010) and 
Kleingeld (2004). 
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example, moral conflict, is one of the central questions this thesis addresses. I believe 
that Kant stands out from this lineage of philosophers (think here of Plato, St Augustine, 
and Hobbes), in thinking about conflict not in terms of its positive or negative role for 
advancing political ends, nor in terms of its beneficial or detrimental influence on 
progress. Rather, I argue that Kant is unique in answering the question of the nature of 
conflict in terms of the relation of the will with universal law. More specifically, within 
the context of politics, Kant conceptualises conflict as a problem of the will based on 
two assumptions: first, that the will is the only source of lawfulness upon which our 
obligations vis-à-vis others can be grounded, and second, as the normative locus of 
political interaction, a conflict between wills inevitably arises, based on our equality of 
choice. This conflict is only resolved by the establishment of a public authority, capable 
of making these obligations binding. 
 
I have previously mentioned how the second pillar of my thesis, namely, Kant’s 
perennial preoccupation with the idea of conflict, runs throughout his works in parallel 
to his theory of the will. In his theoretical philosophy, Kant is concerned with the 
conflict of reason with itself. 8 Much of reason’s efforts go towards resolving opposing 
views fighting to gain reason’s approval. Reason oscillates from dogmatism, on the one 
side, to scepticism, on the other. It follows that when a claim “is adequate to reason it is 
too great for the understanding; and when suited to the understanding, too small for 
reason.” According to Kant, a conflict arises, “which cannot be avoided, do what we 
will.” [A 422/B 450] 
 
In Kant’s practical philosophy, the resolution of conflict is a similarly pressing 
task. At stake is not a piece of consistent theoretical knowledge, but rather the very 
possibility of our moral lives. As finite rational agents, we vacillate between the force of 
inclinations and the call of duty. Moral conflict is resolved by reason’s capacity to 
prescribe law to the human will with necessity, and to make duty the only voice “that 
                                                
8 In his famous letter to Garve in 1798, Kant explains how deeply-rooted this dialectic of reason is in 
his thinking: “It was not into any inquiry into the existence of God, or the immortality of the soul that 
I started”, writes Kant, “but from the antinomies of pure reason” (cited in De Vleeschauwer (1962), p. 
49). 
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makes even the boldest evildoer tremble [forcing] him to hide from its sight” [G 4:413; 
CPrR 5:80]. 
 
Equally, in his political writings, conflict emerges from the inevitable interaction 
of human beings. In a somewhat Hobbesian spirit, Kant describes this interaction as one 
of “resistance” between our strong inclinations to live together within the precincts of 
law, and the drive to “constantly [threaten] to break up this society”. This resistance 
comes with the difficulty of overcoming our “propensity to indolence”, and our 
tendency to desire to “gain worth in the opinion of others”. Kant investigates the 
centrality of conflict in political interaction, primarily through his analysis of the state 
of nature. This condition, he tells us, is one where men “must remain forever armed for 
battle.”9  
 
What this survey reveals is the way in which Kant views conflict as an 
inescapable ingredient of human experience. Its central role in Kant’s thought makes 
him appear as a polemicist’s philosopher, engaged in a constant “dialectical battlefield” 
[A 423] with his opponents. More than anyone else, it is Lewis White Beck who has 
captured this polemical drive in Kant’s thought, when he characterises Kant’s 
endeavours as an open “intellectual warfare” with various philosophical positions.10 The 
vastness and originality of Kant’s thought was apparent in the intensity of the 
immediate reaction of both his followers and detractors. In the German language alone, 
“more than 400 publications on the new system in general had appeared by 1804, an 
equal number on its ethics, more than 200 on Kant’s theory of religion, 130 on his 
philosophy of law… All told, more than 2000 essays and books pro and con, by some 
700 authors, were printed in the last 20 years of Kant’s life”.11 
 
What can be added to this never-ending series of defences and reactions? My 
specific contribution in this thesis is to ground the significance of Kant’s politics in the 
way he relates the conflict of political life to a problem about willing. The aim of this 
                                                
9 Cf. IUH 8:20–21; Rel 6:27; PP 8:366; Rel 6:93, emphases in the original. 
10 Beck (1978) Essays in Kant and Hume, p. 4. 
11 Saner (1973 Kant’s Political Thought: Its Origins and Development, p. 113. Reidar Maliks focuses 
on Kant’s specific polemical and “critical intervention” against his German conservative critics. Cf. 
Maliks (2014), p. 13. 
15	
thesis is, then, to show how the relation between these two things – conflict and the will 
– becomes a philosophical problem for Kant, with political implications.  
 
To ground Kant’s creative approach to these issues, I make a conceptual 
distinction between the notion of political conflict and moral conflict. Moral conflict is 
experienced as an inner struggle between two competing grounds of determination, i.e., 
our inclinations, and the pure motive of duty. As previously discussed, Kant’s theory of 
reason as autonomy is designed to show how, in this internal battle within the 
individual, it is duty which has the upper hand. Political conflict is radically different 
from this experience, because two of its constitutive aspects: first, political conflict is 
external, to the extent that it manifests in the external character of actions, and in the 
way these actions affect the choices of everybody else. It is uncontroversial to say that 
an important source of disagreement underlies our practices in the political sphere, 
triggering frictions and competition between agents of choice. What Kant is interested 
in exploring, however, is the formal aspect of choice, which makes its external character 
a matter of conflict. Furthermore, political conflict is external in the specific Kantian 
sense of it being a conflict which arises independently of the inner motivations, or 
ethical considerations, of the individual. In his politics, Kant focuses on the “legality 
(legalitas)” of actions, and not on “the morality (moralitas) of the action” [DofR 
6:225].  
 
Second, political conflict is relational, since it emerges from the fact that 
beyond the limits of our inner moral life, political life places us in an unavoidable 
relation to others. Again, Kant theorises this relational aspect of conflict, from the 
perspective of its formal manifestation, in terms of a formal relation between wills 
[Willkür], and not the mere material manifestations of our empirical interaction in a 
world of uncertainty and scarcity. I believe Kant’s view of politics emerges from this 
fundamental commitment to externality and relationality in willing. In a scientific vein, 
he explains these two aspects in the Prolegomena thus: “I can never do anything to 
anybody without giving him the right to do the same under the same conditions, 
likewise no body can act on another with its moving force without causing the other to 
act reciprocally by the same amount” [Prol 4:358]. This constitutive aspect of 
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relationality grounds Kant’s development of a juridical condition as a system of rightful 
relations. Such a system would be futile if we remained bound to the isolation of our 
inner moral worlds: “so long as Robinson remains alone on his island, a Doctrine of 
Right is superfluous”, says Joachim Hruschka, “with Friday's arrival, a Doctrine of 
Right becomes morally necessary”.12 
 
Kant conceptualises this external and relational conflict as being (i) unavoidable, 
(ii) intelligible and (iii) solvable. I explore these assumptions by showing how, first, 
possessing a will as choice makes conflict with others agents unavoidable; second, how 
we can make the roots of this conflict intelligible by looking at the lawless standing of 
our will, before public law is established; and finally, how Kant thinks this problem can 
be solved, i.e., made rightful, by means of the authority of Public Will.  
 
I defend these assumptions in the broader context of Kant’s place in a tradition 
of thought. I claim that Kant adopted a paradigm from a tradition of political thought, 
which states that the nature of the problem we are investigating, be it the workings of 
human nature, or the constitution of the human will, defines the nature of the solution 
directed to resolve this initial assumption. To defend this claim, I survey a version of 
this paradigm which assumes the problem as one of human nature. This assumption 
defines the solution offered by authors such as Plato, Hobbes and Rousseau in terms of 
the state’s capacity to overcome the unruly elements in human nature, by means of the 
eradication, the containment, and the potential transformation of the way we are. As 
Sheldon Wolin explains, there is an intrinsically two-way relationship at work in this 
paradigm, between “the form-giving role of political thought, and the form-receiving 
function of political matter”.13 
 
However, Kant does not align himself with the solutions of Hobbes and 
Rousseau, since he does not view the nature of the problem as relating to the way we 
are, but rather to the way we will. I develop an argument throughout the thesis to 
ground the claim that Kant is distinctive both in his understanding of the conflict which 
                                                
12 Hruschka (2003), p. 210. 
13 Wolin (2004) Politics and Vision, p. 33. 
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necessitates political authority (i.e., as one of willing), and in his approach to the 
solution to this problem as an account of political willing. I suggest that Kant should be 
read as offering a different response to the problem of political authority, in contrast to 
what I term the ‘common good view’ and the ‘teleological view’ of politics. 
 
The ‘common good view’ of politics, as its name suggest, defines politics as the 
coming together of individuals for the sake of a view of the ‘common good’. In 
Aristotle, for example, “individuals come together out of need… but end up living for 
the sake of the ‘good life’ in political communities”.14 As Bernard Yack explains, 
conflict is resolved within a “community of interests”, that is not only a regime but a 
“way of life”.15 In a similar vein, this idea of politics as a sphere for common agreement 
on what is ‘good’ or ‘just’ is also present in Cicero. In the dialogue of the De Re 
Publica, Scipio Africanus claims that a society is “not every assembly of the multitude, 
but an assembly united in fellowship by common agreement as to what is right”.16 
 
Though Hobbes cannot be fully aligned with this view of politics in terms of the 
common good, he does nonetheless share the claim that life in the ‘Civitas’ demands the 
containment of the causes that make us prone to conflict, competition and violence. For 
Hobbes, the ‘solution’ to this problem lies in making us “partners to a contract rather 
than sharers in some notion of the good life”.17 This contractual partnership is designed 
to alleviate the animosity anchored in our passions. As Yack further describes it, this 
‘coming together’ in the Hobbesian state involves a share in “common interests”. In 
stark contrast to Hobbes, Rousseau’s politics is envisioned as a community “of virtue 
among comrades”,18 for whom the “the greatest good of all” is the thing that holds the 
political community together. For Rousseau, the state is defined in terms of the common 
good, since “what these interests have in common is what forms the social bond” 
(Social Contract, Book II, chap. iv; i). 
 
                                                
14 Yack (1985), p. 97.  
15 Ibid., p. 106. 
16 Cicero quoted in Weithman (2006), p. 241. 
17 Yack (1985), p. 107. 
18 Ibid., p. 107. 
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This particular tradition of political thought makes the transition from the state 
of nature to a civil condition dependent upon the possibility of shaping the recalcitrant 
and self-regarding elements of our human nature, into passions which promote and 
guarantee the stability of the state. In Hobbes, this transition from a war-like condition 
to the long-lasting peace of the ‘Civitas’ is based upon the newly created sovereign’s 
capacity to constraint our glory-seeking nature within the precinct of the state. In a 
similar spirit, for Rousseau, a ‘purification’ of our private interests, by means of civic 
discipline and education, must take place to guarantee the moral perfectibility of 
individuals, required to will what is general and common. 
 
In the vicinity of the ‘common good view’ of politics lies another, more specific, 
interpretation of the dialectic between the problem of and solution to conflict developed 
in this thesis. This ‘teleological view’ of politics is specific to Kant’s moral philosophy 
and his teleology of history. The ‘teleological view’ draws a strict connection between 
these two spheres, thereby making Kantian politics instrumental to the teleologically 
oriented ends of reason, on the one hand, and to the progressive achievement of the 
moral ends of our vocation, on the other. These aims, as one prominent voice of this 
view puts it, involve “transcending individual morality” in order to shoulder the 
“collective historical task… of promoting the interests of reason, while progressively 
overcoming its constraints”.19 This interpretation reads Kant’s politics through the 
lenses of his commitments to teleology and to the ethics of individual morality, leading 
some to conclude that a “good will’s absence necessitates politics”.20  
 
What the ‘common good view’ of politics shares with the ‘teleological view’ is a 
commitment to (i) the pacification and eradication of conflict, as a precondition of the 
stability of political institutions, (ii) the establishment of political institutions as ends 
proper to our vocation, and to the (iii) idea of transforming human nature as a 
precondition for the establishment of these moral and political ends, in the context of a 
conflict-free world.  
                                                
19 Ypi (forthcoming) The Architectonic of Reason, p. 140. 
20 Riley (2015a), p. 335. 
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In stark contrast, I argue that what ‘brings us together’ in Kant’s politics is not a 
shared commitment to a view of the ‘common good’ or the ‘good life’, nor a 
commitment to the teleological ends of reason. For Kant, it is not a problem with the 
way we are that necessitates political authority, but rather the fact that we have a will. If 
political authority were grounded in the contingency of our passions and the empirical 
frictions that ensue, this form of authority would lack the necessity which Kant believes 
grounds a duty to enter the state. For Kant, exiting a condition of lawlessness for a 
system of rightful relations is grounded in a moral necessity, rooted in the conditions of 
equal agency. Equally, this duty cannot be grounded in some fact regarding how we are, 
let alone in the acknowledgement that there exists something evil or corrupt in our 
nature. As Kant insists, “however well-disposed and law-abiding human beings might 
be, it still lies a priori in the rational idea” of a condition of right, that the duty to enter 
the state is a matter of necessity. For this reason, Kant concludes, “when you cannot 
avoid living side by side with all others, you ought to leave the state of nature and 
proceed with them into a rightful condition, that is, a condition of distributive justice” 
[DofR 6:312, 307]. 
 
This transition from the state of nature to the civil state should be understood as 
a transition in forms of willing: from a form of willing which is private, unilateral, and 
lawless, to a form of public and omnilateral lawfulness, embodied in the idea of Public 
Will. My aim is therefore to understand how the idea of a Public Will emerges from the 
deficiencies present in the form of willing which initially necessitates it. This 
interpretative approach is further grounded in a series of questions. My contention is 
that these questions trace the stages of Kant’s ultimate account of political willing as 
theorised in this thesis, namely, (1) what requires political authority?, (2) how does Kant 
understand political authority as Public Will?, and (3) what does this approach to 
politics as a matter of willing tell us about Kant’s view of politics more generally?  
 
 To approach these questions, my thesis is divided into five chapters. In Chapter 
1, I present the structure of Kant’s account of moral willing by focusing on three aspects 
of his theory: (i) law-governedness, (ii) causality, and (iii) autonomy. These three 
aspects ground Kant’s understanding of reason [Wille] as prescribing universal law to 
20	
the human will [Willkür], in contrast to the idea of moral willing as a matter of self-
legislation.  
 
From there, I move into the sphere of Kantian politics via his political teleology 
in Chapter 2. There, I defend the view that teleology, as a theory of purposes, allowed 
Kant to explore some nascent thoughts regarding the possibility of an external and 
coercive kind of will. I systematise this idea through my ‘Harnessing model’ of conflict 
resolution. This model works by means of two mechanisms, namely, the ‘nature wills it 
so’ mechanism, and the ‘counteracting’ mechanism. I raise some objections against 
Kant’s strategy of viewing Nature as a teleologically informed agent, and as a will with 
the capacity to harness, channel, and coerce human affairs.  
 
Chapter 3 defends a reading of the Kantian state of nature by contrasting it with 
Hobbes’s paradigmatic account. I develop an interpretation of the kind of conflict which 
arises in this ‘natural’ condition, the conflict which makes the duty to enter the state 
morally necessary. I understand this as a conflict of the will in the absence of law – a 
“stato iniusto” – and not as a conflict involving human nature. The lawlessness of the 
human will in the absence of public legislation raises an existential threat to others, 
requiring the establishment of public law.  
 
Chapter 4 presents my systematic account of Kant’s idea of Public Will, which I 
argue is  his unique solution to the problem of conflict diagnosed in the state of nature. I 
argue that Public Will is a different kind of will, capable of embodying an omnilateral 
perspective, with the coercive power to place all others under an obligation. This form 
of public legislation does not depend upon a model of collective legislation, but rather 
upon Kant’s model of subjection under law. 
 
In the final chapter, I appeal to an intellectual tradition underlying some of the 
concerns at the heart of Kant’s politics. What Kant takes from this tradition of political 
thought is the idea that conflict is both central to our political theorising, and open to a 
resolution. I argue that this solution in Kant does not involve the eradication of conflict, 
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nor the conflation of our ethical and teleological assumptions with our commitments to 
an external and public model of legislation.  
 
Four key thinkers have influenced my intellectual journey in the thesis. There is 
one whose influence transpires in many of my arguments, although I never explicitly 
refer to him. This is Carl Schmitt. Thomas Hobbes, Sheldon Wolin, and Albert 
Hirschman have opened my eyes with regards to how far Kant is from their respective 
understandings of conflict and politics. This contrast allowed me to see how unique 
Kant is as a political philosopher. You learn much from those who think differently to 
you. 
 
This dissertation concludes that the significance of Kantian politics lies precisely 
in the fact that we do not, nor ever will, live in a conflict-free world. For politics to 
become a sphere protective of the limits of human freedom, we must be capable of 
willing the requirements that make a rightful condition possible, accepting that conflict 
will remain unavoidable. This I name political willing in Kant. My thesis is an effort to 
defend this notion. 
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Chapter 1 
The Structure of Moral Willing 
Introduction 
Wherever we place our focus on Kant’s practical philosophy, the notion of the will 
takes centre stage. Considering Kant’s views on human freedom, choice, action, and 
desire inevitably leads to a question regarding the nature of willing. It can be said that 
for Kant the will refers to two distinct capacities: (i) the will as pure practical reason 
[Wille], and (ii) the human will [Willkür], i.e., the common-sense meaning of a capacity 
for choice.21 How these two capacities relate to each other from the first-personal 
perspective of the individual agent will be the focus of this chapter.22 The rest of this 
thesis investigates the role of the will beyond the limits of the individual, in order to 
make sense of the way we will in relation to others in our political interactions. The 
notion of the will, therefore, both as practical reason and as a capacity for choice, plays 
a decisive role in both of these domains of practical reasoning , namely, the domain of 
morality and of politics. This chapter offers an account of the structure of moral willing 
in Kant’s moral philosophy. 
 
It is important to clarify here that when I speak of ‘two different capacities’, or 
of ‘two different kind of wills’, this should be understood figuratively. As Lewis White 
Beck rightly states, “there are not two wills” in Kant; there “is only one will, with its 
formal universal condition which is universally valid practical reason, and with its 
material condition which depends upon the specific involvement of the individual in the 
peculiar circumstances of his world, at his time and place.” The formal condition of 
‘practical reason’ [Wille] is the source of lawfulness, capable of determining the human 
will either internally, through an imperative, or externally, through public law, in its role 
                                                
21 G 4:12–13, MM 6:213. Cf. Allison (2012). 
22 I will refer mostly to the will, in its two different conceptions, instead of to the agent throughout the 
chapter. However, I should note that, strictly speaking, it is always an agent who embodies a will, 
even if I treat them separately for the purposes of my discussion. 
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as a “legislative faculty”. In contrast, the material condition of the human will [Willkür], 
may be referred as the “executive faculty” of the will to determine the choices and 
actions, which give expression to human agency. These choices and actions are the 
focus of Kant’s politics. For Kant, the will is thus a single capacity, expressed through 
different models of legislation, since “without the former, there is not law; without the 
latter, there is no deed”.23 
  
Difficulties surrounding the notion of will as practical reason and will as a 
capacity for choice persisted until Kant’s formal distinction between Wille and Willkür 
was officially endorsed in the later Doctrine of Right. The distinction draws upon two of 
Kant’s earlier works. Will as practical reason [Wille] can be found in the Groundwork, 
as a concept relating to the autonomy of reason, “and freedom as lawgiving, and hence 
as independent from any pre-given law”. Will as choice [Willkür], in contrast, can be 
traced back to the Critique of Practical Reason’s “concept of freedom as spontaneity, 
the faculty of initiating a new causal series in time”. 24 
 
In view of these clarifications, this chapter presents the basic structure 
underlying Kant’s model of moral legislation by focusing on two questions: what the 
will is, and how it legislates the law to finite and rational beings like us. I explore the 
question of the nature of the will by examining three of its most important features, 
namely (i) law-governedness, (ii) causality, and (iii) autonomy. These features frame the 
particular way in which the human will stands in relation to the moral law. I then turn to 
the second question, namely, how the will legislates, to suggest that this relation to the 
moral law is not one of self-legislation on the part of the agent, but rather a relation of 
prescription between pure practical reason and the human will. I am particularly 
interested in understanding how reason is for Kant this “lawgiving capacity”, to which a 
form of universal legislation is rightly attributed to. [G 4:432–34]. In other words, 
insofar as we are beings capable of taking up the demands of morality, we must be 
equipped with the necessary tools to be subjected to the universal necessity of the law of 
reason. This experience, as Janine Grenberg explains, is rooted in the “painfully 
                                                
23 Beck (1993) ‘Two conceptions of the will’, p. 41, 46. 
24 Ibid., p. 117. 
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intimate and common experience of conflict that thrusts us into the world of practical 
philosophy”.25 Understanding this conflict, and the unique capacity of human beings to 
resolve it by means of the determination of a law prescribed by reason itself, is the 
central aim of this chapter. 
 
With this aim in mind, it is important to draw attention to a tension that exists 
between two central ideas in Kant’s ethical thinking: On the one hand, Kant attributes to 
human beings the capacity to act in accordance with the demands of the moral law [G 
4:412]. On the other hand, Kant does not believe that our disposition to do what is 
morally right comes “from voluntary liking” or “gladly and of [our] own accord”. 
Instead he regards this disposition as a form of necessitation, due to our finite and 
sensible condition. If there were a natural accord between our will and the moral law, 
the law would cease to be a command for us. A tension therefore arises between our 
capacity to be determined by the moral law, and the fact that this capacity does not 
ensure that morality is natural for us. In other words, we are potentially moral beings 
who do not always get it right [CPrR 5:82, 84]. 
 
Kant then goes on to argue how this tension is constitutive of what it means to 
be an agent. It is Kant’s “deep-rooted conviction”, as Robert Paul Wolff puts it, that 
“moral life is a continuous struggle between the call of duty and the lure of 
inclination”.26 We are the kind of beings for whom morality is an experience involving 
an inescapable conflict between these two grounds of determination, a conflict that 
arises from the fact that we are “beings affected by needs and sensible motives.” [CPrR 
5:32]  
 
                                                
25 Grenberg (2013) Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account, p. 8 
26 Wolff shares our interest in the centrality of conflict in the context of Kant’s practical philosophy. 
However, he discusses the issue within the broader context of Kant’s metaphysical assumptions made 
in the first Critique. According to Wolff, the conflict between a noumenal experience such as the 
experience of duty, and the empirical pressure of our inclinations as appearances cannot be coherently 
resolved from the perspective of the critical philosophy. In order for this conflict to take place “the 
real, or noumenal, self would have to step into the temporal order of appearances and to battle with 
phenomenally determined inclinations, now defeating them, now being in turn defeated.” This inner, 
moral conflict would have to be reduced to “a conflict of inclinations of the sort described by Hobbes 
and Hume.” I think this is a powerful objection to the coherency of Kant’s system as a whole, 
however it is not crucial for the argument developed in this chapter. Cf. Wolff (1986), pp. 1–3.  
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Kant’s first task is, then, to offer an account of moral willing that explains how 
we can rise above this conflict by means of the constitutive features that make our will 
‘open’ to the determination of the moral law. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant 
stipulates that “whatever inclination may say to the contrary, their reason, incorruptible 
and self-constrained” must be capable of showing that rational beings, “insofar as they 
have a will”, have also the required capacity “to determine their causality by the 
representation of rules”, i.e., to demonstrate that they are capable of “actions in 
accordance with principles.” [CPrR 5:32] In short, it must be possible to overcome this 
kind of conflict,27 otherwise the following question arises: if we do not possess the 
resources to rise to morality’s demands, what is the point of morality after all? Hence 
morality, “always realised in decisions only, presupposes the possibility of conflict”.28 
 
Kant’s second task is aimed at reminding us of the fact that morality has a grip 
on us precisely because our relationship to it is conflicted. Morality must remain a 
struggle for us if we are to take seriously our finite and inclination-driven nature. As I 
suggest above, however, it is possible to solve this conflict at the level of our will. This 
highlights the tension at the heart of Kant’s moral thinking: if we were angels, the idea 
of duty would cease to have meaning for us, but if we were naturally determined by the 
moral law, we would cease to be agents.29  
 
For Kant, the question of morality is therefore inescapable and unique to beings 
“insofar as they have a will”. It is this uniqueness which Kant’s theory of the will is 
intended to capture. These aspects further explain why both moral and political agency 
in Kant require a certain relationship between the law and the will. In the case of ethical 
agency, the law is experienced as a matter of necessity to a will that is not pure, and so 
                                                
27 However, the resolution of this conflict by means of reason’s authority is never an easy experience 
from the perspective of the agent. Kant is aware of the tricks we play to ourselves through self-
deception to evade the pressure of moral demands, or to make ourselves believe that we have silenced 
the voice of our self-regarding inclinations in favour of the voice of reason. On Kant and self-
deception in moral experience see Papish (2018). 
28 Saner (1973), p. 268. 
29 Kant thinks that in our moral development as persons, we should strive to come closer to the idea of 
virtue, instead of a condition of holiness. However, he still insists that “the life of virtue involves, as 
an essential component, the pursuit of holiness”. [CPrR 5:112] To be sure, complete fitness of the 
human will [Willkür] to holiness is impossible for finite rational beings like ourselves, however, virtue 
and holiness seem to be working as two paradigms of moral perfection, influencing our vocation as 
moral, yet finite agents. Cf. Allison (2012), p. 172. 
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“the relation of such a will to this law is dependence under the name of obligation” 
[CPrR 5:32]. In the case of political agency, the relationship of the law with our will 
[Willkür] is determined externally, by means subjecting to the coercive power of a 
Public Will, in “a dependence upon laws, that is, in a rightful condition.” [DofR 6:315] 
 
One of the aims of this thesis is to trace the conditions of both moral and 
political agency, by giving centre stage to the role of the will in each of these spheres. 
Before venturing into Kant’s politics, some preparatory work is required. Kant’s 
solution to the conflicting nature of political interaction lies in his account of political 
willing. In order to fully understand this solution, we must first grasp the role of the will 
in individual moral willing. This chapter is therefore dedicated to Kant’s moral 
philosophy in the narrow sense of that term, i.e., his writings on individual ethics. It is 
in these writings that we find the basic presuppositions concerning law-governed 
willing, which will turn out to have a subsequent systematic role in his political works.  
 
However, turning to Kant’s politics does not mean that the latter amounts to a 
mere extension or a re-statement of his moral philosophy. We must be careful to 
identify exactly which assumptions Kant takes from his ethics to be put to work in his 
understanding of politics. I believe there are two assumptions: (i) the fact that we are 
not morally perfect beings, but beings partly determined by our inclinations and 
desires30, and (ii) Kant adopts in his politics a view of the will as the seat of law-
governedness, analogous to the view he has of the will vis-à-vis our inner moral world. 
If we were morally perfect, and our will as practical reason “would choose only that 
which reason independently of inclination cognises as practically necessary” [G 4:413], 
no conflict would ever arise in morality, and “there would be no Kantian politics to 
study.”31  
 
                                                
30 There is a growing interest in the impure dimension of Kant’s ethics, specifically on aspects of his 
moral psychology, that purport to explain the empirical dimensions of our moral strivings. This 
approach places an emphasis on the anthropological and historical concerns motivating Kant’s 
approach to moral agency more broadly conceived. I find these efforts laudable, and I incorporate this 
dimension into my analysis to the extent that it allows us to bridge the connections between moral 
agency and political agency. For a few recent commentaries addressing this dimension of Kant's 
thought, see Louden (2000); Frierson (2003). 
31 Riley (2015), p. 345. 
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Moreover, if our will as choice were naturally disposed to respect the choices of 
everybody else – in particular, their choices to acquire property – political authority 
would be futile. To talk meaningfully about political and moral agency, we must be 
capable of offering an account that can legitimately and rightfully explain our 
relationship to the law, either from an internal or external perspective. 
 
To anticipate: Kant thinks of the will as a kind of causality [G 4:446], equipped 
with the unique capacity to act in accordance with universal laws [G 4:427] -– laws that 
it both legislates and to which it remains subjected. [G 4:431] In what follows, I 
consider the three basic elements which together shape Kant’s overall conception of the 
human will: law-governedness, causality, and autonomy. All these elements will come 
into focus over the next three sections, and I shall refer to them as the general ‘structure 
of the will’. This structure is revisited and further systematised in Kant’s political 
philosophy in the remaining chapters. For the moment, the focus remains on the 
individual agent. 
1. The will as a law-governed capacity 
Purity 
In his ethics, Kant presents us with a clear and profound proposal: if reason is the source 
of moral laws, then rational beings in general, and human beings in particular, must 
have the capacity to act in accordance with them. Reason is thereby understood as a 
universal capacity, capable of legislating the moral law without exceptions. Kant calls 
this capacity of reason a “universally legislating will” [G 4:432]. This section analyses 
this intricate capacity of the Kantian will [Wille] to adopt a universal perspective. 
 
Attributing a universal perspective to reason yields two important ideas: first, 
the will as reason is a capacity with the power to generate pure motives, namely 
motives for action that are independent of our particular and hence non-universal set of 
reasons. Reason’s legislation would never be universal, if it depends on the 
particularities furnishing our wishes and desires. This universality of motives, Kant 
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attributes to reason’s capacity to be pure. Second, the will’s capacity for universal 
legislation must present itself to us in the form of an imperative (an idea which relates 
to the inherently conflicting relationship between the will and reason, as discussed 
above). Kant expresses this thought through his notion of duty, as the pure motive he 
was so far after. [G 4:400; CPrR 5:32–33; G 4:397]. 
 
For Kant, if morality is to be possible for beings like us, the will as practical 
reason must show itself to be a pure practical reason, in order to silence the “wishes of 
those who ridicule all morality as the mere phantom of a human imagination” [G 
4:407]. Those who ridicule morality in this way believe that experience has failed to 
give us examples of actions which have, indeed, been determined by pure motives, 
namely, actions done out of duty alone. Kant’s theory of willing is thereby based on the 
claim that “if man is capable of acting at all, if… in the language of the Critical 
Philosophy, reason can in any manner be practical, then pure reason must be capable of 
moving him to act.”32  
 
We can trace Kant’s strategy to account for this particular version of a pure 
moral philosophy through his arguments against alternative ‘populist’ conceptions of 
morality. These ‘populist’ conceptions maintain that only empirical principles, on which 
the agent finds an interest, can influence the human will to do what is right. Kant 
suggests that the moral sceptic is confused due to a certain misunderstanding: “what is 
at issue here is not whether this or that happened; but that, instead, reason by itself and 
independently of all appearances commands what ought to happen” [G 4:407–8]. He 
expands this diagnosis in a short survey of the ‘populist’ principles offered as potential 
empirical candidates for grounding moral worth. These principles – most prominently, 
the principle of happiness – will always fall short of the task of explaining how reason 
can have, from its own sources, pure motives to determine the will. Happiness could 
only offer a conditional ground for action. However, Kant’s argument against these 
types of moral theories should not be mistaken for a general hostility towards the 
sensuous, empirical and ordinary side of human experience. Instead, this argument 
should be seen within the context of his interest in finding a motive in the will that is on 
                                                
32 Wolff (1986), pp. 27–28. 
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the one hand, universal, and on the other, able to determine Willkür with absolute 
necessity.  
Reflexivity 
Kant then invites us to “follow and present distinctly the practical faculty of reason” [G 
4:412], as the only source from which such pure motive could be derived: 
For, the pure thought of duty and in general of the moral law, mixed with no 
foreign addition of empirical inducements, has by way of reason alone (which with 
this first becomes aware that it can of itself also be practical) an influence on the 
human heart so much more powerful than all other incentives. [G 4:410, my 
emphasis] 
Note that, at this point, Kant has not yet introduced the will as that capacity which 
takes the “pure thought of duty” as its law, namely, the will as choice or Willkür. He is 
here concerned with the will as pure practical reason. However, the formal definition 
that connects the will with law as necessitation is still to come. What he has introduced 
is the idea that for reason to become practical, i.e., to become identical with the will, it 
must go through a process of self-awareness: when the will has no other incentive but 
the pure motive of the moral law, it “first becomes aware that it can of itself also be 
practical.” This reflexive awareness of reason as practical is something Onora O’Neill 
has rightly identified as the “reflexive but impersonal” ability of reason to have a view 
of itself.33 And what does reason become aware of by means of this reflexive and 
impersonal act? It becomes aware of its capacity for universal legislation. 
  
In thus presenting reason as both active and reflexive, Kant is suggesting two 
different senses in which reason can be called practical: first, it is called pure practical 
reason when it determines the human will independently of any motive beyond the idea 
of duty alone. So reason becomes practical, “only upon the acceptance of its law as a 
motive (Triebfeder) by Willkür.”34 Second, it becomes practical when it adopts this 
                                                
33 O’Neil (2012), p. 286. 
34 Beck (1993), p. 41. 
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reflexive standpoint on itself, as a universal legislating capacity. All of this serves as the 
prelude to Kant’s second attempt at a definition of the will:  
Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation 
of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is 
required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than 
practical reason. [4:412; emphasis in the original] 
There are two distinct thoughts here. On the one hand, a will is a capacity 
attributable only to rational beings, namely to agents that are capable of acting in 
accordance with principles. On the other hand, by having this capacity, we possess the 
power required to derive our actions from the law itself.35 In other words, we prove to 
be the kind of beings that can act from pure motives, namely, to act in accordance with 
principles alone. Kant runs these ideas together in the above quote, not due to a lack of 
clarity regarding their distinctiveness, but rather because he reads them as jointly 
delivering the notion that we can refer to a human being’s will [Willkür] as identical 
with pure practical reason [Wille] only when the latter has been determined by 
principles, independently of any empirical influence emanating from their finite and 
sensuous nature. Passages such as the above demonstrate why we have to be cautious of 
the difficulties we inevitably confront when trying to disentangle the thorny distinction 
between Wille and Willkür.  
The capacity to act in accordance with the representation of law 
It is important to note that this capacity to act in accordance with laws comes with a 
crucial qualification: rational beings have the capacity to act in accordance with the 
representation of laws. What is this form of representation meant to clarify here? In this 
section I will argue that, by approaching morality in this way, Kant is carving out a 
space for a distinctive model of willing – moral willing – which contrasts with the 
various other activities of the will, such as desiring, wanting, and wishing [MM 6:213]. 
When the agent recognises the moral law as its proper and only object, it does so by 
                                                
35 As Kant puts it in the General Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, the ability of pure reason 
to become practical is dependent on its being, also, “the faculty of principles (here practical principles, 
hence a law-giving faculty)” [MM 6:214]. 
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way of representing it to itself as a law. I claim that the experience of morality places 
the agent in a particular standing to her will in respect to law. Kant captures this through 
the idea of the representation of law. This normative standing must be one which is 
radically different from other types of relation where both the will and law are present, 
but in a merely hypothetical way. Moreover, the normative standing between the human 
will and the moral law is found in the agent’s capacity to reflect on her own 
determination, and to become aware that this determination is her own. I have referred 
to this capacity of reason for self-awareness in the discussion above.  
 
Let me contrast this peculiar relation of representation between the will and the 
moral law with the idea of habits. What is distinctive about habits is the fact that we go 
about them without really reflecting on what we are doing, but more importantly, why 
we are doing it. We seem to be following a rule, and to determine our will accordingly. 
In such cases, Kant speaks of an action that merely accords with the relevant rule, as 
opposed to the reflective awareness that is reserved to our representing the law as one’s 
own. Lewis White Beck reinforces this contrast by referring to the difference between 
agents and actors: agents obey the law, whereas an actor is seen as merely “illustrating 
these laws”. To put it bluntly, morality can never be a matter of habit, since it requires a 
reflexive and normative standing of our will in respect to the reasons that determine it to 
action. In contrast, “I no more need to know the laws of habit formation in order to act 
in accordance with them than the planets need to know Kepler’s laws”. This is an 
important point: our awareness of the law by representing it as one’s own, is one of the 
condition that makes this a case of moral willing, in contrast to other activities of the 
will such as wishing, desiring, or just ‘going along’ out of habit. So, what we as agents 
possess, and what the planets and the actor lack, is the capacity to reflexively act in 
accordance with the representation of laws, of which we are aware as our own. This, 
Beck thinks, is “the simple thought Kant had in mind” when he understood that “only a 
being who claims knowledge of the connections of acts with one another and with 
consequences and sees them all in the context of a patter of life can be said to have a 
will”. 36 
                                                
36 Beck (1960) A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 34, 36. 
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But what kind of laws are these represented laws meant to be? More to the 
point, is it the will’s capacity to represent these laws, and not merely to ‘have’ them, or 
enact them as actors do, that sets us apart from the causal determinism of the world of 
appearances?37 Remember that, for Kant, “everything in nature works in accordance 
with laws” [G 4:412]. I am keen to insist upon this idea, as it will turn out to have an 
important philosophical role to play in Kant’s political philosophy too. The idea is that 
all human action is determined by law, at least of some kind.  
 
So far, I have discussed a particular kind of law, namely, the moral law. 
However, if we accept that the totality of events in nature, and more specifically the 
experience of human agency, is open to being law-governed, we can readily see an 
important entailment of this claim in the sphere of politics. As I will come to argue in 
Chapter 4, it is at least conceptually possible that political agency may also be 
externally law-governed, in contrast to the model of inner necessitation of the moral 
law.38  
 
Given that ‘everything in nature works in accordance with laws’, it will be 
necessary to explain how the human will, though law-governed by reason, is free from 
the causal determination of the laws of nature. Kant addresses this problem by drawing 
a distinction between the ‘doctrine of nature’ and the ‘doctrine of morality’, where the 
former is governed by ‘laws of nature’, and the latter is determined by ‘laws of 
freedom’.39 These laws have different modes of operation: the laws of nature are “laws 
in accordance with which everything happens”, in contrast to the laws of freedom, 
which are “laws in accordance with which everything ought to happen,” and which are 
understood in a way which “still tak[es] into account the conditions under which it very 
often does not happen” [G 4:387–8].  
 
To be sure, Kant is here supplying the basic guideline of his metaphysics of the 
will, and I can only speak of this in passing. My strategy in this chapter has rather been 
                                                
37 I expand on this issue of natural determinism from the perspective of Kant’s political teleology in 
Chapter 2, sec. IV, ‘A Will of Nature: between determinism and freedom’. 
38 I explore this form of lawful determination in politics in Chapter 4, sec. II ‘What is a Public Will?’. 
39 For a compelling interpretation on Kant’s notion of a ‘law of nature’ see Watkins (2014). 
33	
to highlight certain aspects of Kant’s theory of the will in his moral philosophy, as a 
groundwork against which my interpretation of Kant’s account of political willing will 
be further developed. In this way, this section has aimed to deliver three specific claims: 
first, that the relationship between reason [Wille] and the human will [Willkür] is a type 
of relationship with the law. Second, this form of ‘standing up’ to the law requires for 
Kant an act of reflexivity and self-awareness, for it to have the normative standing 
proper of a relationship of necessity involving an obligation. Third, this relationship of 
the will to law involves a particular kind of representation. The moral law, as an object 
of representation, cannot be an object in the world of appearances. For this reason, it 
must be accounted for as a different kind of representation, related not to empirical 
objects but to the form of the law itself. When the will acts in accordance with the 
representation of laws, it does so by acting from the sheer form of law, “since the mere 
form of a law can be represented only by reason and is therefore not an object of the 
senses and consequently does not belong among appearances”. [CPrR 5:28] 
 
The conjunction of these three claims is essential to my argument because it 
reveals, in the most general way, Kant’s understanding of the will as a capacity that is 
both the seat of lawfulness, and the locus of legislation of the form of law. I argue that 
these two aspects of what it means to will morally, namely of reason as the source of 
lawfulness, and its legislative office, are taken up by Kant, who translates them as 
features of the political morality of Public Will. In the vocabulary of the Critique of 
Practical Reason, Kant calls this the “universal lawgiving form” of the will. [CPrR 
5:29] 
 
There is, however, a missing element in Kant’s account of the will to which we 
now turn, namely the capacity of the will to be causally efficacious. By attributing 
causality to the will, Kant is consistently acknowledging the fact that it is not enough to 
be capable of representing the moral law to ourselves; we must also be capable of 
acting in accordance with such a law. Causality is the property of the will which allows 
us to take this crucial step. 
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2. The will as a kind of causality 
Two kinds of causality  
That “the will both creates and executes obligations is the most dramatic thesis in 
Kant’s philosophy”.40 Certainly, agents perform these obligations, but it is the will that 
“creates” them in the specific sense of universal lawgiving discussed above. This 
capacity to execute an action as a result of the will’s own determination is what Kant 
calls the ‘causality of the will’. This efficacy of the will is “a power to determine the 
causation of an act by the representation of rules” [G 4:446; CPrR 5:32]. I suggest we 
read Kant as operating with two related understandings of causality: on the one hand (i) 
causality as law-governedness, and on the other hand, (ii) causality as efficacy. I shall 
explain each in turn.  
 
Kant first approaches the will “as a kind of causality” in analogy with the law-
like regularity of the order of nature. This is surprising, partly because he has tried to 
exclude the will from the regularity of the laws of nature, to account for its freedom.41 
As Grenberg rightly notes, when an agent is going through the experience of moral 
determination she must set aside “her arguments, her deductions and her worries about 
causal determinism, and turn instead to [a] phenomenological reflection on this 
existential conflict at the basis of her existence as a human agent”.42  
 
However, the analogy to the law-like order of nature is relevant: it allows Kant 
to show that even if the human will can be freed from alien determinations, and have its 
own ‘internal order’, so to speak, this does not mean that it is free from the requirements 
of a law-governed constitution. The idea Kant is trying to establish is that it is in the 
nature of willing to be governed by a kind of law, just like any other phenomena in the 
natural world. I suggest that a fruitful way to understand this intimate relationship 
between the will and law is by means of this first sense of causality, namely, as law-
                                                
40 Beck (1993), p. 43. 
41 For the connection between the problem of determinism and that of transcendental freedom in Kant 
see Pereboom (2006). 
42 Grenberg (2013), p. 8. 
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governedness. Kant explores this idea by attributing to the will the capacity to will laws 
with the same necessity and generality as the laws of nature, “as if a natural order must 
at the same time arise from our will” [CPrR 5:44]. It is from this order of reason, arising 
from our own will that I see the emergence of the notion of causality as involving a law-
like regularity akin to the causality governing natural phenomena.  
 
Secondly, Kant addresses the causality of the will in terms of efficacy, or the 
power to bring about a new state of affairs through action. This should not be confused 
with physically acting out a volition or a plan, e.g., our resoluteness to run a marathon, 
or to go on holiday. What we causally bring about, according to Kant, is a law 
resembling the regularity and necessity of the laws governing the natural order. In other 
words, it is the internal efficacy of the will to bring about a law that is its own, 
something which Kant expresses when he says causality is a “property of the will”. De 
Vleeschauwer usefully distinguishes between ‘acting’ and ‘willing’ in the strict Kantian 
sense: “to perform an act is a physical operation: only the willing of an act can be the 
effect of this kind of [practical] causality”.43  
 
Kant is careful to bring these two senses together into a coherent picture. The 
will, by analogy with the natural world, has an “order” of its own, governed by an 
internal form of causality to bring about its own laws. These laws are the efficacious 
result of this causal property. This talk of causality, however, can easily mislead us into 
thinking that the inner causality of the will is equivalent to literally acting in the 
empirical world, in accordance with what the moral law says. I emphasise this point 
since we should be cautious to attribute to Kant a kind of voluntarism according to 
which, in knowing what we ought to do, we are bound to act in accordance with it. 
 
What I wish to focus on here is how this property of the will of inner causality is 
vital to the coherence of Kant’s picture of a law-governed will. The property is useful 
because of its systematic relation to the idea of law. Causality is, by definition, a law-
governed activity (if not, we would not speak of causality but instead of hazardous 
sequences of events). As Kant emphasises in the Groundwork: 
                                                
43 De Vleeschauwer (1962) The Development of Kantian Thought. The History of a Doctrine, p. 121. 
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Since the concept of causality carries with it that of law according to which, by 
something that we call a cause, something else, namely the consequence, must be 
posited: freedom, though it is not a property of the will according to natural laws, is 
not lawless because of that at all, but must rather be a causality according to 
immutable laws, but of a special kind; for otherwise a free will would be an 
absurdity. [G 4:446, italics in the original, my emphasis in bold] 
Two important ideas are conveyed in this passage. On the one hand, it reinforces 
our previous point about Kant’s appeal to the immutable and general character of the 
laws of nature, as appropriately analogous to the way we should think of the laws of 
freedom that apply to the will. On the other hand, it illustrates how this new kind of 
causality is required if we are to make sense of the idea of a law-governed will. Kant 
phrases the issue in terms of an assimilation between a “free will” and a will subject to 
law. I prefer to utilise the latter expression, i.e., a will subject to law, in order to bracket 
the issue of whether, for Kant, our will is only free when it is moral.44  
Normative standing of the will to law 
To recap: Given his definition of the will as a law-governed capacity, Kant must further 
attribute to it the property of causality, thereby endowing the will with practical 
efficacy. In doing so, Kant is drawing a strict relation between his claim regarding the 
representation of laws and his claim regarding the causal power of the will. As we have 
seen in the previous section, will as reason [Wille] does not find its laws ready-made in 
the order of nature: reason represents them in a particular way. Through this act of 
practical awareness, i.e., of reason’s first awareness of itself as practically efficacious, 
                                                
44 This objection was forcefully raised by Kant’s immediate reader and critic, Carl Leonhard 
Reinhold, in his 1792 Letters on Kant’s Philosophy, and rehabilitated by Henry Sidgwick in 1888. 
Kant seems to make the mistake of having only moral considerations as the basis of the assertion of 
freedom. According to a more charitable reading – for example Ameriks’ – Reinhold, instead of 
criticising Kant, helped to correct some of his earlier formulations, and to explain why we attribute to 
him the “unfortunate impression that the actuality of freedom is to be found only in obedience to the 
moral law.” What Reinhold highlights is that the view of human freedom which is proper to Kant’s 
critical project “must instead involve the ability to reject or accept one’s given desires.” It is 
interesting to view this in the context of our present interest, namely, Kant’s notion of Willkür. As 
Timmermann explains, Kant endorses a solution to the problem in his later Metaphysics of Morals 
similar to the solution Reinhold had anticipated in his critical commentary. According to 
Timmermann, Kant there explains “that freedom of Willkür cannot be defined as the choice for or 
against the moral law, but rather as the capacity to act as one ought to act”. In this sense, it is not a 
matter of being free only when we choose the moral law, but to act in accordance with our capacity to 
do the right thing. Cf. Ameriks (2000), pp. 156–157; Timmermann (2007), pp. 164–165.  
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and hence as causal, the will settles a particular kind of relation to the law it represents. 
I have defined this relationship as the normative standing of the will as a universally 
legislating will. I refer to the standing as ‘normative’ because this is not an indifferent, 
contingent, or arbitrary relation to law. Rather, it accounts for Kant’s effort to make 
room for a distinct kind of relation in the realm of appearances, one that ‘stands out’, so 
to speak, from the causal relations that govern natural phenomena. As Johnson puts it: 
One could, for instance, imagine a creature who could represent the world as 
operating according to laws, in fact could represent itself as connected through 
laws to the operations of that world, and yet not have these representations lead to 
any action, to any willings, at all. Its representations of the lawfully related 
elements of the world might be causally isolated from that world.45 
I believe this to be the sort of picture which Kant finds alien to the experience of 
moral determination. There are many ways in which we represent courses of action to 
ourselves, but which plainly lack the causal connection that Kant thinks exists between 
the will and its laws. For example, imagine the will representing an instrumental 
principle to itself, such as ‘you must will the means if you will the ends’. On a rainy 
day, this principle stipulates that if you wish to stay dry whilst going for a walk, you 
must take an umbrella with you. The will in this case represents the principle in view, 
but bears a contingent relation to it: once we dismiss the end of having a walk, we also 
fall indifferent to the representation of the maxim according to which we should have 
taken an umbrella. This is what Kant calls heteronomous willing, which makes a 
conditional demand on the agent, and is in contrast with the unconditional demand that 
the moral law makes upon our will. [G 4:441] 
 
It is worth noticing that in the above example, the will’s relation to this 
instrumental principle is still law-governed, in the sense that anyone who shares the end 
of going out for a walk and staying dry had better take an umbrella if it is raining. 
However, in the case of non-instrumental principles such as the moral law, the relation 
is of a distinct kind. In line with my interpretation of Kant’s structure of willing, when 
the will represents the moral law, a lawful and causal relation arises. The representation 
                                                
45 Johnson (2010), p. 93. 
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of the moral law through the agent’s will discloses in that same willing that the law 
must have the form of universality appropriate to a universally legislating will. This 
universality requires that anyone in my situation ought to will in the same way. To put it 
somewhat differently: for Kant, it is through the inner world of our practical 
representations that we discover the universally legislating dimension of the will as 
reason. And it is through this discovery that we become normatively related to the law. 
We cannot remain indifferent to the demands of morality, even if we try to silence its 
voice.46 
 
In this section, I have argued for the claim that when the agent wills morally, the 
will stands in a normative relation to its own representations. For Kant, this relation is 
causal. The fact that the will has the property of causality implies that when it represents 
an ‘ought’, it knows that this implies ‘can’. This intimate connection between law, 
causality, and representation is similar to Johnson’s suggestion that “given the fact that 
thoughts about ‘what we ought to do’ are at bottom thoughts about ‘what we ought to 
cause’, we have to make use of the concept of causation”.47 Having addressed the first 
of my two interpretative questions, namely, what are the relevant features of Kant’s 
account of the will in his moral philosophy, I now turn to the question of how this will 
legislates the law. This will involve a discussion regarding the notion of autonomy. 
3. The will and the autonomy of reason 
I have so far presented the first two elements furnishing Kant’s account of the will – 
law-governedness and causality. We are now in a position to explore how the will 
actually legislates the law. This brings us to the much-disputed intricacies of Kant’s 
definition of the will as autonomous, that is, “the property of the will of being a law to 
itself.” [G 4:447] As we have seen, Kant speaks of the will as a capacity for legislating 
its own laws through reason’s pure constitution, and this capacity for legislation grounds 
                                                
46 According to Kant, the “internal judge” that is the moral law, follows human beings “like his 
shadow when he plans to escape. He can indeed stun himself or put himself to sleep by pleasures and 
distractions, but he cannot help coming to himself or waking up from time to time; and when he does, 
he hears at once its fearful voice. He can at most, in extreme depravity, bring himself to heed it no 
longer, but he still cannot help hearing it” [DofV 6:438]. 
47 Johnson (2010), p. 96. 
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a strict relation between universal legislation and autonomy. As Timmermann points 
out: “the explicit introduction of the subject of legislation brings to light the 
characteristic feature of Kantian autonomy: that by virtue of making universal law every 
rational agent subjects him or herself to it”.48  
Reason as a vigilant government 
Kant is interested in casting light on the phenomenology of our inner world as a means 
to anchor this property of autonomy of the will in terms of reason’s unique form of 
legislation. He describes our experience as a plateau of interests and inclinations 
competing against reason’s self-government. As he puts it in the Collins lectures of 
1784–5: “There is in man a certain rabble element which must be kept under control, 
and which a vigilant government must keep under regulation”.49 He expresses the same 
thought in terms of the voice of conscience, which, in reference to the will, is “so 
distinct, so irrepressible, and so audible even to the most common human beings”. The 
reason these two remarks are interesting is the way they allow us to witness Kant 
comparing this “vigilant government” of reason to an “internal judge”, capable of 
keeping the individual “observed, threatened, and, in general, kept in awe”. This is even 
more evident for the political resonances that these expressions about “government” and 
“judge” seem to convey. The question for us is whether we are right in interpreting Kant 
as attributing to reason [Wille], the capacity to be a type of government over and above 
the human will [Willkür]. [CPrR 5:35; DofV 6:438].50  
 
                                                
48 Timmermann (2007), p. 103 
49 Kant quoted in Guyer (2013), p. 76.  
50 In the Preface to the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant tries to articulate what goes on, from the perspective 
of the agent, when this kind of moral determination of Wille upon Willkür takes place. He appeals 
again to political notions, when he criticises those “who are accustomed merely to explanations by 
natural sciences [and whom] will not get into their heads the categorical imperative from which these 
laws proceed dictatorially, even though they feel themselves compelled irresistibly by it”. Moreover, 
this experience of ‘dictatorially’ determined laws finds further resistance from speculative reason. 
This capacity, “unable to explain what lies entirely beyond that sphere (freedom of choice)… band[s] 
together in a general call to arms, as it were, to defend the omnipotence of theoretical reason. And so 
now, and perhaps for a while longer, they assail the moral concept of freedom and, wherever possible, 
make it suspect; but in the end they must give way” [MM 6:378]. It is Kant’s expectation that, in this 
“call to arms” between speculative and practical reason, the latter will win out, even if it imposes its 
laws on the human will “dictatorially”. 
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What I want to take from these remarks is the way they allude to a potential 
coercive, constraining, vigilant, yet ordering role of reason [Wille]. I argue that a fruitful 
way of approaching Kant’s complex notion of autonomy is to think of reason as a 
distinctive kind of government, one which is not externally imposed upon us, but rather 
one whose legislative office is seated in reason’s own capacity for universal legislation 
in the name of all.51 In lines with our analogy, in the case of moral legislation, this form 
of subjection to the ‘government’ of reason is conscious and voluntary, through the act 
of reflective awareness discussed in Section 1. 
 
To be sure, my motivation for exploring the idea of reason as involving a 
“vigilant government”, as Kant refers to it in the Collins lectures, speaks directly to my 
interest in Kant’s political appropriation of the basic notions of his moral philosophy, 
and my intention to track the development of his political account of the will. In the 
specific context of Kant’s notion of moral autonomy, I understand this notion as the 
defining activity of the will as reason, akin to the activity of self-government. From this 
perspective, the self-government of reason is the capacity of reason to prescribe laws to 
itself. 
 
There are a couple of problems related to autonomy as an activity of reason that 
should be kept distinct. First, there seems to be diversity in scholarly interpretations of 
autonomy due, at least partly, to a confusion surrounding the autonomy of reason versus 
the autonomous agent, who has determined his will [Willkür] in accordance with 
reason.52 Given that autonomy in Kant seems to signal the idea of self-legislation, this 
has led some commentators to think that he who legislates the law to himself is the 
agent, instead of reason to itself. Second, this difficulty is, I accept, sometimes 
unavoidable. The way Kant distinguishes between pure practical reason and the human 
will, and the way he expresses the apparent relationship between these two capacities, 
can cause us to assume, rather unfortunately, that there is one thing called ‘reason’ 
                                                
51 I am deliberately phrasing this interpretation with a vocabulary that resonates the way Kant thinks 
of the general will. On the relation between de idea of the general will and reason as Wille see Chapter 
4, sec. IV ‘How does Public will will: A model of subjection’. See also the distinction between the 
‘executive’ and ‘legislative’ faculty of the will discussed in the Introduction of this chapter. 
52 For some of the problems relating to the notion of ‘self-legislation’ in Kant’s moral philosophy, see 
Kain (2004). 
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which is over and above the human will, prescribing law to the latter from an 
independent office. For Kant, human beings have only one will, which determines itself 
in different ways. Autonomy is for Kant a particular mode of determination. This mode 
is only possible when the agent determines his will independently of any inclination, 
and solely in accordance with reason’s pure motive of duty. In other words, the agent is 
autonomous when it is reason prescribing the law autonomously to the will.  
 
However, not all commentators understand Kant’s notion of autonomy as an 
exclusive activity of reason [Wille].53 As Onora O’Neill rightly identifies, “a common 
approach to Kantian autonomy harks back to the etymology of the word autonomy”, 
hinging on its limited etymological sense of “some conception of self-legislation”. What 
O’Neill finds problematic about this preference is that it is hard to see how we can make 
sense of the way Kantian autonomy, “pictured merely as legislation by individual 
selves”, can in turn converge with “anything that should count as morality”. This, 
O’Neill concludes, “remains a mystery”, yet “this reading remains popular”.54 
Autonomy as the legislation of a ‘self’ 
Most prominent among commentators who focus on the agent is Christine Korsgaard. 
Korsgaard advances an interpretation according to which the Kantian notion of 
autonomy must be found in the constituting act of a self. This approach rests on a 
substantive view of the self and agency, one which favours a model of the will as self-
legislation. This model accounts for the authority of moral requirements in the fact that 
we legislate the law, in what Korsgaard calls a constituting act of the agent. In Self-
Constitution, she expresses her account as follows: 
When you deliberate, when you determine your own causality, it is as if there is 
something over and above all your incentives, something which is you, and which 
chooses which incentive to act on. So when you determine your own causality, you 
                                                
53 I share this reading with Onora O’Neill (1990, 2015) I expand on this later in this section. 
54 O’Neill (1990) Constructions of Reason, p. 59. 
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must operate as a whole, as something over and above your parts. And in order to 
do this, Kant thinks, you must will your maxims as universal laws.55 
According to Korsgaard, it is a robust and unified “self” which takes up the role 
that I think Kant reserved for the “vigilant government” of reason. This “vigilant” role 
is now enacted by “something which is you”, through an act of rational deliberation.56 
This “you” takes up the central task of legislating the law, based on this prior act of 
self-constitution. Tom O’Shea, for example, further points out that what is revealed by 
this “ever-present capacity for reflection—to ask whether there is a reason to do as we 
are inclined” is that there is an underlying “self [that] is divided.” 57 Korsgaard’s project 
is then to reunite this divided self by means of an appeal to Kant’s notion of autonomy 
as the paradigmatic act of constituting our identity. More importantly, she defines this 
self-constituting act in two ways: on the one hand, it is defined as an act of self-
legislation, and on the other hand, she makes this act a demand of “agency itself”, and 
not just of moral agency in particular.  
 
Following this series of commitments, Korsgaard further attributes to the ‘I will’ 
of the agent a role which is similar to that of the ‘I think’ in Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy. The ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all our representations if it is to 
make sense of the unity of experience. Similarly, here the ‘I will’ unifies agency, 
allowing you to “operate as a whole”: 
To put the point in familiar Kantian terms, we can only attach the ‘I will’ to our 
choices if we will our maxims as universal laws. The categorical imperative is a 
constitutive principle of acting, according to Kant, because conformity to it is 
constitutive of an exercise of the will, of the determination of a person by himself as 
opposed to his determination by something within him.58 
I understand these remarks as follows: there is a ‘real you’, i.e., the unified, 
deliberating, self-constituted agent. When the agent wills morally, namely in accordance 
                                                
55 Korsgaard (2009) Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, p. 72. 
56 I criticise this quest for a unified conception of agency, and the political implications Korsgaard 
draws from this ‘constitutional model’ of action in the context of Plato and Kant’s vision of the state 
in Chapter 5, sec. III, ‘The dialectic of conflict and politics in Kant’. 
57 O’Shea (2013). 
58 Korsgaard (2009), p. 76. 
43	
with the Categorical Imperative, the element that determines that this is actually a case 
of willing is, according to Korsgaard, the fact that it is a form of determination done by 
you, “of a person by himself”. This radical emphasis on the agent, in contrast to the role 
of reason, seems to me mistaken as an account of Kant’s theory. Kant predicates 
autonomy as a property of reason, to be a source of moral legislation that is independent 
of external motives and influences. As such, Kantian autonomy does not seem to 
correspond to the act of “volitional unity” that Korsgaard attributes to the “whole 
person”.59 
 
That autonomy is a relation of reason with itself, and not the capacity of a unified 
self to legislate her own laws is confirmed by Kant’s passages on the issue. To be sure, 
the text itself is unfortunately not free from ambiguities on this count. As both 
Timmermann and Mary Gregor have noticed, Kant states in the Groundwork that “the 
will is not just subject to the law, but subject in such a way that it must also be viewed 
as self-legislating, and just on account of this as subject to the law… in the first place” 
[G 4:431]. In Gregor’s edition of the Groundwork, ‘selbstgesetzgebend’ is translated as 
“giving the law to itself”, whereas Timmermann’s salutary emendation rightly notes 
that neither a legislation by the self, nor a legislation to the self is able to capture the 
subtlety of Kant’s thought, according to which the will [Wille] must be viewed as itself 
legislating, in its sublime capacity to be a universal legislator not of this or that 
particular self, but for all.  
 
Pauline Kleingeld is another commentator who has carried out rigorous 
interpretative work to clarify this issue. According to Kleingeld, the Kantian will does 
not stand in a kind of “self-addressing act… of enacting legislation”. Rather, Kant has 
                                                
59 Korsgaard (1999), p. 3. In the context of a discussion against Parfit on the possibility of personal 
identity, Korsgaard describes this kind of volitional unity in analogy to the way the parts of our brain 
work and collaborate harmoniously to the extent that there is a someone, a “whole person”, in the 
back. She invites us to imagine the following scenario: “So imagine that the right and left halves of 
your brain disagree about what to do. Suppose that they do not try to resolve their differences, but 
each merely sends motor orders, by way of the nervous system, to your limbs. Since the orders are 
contradictory, the two halves of your body try to do different things. Unless they can come to an 
agreement, both hemispheres of your brain are ineffectual. Like parties in Rawls's original position, 
they must come to a unanimous decision somehow. You are a unified person at any given time 
because you must act, and you have only one body with which to act”. I insist in Chapter 5 that we are 
warranted to assume political implications from this Korsgaardian picture of action. Her reference to 
Rawls in this passage, and to the original position, seem to confirm this suggestion. Korsgaard (1989). 
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in mind a will which “gives laws to the entire imagined community (of which one is a 
member)”. Under this reading, the principle of autonomy “requires that I conceive of 
myself, counterfactually, as giving universal law through my maxims—as legislating to 
all (including myself)”.60  
Autonomy as reason’s prescription of law 
It should be evident from these clarifications just how crucial it is to understand the 
sense in which Kant speaks of self-legislation in relation to the will as reason. If we 
accept our preferred reading of autonomy as reason’s capacity to legislate law to itself, a 
new interpretative dimension arises. Consider the way reason legislates such a law. Two 
possible options emerge: on the one hand, we can think of reason as ‘making’ the law, 
in line with a voluntaristic tradition. On the other hand, we can think of reason as 
‘prescribing’ law in its role as a capacity for principles and rules.61 
 
This reading of reason prescribing law has been most prominently defended by 
O’Neill and Karl Ameriks. I engage more thoroughly with Ameriks’s version in the rest 
of the chapter, given his explicit polemic with the Korsgaard–type view I sketched 
above. O’Neill’s interpretation is useful, however, to the extent that it expands upon my 
previous analysis of the difficulties surrounding Kantian autonomy, when we confuse 
the role of the agent with the role reserved for reason in the account. As O’Neill 
explains, Kant “predicates autonomy not of agents or acts, but of the will and 
determinations of the will, of principles, of reason”. In grounding autonomy in reason 
rather than in the agent, it is difficult to see how Kantian autonomy can be an example 
of contemporary accounts of autonomy “which focus on agents and their procedures for 
choosing” instead.62 
 
This Kantian emphasis on reason is rehabilitated by Ameriks via his analysis of 
what it is to be a law, and more specifically, what it is to be a law of reason. Ameriks is 
                                                
60 Kleingeld (2018), pp. 7, 6. 
61 For a discussion of the differences between ‘voluntarism’ and ‘intellectualism’ about law see 
Schneewind (1998), Chapter 1. 
62 O’Neill (1990), p. 110. 
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adamant in warning us that the sense of ‘prescription’ underlying Kant’s conception of 
law should not be confused with that of “a literal process of making”, less so with a 
making on the part of the agent.63 Such an understanding of law as a literal making or 
God-like ex-nihilo act of creation tends to place the authority of law in the human mind. 
But Kant is aware that the necessity and universality proper to law could not emanate 
from the ‘finite and receptive’ human mind. This “nonstarter” approach to Kantian law-
making, as Ameriks calls it, seems to me to underlie the Korsgaard–type interpretations 
of the law as an act of ‘self’ making.64 This radical form of constructivism65 misses an 
important point: it does not correspond to Kant’s distinctive understanding of reason as 
the only capacity capable of “making” laws with the required universality and necessity. 
I will unpack this claim in two parts, first by explicating what it means, and second by 
presenting the polemical aspect of Ameriks’s defence of it. 
 
With regard to the first point, the kind of act reason does when it prescribes the 
law reflects one of two forms of reasoned determination: when reason prescribes the 
moral law to the rational and finite human will, it does so with a “demanding status” 
contrary to its non-demanding use when it prescribes mere rules of skills or counsels. 
What ultimately matters for Kant is reason’s “specific kind of action” when it prescribes 
law with the required demandingness.  
 
The paradigmatic case of this kind of prescription is, for Kant, that of moral 
determination. As Ameriks understands Kant, when reason legislates morally, it 
legislates laws “that are expressed as having some kind of strictly necessary and 
therefore demanding, rather that optional character”.66 I think this coheres with my 
previous discussion about the normative standing of the will to law. I argued that we 
can never be wholly indifferent to the demands of morality. Of course, it is ‘optional’ to 
us to act or not to act in accordance with what the moral law demands; however, what is 
moral, i.e., right, is never, optional. Moreover, this distinctive act of reason should not 
                                                
63 Ameriks (2017) ‘On Universality, Necessity and Law’, p. 42. 
64 Ibid., p. 41. 
65 My aim here is not to adjudicate whether Kant should be rightly understood as a constructivist 
about moral laws, but rather to understand the specific way in which reason legislates the law to itself. 
On some compelling criticisms of Korsgaard’s version of constructivism see O’Shea (2013). 
66 Ameriks (2017), p. 42. 
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be confused with “mere spontaneity of action as such”. Ameriks does not say much 
more on this point. However, I believe that his rejection of reason’s capacity for 
“spontaneity”, as the act that explains lawgiving, is another way of reinforcing the idea 
that reason “prescribes” the law instead of “making” the law out of an act of pure 
spontaneity.  
 
In short, for Ameriks, this act of prescription on the part of reason must not be 
mistakenly attributed to the spontaneous activity of a self or agent. As he goes on to 
argue, “to say that reason prescribes morality as a law” means that it cannot prescribe it 
“out of some contingent matter concretely within a person, such as the mere desire of an 
individual human agent to preserve an identity”.67 I cannot help but suspect that 
Korsgaard’s account of self-constitution and identity is what is lurking in the back of 
these particular remarks, and further comments Ameriks makes seem to confirm this, as 
we are about to see. 
 
Let me now turn to my second point, regarding the polemical aspect of 
Ameriks’s reading. In discussing this “desire of the human agent to preserve an 
identity”, Ameriks makes an explicit reference to a tendency, “especially in the 
Anglophone tradition”, to misunderstand Kant’s principle of autonomy as presented in 
the Groundwork and elsewhere. This misunderstanding seemingly consists in the 
temptation to suppose that for Kant, autonomy is “literally some kind of extra force 
attaching to ordinary beings as such (either individually or as species), that is, as 
human and finite rule-givers”.68 As I understand it, this “extra force” attached to human 
beings is equated to a power to make the law for oneself. Moreover, this tendency is 
bound to involve the controversial assumption that if we make the law, then we must be 
the ones who legislate it. Here we can see the deep philosophical implications of, on the 
one hand, giving priority to the agential perspective instead of reason’s own, and on the 
other hand, favouring an original act of ‘making’ over the sense of ‘prescription’ I have 
here defended.  
 
                                                
67 Ameriks (2017), p. 44. 
68 Ibid., pp. 43–44, my emphasis. 
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This particular tendency identified by Ameriks finds its clearest expression in 
Korsgaard’s predicament, according to which, given that we are reflexive beings, we are 
“condemned to choice and action”, and as such, to constitute our agency in light of this 
“extra force” for autonomy that Ameriks is describing. To be a moral agent is, strictly 
speaking, to be able to impose on oneself a principle not “from outside, for it has no 
reason to accept such a principle, but one that is its own”.69  
 
But who or what is this “own” that both makes and legislates the law? In line 
with what I have argued thus far, it is not the agent nor the human will, but the will as 
reason. Part of the difficulty of accepting this claim can be explained by the tendency of 
“Anglophone philosophers” (of which Korsgaard is a clear representative), to 
understand practical reason as something different (possibly a reasoning capacity in 
practical matters) from the specifically technical meaning the term Wille bears for Kant. 
As Ameriks concludes, Wille is “nothing other than the faculty of being able to 
formulate and appreciate, and thus make it possible in principle to act on, the lawfulness 
of practical law as such”.70 
 
I suggest that this way of interpreting Kant’s complex account of moral willing 
has three benefits: first, it gives central place to the idea that reason is subject to laws of 
its own, thereby incorporating the element of lawfulness and the defence of the pure 
motivational force of reason discussed at the beginning of the chapter. Secondly, the 
idea of prescription of law coheres with Kant’s attribution of a distinct kind of inner 
causality to the will as reason. Finally, it leaves behind the merely etymological use of 
autonomy as self-legislation, by putting in its place the idea of reason as the only faculty 
in Kant with the capacity for “prescribed lawfulness”. I agree with Ameriks that this 
lawfulness is “not just something that happens to apply to a being” like an inheritance, 
but “it is to be understood as prescribed or ‘self-determined’ by reason to itself”.71 As 
                                                
69 Korsgaard (2009), p. 213.  
70 Ameriks (2017), p. 44. 
71  Ameriks (2017), p. 43. Note that Ameriks is here offering the literal translation of 
‘selbstgesetzgebend’ in the crucial passage on autonomy and legislation in G 4:431. This prescribing 
capacity of reason resembles s’s own understanding of autonomy of reason in Kant as a matter of 
“lawgivings of reason.” These lawgivings, combining the formal requirement of lawlikeness, with the 
scope requirements of universality are the way, O’Neill suggests, to understand “Kant’s distinctive 
use of the metaphor of self-legislation.” O’Neill (1990), p. 119. 
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we will see in the rest of the thesis, this prescribed lawfulness will emanate from the 
rightful source of legislation that is the Public Will. 
The political implications of autonomy as self-legislation 
To conclude: there are systematic reasons for clarifying Kant’s notion of autonomy in 
his moral philosophy, in order to distinguish it from the role it plays in his political 
philosophy, if it plays any role at all. To anticipate, Kant’s public and external model of 
political willing will need to account for how public law is legislated. A very different 
picture of politics emerges if we think that in order to retain autonomous agency, we 
need to commit to a view of legislation as collective legislation. I will argue that in spite 
of a widespread defence of this view in the secondary literature, this is not the model of 
legislation which Kant defends in his political account of the will.  
 
There are at least two problematic consequences which arise when we read 
autonomy as self- or collective legislation: first, its over-demanding view of the self as a 
self-constituting agent seems to be generalised and applied to a view of political agency, 
which is equally demanding and moralised. According to this view, the moral 
perfectibility of individuals is a precondition of achieving desired political ends. In 
other words, the realisation of a peaceful republic is dependent upon the capacity of 
individuals to shape and transform themselves into better moral agents. This is most 
clearly illustrated by those who see Kant’s political philosophy as an extension of his 
philosophy of history.72 Secondly, identifying autonomy with self-legislation carries the 
delicate implication that the law is only justified when we self-legislate it. Politically, 
this implies that it is only when we legislate collectively, i.e., when we legislate directly 
and not through an externally constituted Public Will, that we are genuinely obligated to 
the law.73 As we will see in the rest of this thesis, this is not Kant’s view.  
                                                
72 I discuss these readings in detail in Chapter 5, section I, ‘Politics as a Kingdom of Ends’. Cf. Reath 
(2006), and Ypi (forthcoming). 
73 For example, Wolff defends Kant’s notion of autonomy as a notion relating to the integrity of 
individual moral judgment over the arbitrary impositions of positive law. Accordingly, Kant’s concept 
of autonomy involves a duty, of taking responsibility for our actions, by figuring out for ourselves 
what we ought to do. For the autonomous person “there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as a 
command”, and because submission to public authority involves doing certain things just because the 
extant legal authority tells you to do them, it seems to follow that we are required, on the basis of 
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However, all is not lost. I suggest at least two ways in which to counter-balance 
the above implications: first, we can offer systematic and exegetical reasons for why the 
notion of autonomy is not present in Kant’s later political writings. This view has been 
forcefully defended by Kleingeld, for whom the notion of autonomy in the Groundwork 
served as a political analogy only up to 1793.74 Second, we can offer philosophical 
reasons why extending the notion of autonomy as self-legislation to political legislation 
fails to acknowledge Kant’s account of external coercion as a fundamental achievement 
of his mature political thought. In his later Doctrine of Right, Kant understood that 
direct government by means of collective legislation is not the only way we can 
guarantee the legitimacy of a system of laws. In this work, he offers an alternative 
account of public will, safeguarding the legitimacy of law and the justification of 
political obligations through the notion of an omnilateral will. I will explore such views 
and others in the following chapters. I will ultimately claim that that it is the notion of 
the will as reason [Wille], and not autonomy, that is the link between Kant’s moral and 
political philosophy. 
4. Morality as conflict: finitude and plurality 
In this chapter, a systematic account of moral willing in Kant’s practical philosophy has 
been developed. The aim has been to understand the different aspects involved in the 
notion of the will, both as reason [Wille] and as choice [Willkür] in Kant’s ethical 
writings. I have interpreted the human will as a capacity to stand in a particular relation 
to the law, i.e., the reflexive stance of agents with respect to their own representations. 
The source of this law turns out to be none other than reason, whose voice is “so 
irrepressible, and so audible even to the most common human beings”. It is reason 
which legislates this law to itself, through an act of autonomy. This law is then 
prescribed to the finite human will. [CPrR 5:35; G 4:431] 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Kantian autonomy, to reject all authority, on the basis that “the primary obligation of man is 
autonomy, the refusal to be ruled”. These kinds of interpretations are bound to arrive at the following 
conclusion: “It would seem that anarchism is the only political doctrine consistent with the virtue of 
autonomy”. Wolff (1970), p. 18. 
74 For the extended argument see Kleingeld (2018), pp. 61-80. 
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In this final section, the focus will shift from the perspective of the will to the 
perspective of the embodied moral agent. The question which will be addressed is this: 
what does morality feel like to beings like us? Is our inherent capacity to will what is 
right a given or a struggle? Kant writes that “in so far as [we] are beings affected by 
needs and sensible motives”, pure willing presents us with a conflict. [CPrR 5:32] This 
chapter began by arguing that if morality is to be possible at all, we must have the 
capacity to meet its demands. By asking what morality feels like to beings like us, I 
suggest we turn to Kant’s insistence that we are deeply “dependent” beings who can 
never “be altogether free from desires and inclinations”, yet who also have the capacity 
to be open to be determined by law, independently of those desires and inclinations.  
 
Kant views this as a never-ending struggle, explicitly calling it a “moral 
disposition in conflict” [CPrR 5:84]. I believe this expression captures very clearly the 
idea that for Kant, as agents with wills, we are inevitably confronted with a conflict of 
sorts. In the case of individual morality, the conflict is with our own sets of grounds of 
determination. In the case of political morality, by contrast, the conflict arises from the 
fact that our will as choice becomes a morally constraining condition on the scope of 
other people’s agency. More will be said on how this morally constraining condition 
arises, and how Kant conceives of it within the context of the state of nature in Chapter 
3.  
 
My final remarks here will be limited not to political conflict, but to the question 
of whether there is a legitimate space in Kant’s thought to speak of moral conflict. In 
what sense is our “moral disposition in conflict” if the moral law speaks with an 
“irrepressible” voice? Strictly speaking, a “tension between duty and inclination is ever-
present in [Kant’s] ethical writings”, Timmermann warns us, but “not conflict between 
divergent moral claims”. He argues for this claim by distinguishing between a 
psychological and a normative dimension in human beings. According to Timmermann, 
there can certainly be psychological conflict between duty and enticing immoral 
options. However, there are no normatively valid reasons to violate morality for the 
sake of any alternative and contingent motive. There can be no normative conflict in the 
agent as such. What this means is that duty, as the only determining ground when we 
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are speaking of moral willing, cannot stand in conflict with any other motives, since 
“duty renders any conflicting inclination-based consideration, whether immediate or 
long-term, normatively invalid”.75  
 
This seems correct, at least from the perspective of the will as reason. But is the 
experience of morality conflict-free from the perspective of the agent? Kant emphasises 
that from the agent’s perspective, this experience requires inner necessitation [G 4:413] 
Kant’s real insight into the nature of morality reveals that we are beings capable of 
constraining our wills in this way, and that we do so freely and without external 
coercion, even if we experience this as a conflict. It follows that if there is a conceptual 
space regarding moral conflict, then it must arise in the experience of an agent who is 
aware of morality’s demands, but who still ponders on what to do. The “seeming 
conflict” Kant thinks we are prone to get entangled in, is to mistakenly think that 
happiness and morality can somehow be negotiated. [CPrR 5:115, my emphasis]  
 
However, the picture is more complicated. Kant does not fully dismiss talk of 
conflict in relation to moral matters, even though he accepts that strictly speaking, there 
is only one moral law, and no conflicting alternative candidates are as such available. 
The impression that morality is free from conflict arises easily enough if we limit 
ourselves to the account in the Groundwork. In this earlier work, the idea of moral 
conflict is much less present than it is in, for example, the Critique of Practical Reason.  
 
There are at least two reasons for this: first, in the context of the Groundwork, 
Kant is assuming that we are already ‘on board’ with the idea of morality. As such, this 
conflict does not arise from deciding to act from duty or from sensible inclinations, but 
rather lies in asking ourselves whether morality accepts any exceptions. Secondly, in 
this work, Kant adopts the perspective of “common moral cognition”, a cognition which 
assumes that the demands of morality are, in some way, transparent to the agent.76 
 
                                                
75 Timmermann (2013) ‘Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory’, pp. 36–37 
76 On the role of common moral cognition in Kant, see Sticker (2017). 
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This view of morality as conflict-free stands in contrast both to the style and 
approach of the second Critique. Here, Kant offers a technical definition of moral 
conflict, one repeatedly referred to as “practical” in nature.77 This practical conflict 
arises in the “perplexing speculations of the schools”, and in their ambition to present 
“the principle of one’s own happiness” as a possible determining ground of the will, in 
“direct opposition” to the principle of morality. This conflict “would ruin morality 
altogether”, and so the efforts of this work are directed at safeguarding duty’s position 
as the only determining ground of moral willing [CPrR 5:35].  
 
To the extent that morality is a challenge for us, and not a given, there is a sense 
in which it presents itself as a source of conflict to human beings. If morality were 
already disclosed to us via a set of predetermined rules, like a moral cookbook, the 
moral worth of actions would lose all its force. I believe there is a tendency in the 
literature to obscure this aspect of Kant’s moral philosophy, by favouring a version of 
the moral law that is a matter of ‘choosing’ rather than one of ‘judging’ what to do. 
According to my reading, it is from a first-personal perspective that we judge, instead of 
choose, what is the right thing to do, and in so doing we experience this inescapable 
conflict of agency.78 As Kant says, the existence of the moral law and its power to 
influence the human will, “of course still requires a power of judgment sharpened by 
experience, partly to distinguish in what cases they are applicable…and [obtain] the 
momentum for performance.” [CJ 5:432] 
 
That morality involves an appeal to judgment, thus remaining an ongoing 
struggle for us, is even more evident in Kant’s habitual appeal to a contrast between the 
                                                
77 Cf. CPrR 5:28, 5:32. 
78 I believe this model of ‘choosing what is right’ instead of ‘judging what the right thing to do is’ also 
has implications when taken as an interpretation of Kant’s political philosophy. This interpretation 
aligns Kant closely with Rousseau. The link with Rousseau can be seen in Kant’s claim that we will 
always ‘get it right’ when willing the common good. Willing the common good assumes that we have 
adopted the perspective of the general will (volonté générale), and not the perspective of the private 
will or the mere ‘will of all’ (volonté de tous). In contrast with this reading, we should recall Kant’s 
insistence that (a) the judgment of moral politicians should be honed with practice, and (b) these 
magistrates in office will be tasked with judging what is “right” (Rechts). Just as in morality, there is 
no ‘given’ in politics for Kant: it is a task for finite beings with judgment and will. For a contrast 
between Kant’s and Rousseau’s accounts on these issues see Chapter 4, sec. III ‘Moral features of 
Public Will: Omnilaterality and Coercion’.  
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human will and the holy will.79 To the extent that our will is human and finite, our 
relationship with the law is always mediated by an imperative. Through the holy will, 
we can see more clearly just how the limitations of our will place us in a constant 
struggle. For a holy will, “no imperatives hold… the ‘ought’ is out of place here, 
because volition is of itself necessarily in accord with the law” [G 4:414]. However, the 
fact that we are not holy does not mean that we are incapable of doing what is right: 
there is no value in being angels, but in becoming agents. 
 
In the next chapter we take a definite step into the sphere of Kant’s politics. I 
discuss the role of the will as reason, and the role of the human will within the context 
of Kant’s political teleology. From this perspective, the structure of the will is re-
interpreted in light of the specific constraints and demands that arise when we move 
from being one single agent with a moral conscience, to living among many agents in 
the context of the political life. In this sense, we take a step from individuality to 
plurality.  
  
                                                
79 One could argue that the normative role played by the ‘holy will’ in the ethical writings, as a 
standard of moral perfection, runs parallel to the ideality of the perfect republic in the political 
philosophy, as a criterion against which our deficient empirical republics strive to resemble. On 
Kant’s specific account of the holy will see Callanan (2014). 
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Chapter 2 
Conflict and Teleology 
Introduction 
From morality to politics via teleology 
In Chapter 1, I developed an analysis of moral willing by examining the structure of the 
will in Kant’s practical philosophy. I focused on three features: (i) law-governedness, 
(ii) causality, and (iii) autonomy. The human will [Willkür], was defined as the capacity 
to act in accordance with the representation of laws, with the causal power to determine 
itself in accordance with those laws. The laws in question emanate from the capacity of 
reason [Wille] to be pure practical reason. Reason is then attributed with the power to 
prescribe such laws to the human will, by means of inner necessitation. When the agent 
determines herself in accordance with reason [Wille], she calls these laws her own. Kant 
refers to this prescription of reason as “the property of the will to be autonomous.” [G 
4:440]  
 
I also argued in favour of the thesis according to which Kant understands our 
moral life as animated by an unavoidable conflict. This conflict is experienced as a 
tension between the idea of duty on the one hand, and the influence of our desires and 
inclinations on the other. This conflict, Kant believes, manifests itself at the level of our 
phenomenal experience. Once we are ‘in tune’ with the demands of morality, the 
conflict dissolves, thereby allowing us to hear the only source that is pure in our will, 
namely, the moral law.  
 
In what follows, I move from the sphere of individual morality to the sphere of 
politics. I begin by providing a sense of the bigger picture. My aim in the rest of this 
thesis is to trace the philosophical steps Kant took to develop an account of political 
willing. My central claim is thus twofold: first, to demonstrate that Kant shares Hobbes’ 
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approach to politics as a sphere that is inherently conflictive, defined by the 
interdependency and mutually-affecting choices of individuals. Second, to explain how, 
for Kant, the unavoidability of conflict in political life raises a question regarding the 
role of the will in the lawful ordering of this form of interaction. I argue that Kant’s 
political philosophy must be read as an effort to establish an account of willing which 
can rightfully coerce the limits of individuals’ choices in order to make political agency 
possible. Kant develops this form of political willing through his notion of a ‘Public 
Will’. 
 
In order to shift from individual morality to politics, two important philosophical 
differences must be highlighted. First, moral legislation is defined by the adoption of a 
first-personal perspective on maxims. The individual asks herself the question, ‘what is 
the morally right thing to do?’, thereby restricting her judgment to the sphere of her 
inner moral life. By contrast, political agency is enacted in strict relation to others via 
the effects of our actions. The relational character of this form of legislation contrasts 
radically with the individual nature of moral willing. A second difference concerns the 
external as opposed to the internal character of political agency. The individual’s will as 
a power of choice [Willkür], regardless of their intentions, limits the scope of other 
people’s choices. From the perspective of individual morality, however, we judge moral 
worth by focusing on our intentions, and not on the external consequences of our 
actions. Acknowledging these systematic differences requires stepping away from the 
bounds of inner morality, into the expansive sphere of Kantian politics. 
 
Before we turn to Kant’s politics, though, we must consider an intermediary 
sphere of inquiry between Kant’s moral philosophy and his political philosophy, 
namely, teleology. In this chapter, I explain why exactly Kant makes a detour into 
teleology, and how he believed it helped him answer the following: if human agency, by 
definition, implies that individuals affect the agency of others through their choices, is 
there a form of willing that could order, or at least, limit, these clashes? 
 
I offer an answer to the above question by tracing Kant’s peculiar strategy, 
according to which nature is viewed as an agential source endowed with a will, capable 
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of ordering, harnessing, and coercing the conflict arising from human beings’ choices. 
Kant’s appeal to a teleology of nature provides him with a useful explanatory device to 
construct two aspects of his account of political willing. The first aspect of this account 
arises from the assumption that politics is a conflictive sphere of antagonisms, coupled 
with Kant’s claim that the possibility of achieving an alternative state of concord or 
harmony does not, and cannot, depend upon people’s moral disposition to do so. 
Second, if human conflict is supposed to be confined to the precincts of rightful 
institutions – a juridical condition – then this political solution must be willed through a 
public model of legislation in order to be legitimate. I present this model of public 
legislation in Chapter 4. However, it is the aim of this chapter to trace the philosophical 
resources that a political teleology had to offer for Kant’s investigation of the nature of 
public willing. I conclude that a teleology of nature offers an alternative explanation as 
to how this form of willing could be achieved, even in the absence of individual’s 
disposition to do so “out of their own accord” [TP 8:310]. 
 
There are at least three appealing features of a teleological way of thinking about 
human history, which speak to Kant’s account of political willing. Firstly, as a theory of 
ends, teleology understands human agency in history as in line with primarily political 
ends. As Kant states in Idea for Universal History, the greatest problem for the human 
species “is the achievement of a civil society universally administering right”, 
something “to which nature compels him” [IUH 8:22]. 
 
This brings me to the second favourable feature of teleology: Kant’s appeal to 
nature allows him to test out, as it were, the basic elements of a form of willing which is 
strictly political. Endowing nature with a will of its own highlights the coercive power 
which a public will, i.e., a will distinct from the private and unilateral will of 
individuals, must have in order to establish the required political institutions. In this 
way, teleology provides Kant with the opportunity to theorise a will which can both (i) 
force individuals to limit their choices in ways they would otherwise resist, given their 
self-seeking inclinations; and (ii) subject these choices to the requirements of political 
and legal institutions.  
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This strategy also highlights the constraints that come with transforming nature 
into an agent who actively intervenes in human affairs. From Kant’s perspective, 
therefore, the third attractive feature of teleology is negative in the sense that it 
demonstrates the shortcomings of transposing features – such as the power to coerce – 
to a non-human yet natural (in the strict sense) source.  
 
As I will argue in the following chapters, Kantian political willing must explain 
these three appealing features, that are here problematised from a teleological 
perspective. Kant’s account must be capable of justifying the coercive power of a will 
which can legitimately compel the limits of individual exercises of freedom in 
accordance with public, universal law. I suggest that Kant’s political teleology may 
fruitfully be read as gesturing towards some of the challenges and problems involved in 
his notion of political willing. First, Kant’s appeal to nature as an agent that wills this or 
that to happen for the benefit of the human species, gestures towards the power of 
Public Will to limit, by means of public legislation, the agency of each to guarantee the 
exercise of the agency of all. Second, the idea of unsocial sociability in the context of 
Kant’s teleology, captures the way he views the juridical condition as a home for a 
diversity of ends, so long as they are compatible with the strict requirements of law. 
 
I will therefore put forward an analysis of what I term ‘the Harnessing Model’ of 
conflict in Kant’s political teleology. This explanatory model works by means of two 
interrelated mechanisms: (i) the compulsion of nature, and (ii) the counter-acting 
mechanism of unsocial sociability. These mechanisms should not be understood as 
competing alternatives vis-à-vis how a political teleology achieves its goals. Instead, I 
view them as complementary steps in the construction of Kant’s account of political 
willing. I offer a critical analysis of the philosophical deficiencies of conceiving of 
Nature as a teleologically informed agent, followed by a defence of the benefits of 
understanding political agency as an open-ended sphere, similar to the way we counter-
act the social and unsocial tendencies of human nature. 
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1. The puzzle 
We frequently find expressions in Kant’s teleological writings describing nature as 
intervening, compelling, coercing, using, and arranging states of affairs in the empirical 
world. This should give us reason to worry. Nature, Kant tells us, “despotically wills” 
that people should live everywhere on earth, in order to guarantee the development of 
commerce and the evolution of the species. The success of human progress is further 
attributed “not so much [to] what we do” but instead to what “nature will do in and with 
us to force us onto a track we would not readily take of our own accord” [PP 8:364; TP 
8:310, my emphasis]. 
 
Furthermore, nature is wise in foreseeing and explaining things that our finite 
agency precludes us from observing. Similar to the kind of necessitation Kant attributes 
to the individual human will when it acts in accordance with duty, “the great artist 
nature” must be “regarded as necessitation by a cause the laws of whose operation are 
unknown to us”, and whose ends affect the totality of the human race. What is 
interesting for our purposes is how Kant assumes (a) that this wisdom is concerned with 
the ordering of human conflict, and (b) the fact that such order must come from a will, 
even if not the individual human will. In Perpetual Peace he views the task as one of 
“letting concord arise by means of the discord between human beings even against their 
will” [PP 6:381]. 
 
But how should we understand Kant’s obscure remarks about nature willing 
such and such? My hypothesis is that Kant’s references to nature as an agent endowed 
with a will with the capacity to intervene in human affairs should be understood as an 
explanatory device. Such device allows him to give expression to the features of an 
embryonic account of political willing, that will be later stripped from the teleological 
assumptions endorsed here. Kant’s ‘nature wills it so’ argument gives rise to the 
problem of finding a coercive power which can legitimately compel the limits of free 
agent’s choices, in light of everyone’s right to the same thing. 
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To be clear, Kant does not think that nature actually forces people do the things 
they ought to do in order to respect others’ free agency, e.g., to prevent us from using 
one another’s property, or to encourage us to develop our talents in ways which enrich 
society as a whole. All these things are indeed necessary steps to achieving the ultimate 
political ends informing our moral vocation as a species, but they have to originate in 
the actual agency of individuals here and now. Kant’s language of nature having a ‘will’ 
and acting in the name of individuals is rather metaphorical. 
 
I suspect, however, that this metaphorical talk has more to do with philosophical 
limitations he faced at this point of the development of his thinking than with mere 
rhetorical amusement. As mentioned in the introduction, Kant has not yet fully 
developed crucial concepts of his political philosophy, such as the notion of external 
freedom versus internal freedom, ominlateral versus unilateral will, or public versus 
private willing, concepts which are fundamental to the later account of politics in the 
Doctrine of Right.80 At the time of his teleological writings, (writings which, of course, 
are also political essays at heart), Kant offers us an account based on nature’s role that is 
capable of explaining some of the challenges we encounter in the mere fact of living 
side by side with others. 
 
The way Kant thinks teleologically about nature thus presents this problem of 
externality and relationality in its crudest of forms. Nature here takes on agential powers 
to co-ordinate the conditions necessary for engendering a state of peace, civil security 
and sociability. If we understand these agential powers literally, Kant would appear to 
be committed to an untenable form of providentialism, very alien to his philosophical 
method. Instead he warns us that in order to understand nature’s teleological role in 
appeasing human conflict, we must “make for ourselves a concept of [its] possibility by 
analogy with actions of human art” [PP 6:364]. If this suggestion is correct, Kant is 
expressing, in teleological terms, a model of will determination which can account for 
the demands of a distinctively political, as opposed to a moral, form of legislation, 
                                                
80 I explore these notions in detail in Chapter 4, sec. I, ‘The limitations of universal willing’, and sec. 
III., ‘Moral features of Public Will’. 
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endorsed with the task of drawing the limits of our agency. Nature is, at this point in 
Kant’s thinking, assigned with this task. 
 
So the puzzle that concerns us for the remainder of this chapter can be 
articulated as follows: assuming that human beings do not possess the required 
dispositions and inclinations to give up their “unconstrained freedom” for moral 
reasons, what or who can embody an omnilateral will capable of legitimately coercing 
the limits of our freedom accordingly? Nature, I argue, is Kant’s preferred notion for 
carrying out this delicate job. It is thus by analogy that we must understand Kant when 
he says “that nature wills irresistibly that right should eventually gain supremacy. What 
we here neglect to do eventually comes about of its own accord, though with great 
inconvenience.” [PP 6:367] If I am correct, then a reading of Kant’s political teleology 
as anticipating his desired account of political legislation may be warranted.  
 
It is important to consider, however, exactly how defensible the use of teleology 
in this moral-cum-political context is. Kant is clearly ambivalent. Certainly, he says that 
it “may be assumed that nature does not work without a plan and purposeful end”, and 
that the “thoroughly confused interplay of human affairs” is not all there is to it. Kant 
believes that “if we assume a plan of nature, we have grounds for greater hopes” and 
that this idea will prove to be “useful”, and open up “comforting prospects of a future.” 
[IUH 8:30–1] But is this position philosophically tenable? To engage with this question, 
I will first present the contours of Kant’s political teleology and its relation to the 
broader issue of conflict. Second, I articulate the mechanisms of the ‘Harnessing model’ 
of conflict resolution in Kant’s teleology to, finally, raise some objections to this 
approach. 
2. Conflict and Kant’s political teleology 
Teleology as political teleology 
So far, I have argued that Kant’s detour into teleology is motivated by two factors: first, 
he is attempting to test out a model of willing that is both external to the inner 
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motivations of the individuals, and relational, i.e., not limited to the inner world of a 
single agent. These specific features, as we will see in the mechanisms of the 
‘Harnessing model’ that is to follow, are exemplified by the notion of nature as a 
teleological agent on the one hand, and by the mechanism of unsocial sociability in 
human nature, on the other.  
 
The second factor motivating Kant’s appeal to teleology relates to his enduring 
concern with human conflict.81 In this sense, Kant’s teleology can instead be called a 
political teleology. A political teleology is a form of explanation concerned with the 
teleological structure underlying the antagonisms occurring in political life. This form 
of explanation aims to demonstrate that even if what we see at first sight is only the 
“disjoint product of unregulated freedom”, even despite our unruly nature, and “even 
amidst the arbitrary play of human freedom”, conflict can be harnessed within the limits 
of legal and political institutions. [IUH 8:30, 29]82  
 
In this section, I justify the claim that Kant addresses his preoccupation with 
human conflict through the lenses of a political teleology. In the following two sections, 
I present the two mechanisms underpinning such a political teleology. Both these 
mechanisms – nature and unsocial sociability – fall under the heading of the 
‘Harnessing model’. 
 
Kant’s teleology and his political philosophy share a common starting point in 
the way they describe the initial condition of hostility human beings find themselves in, 
absent a condition of right. In his political philosophy, Kant begins with a ‘state of 
nature’ scenario – one which is less hostile than Hobbes’ version but which is 
nevertheless one of insecurity, indeterminacy, and uncertainty. I offer a much more 
                                                
81 See Part I of Chapter 5, ‘The intellectual roots of conflict’, for my reconstruction of the intellectual 
origins of the role of conflict in the modern tradition of political thought.  
82 I should note that the emphasis on human nature, and the unruly inclinations and passions that 
furnish it, is distinctive of Kant’s discussion on teleology. As I will defend in Chapter 3, this is not the 
case in Kant’s politics. In the context of his discussion on the state of nature, it is not human nature, 
bur rather the condition of our will [Willkür], that is the source of political conflict, and hence, the 
problem to which political authority is a solution to. See Chapter 3, sec. IV, ‘The problem of the state 
of nature as a problem of the will’. 
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nuanced interpretation of this condition in Chapter 3. For now, I want to show the 
political orientation animating Kant’s teleological reflections.  
 
In the teleology, Kant portrays a scenario where human beings stand naturally at 
odds to and in conflict with each other. Plenty of passages support this reading. At 
times, Kant refers to the effort involved in establishing a state and of “the resistance that 
constantly threatens to break up this society”. This resistance is coupled with the 
difficulty we have in overcoming our “propensity to indolence”, and with man’s 
tendency to “obtain for himself a rank among his fellows”. This desire to gain a superior 
rank among our equals epitomises a predisposition in our human nature to compare and 
to “gain worth in the opinion of others”, from which arises “an unjust desire to acquire 
superiority for oneself” over them. This “wild lawlessness (in relation to other human 
beings)” results in a fundamental animosity between human beings. Human beings seek 
“to arrange the conflict of their un-peaceable dispositions”, but with very little success. 
To be sure, were our initial condition one of “perfect concord, self-sufficiency and 
mutual love”, a teleological explanation of why and how we move beyond this initial 
animosity would be unnecessary. A teleological explanation, in my view, is only needed 
if we assume that human interaction is not naturally one of concord and harmony, but 
one similar to the condition described by a state of nature. [IUH 8:20–21; Rel 6:27; PP 
8:366] 
 
However, the description of this initial, conflict-ridden, condition remains a 
source of dispute in the secondary literature. Some commentators interpret the state of 
nature as part of Kant’s empirical anthropology,83 or as the material furnishing a “well 
worked-out theory of human nature and its history”.84 Other, less sympathetic readers 
have identified Kant’s observations as “unfortunate relics” of eighteenth-century 
debates on historical pessimism, fashionable at the time in Germany,85 or as Kant’s 
capitulation to Hobbesian elements in his political philosophy.86  
                                                
83 See Louden (2011) and Frierson (2013). 
84 Wood (1991). 
85 Ameriks (2009). 
86 Astorga (1999), p. 375. 
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In contrast to these lines of interpretation, I believe that Kant’s talk of the 
conflict between individuals raises a deeper issue regarding the relational nature of this 
conflict. As I will argue more extensively in Chapter 3, my claim is that the frictions 
which result from our “folly”, “childish vanity” and “rage to destruction” are rooted in 
the lawless condition of our will (a ‘stato iniusto’), absent public law. Human conflict 
for Kant is, I believe, rooted in a question about the will, and not in a question about the 
way we are, i.e., our human nature. This is not to deny that our animosity is also 
anchored in anthropological aspects of our humanity. However, conflict should be 
understood in Kant as constitutive of human relations to the extent that it arises from the 
unavoidable limits we place upon each other’s capacity for choice [Willkür], and the 
way it requires us to subject these relations under a universal law [IUH 8:18, 26].87 
 
If we accept this relational reading of conflict as constitutive of our inter-
dependent agency, we are left with two options: either to conclude that conflict, being 
constitutive of the way we will, remains unsolvable (from this perspective, “our self-
seeking pretensions” render prospects for a lasting political order futile [IUH 8:21]). Or 
one can take the view that conflict does not preclude the possibility of a law-governed 
order. My claim here is that Kant pursues the second of these two possibilities as his 
working assumption when dealing with political agency. More specifically, my claim is 
that the working assumption of his political teleology is that human conflict is open to a 
form of resolution,88 and that teleology can show why conflict is not intrinsically 
unsolvable.  
 
A political teleology, so the argument goes, should be capable of explaining why 
the antagonistic character of our experience, which at first glance seems lawless and 
                                                
87 Kant defines this duty to state entrance as follows: “So, unless it wants to renounce any concepts of 
right, the first thing it has to resolve upon is the principle that it must leave the state of nature, in 
which each follows its own judgment, unite itself with all others (with which it cannot avoid 
interacting), subject itself to a public lawful external coercion, and so enter into a condition in which 
what is to be recognised as belonging to it is determined by law and is allotted to it by adequate power 
(not its own but an external power); that is, it ought above all else to enter a civil condition.” [DofR 
6:312, emphasis in the original] 
88 On the possibility of conflict resolution in individual moral willing see Chapter 1, section IV 
‘Morality as conflict: finitude and plurality.’ On the openness of political conflict to rightful ordering 
see Chapter 4, sec. II, ‘What is Public Will?’, and Chapter 5, sec. III, ‘The dialectic of conflict and 
politics in Kant’. 
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arbitrary, does not preclude the possibility of attributing law-governedness to our 
agency. But the task is not that simple: in his moral philosophy, Kant begins with the 
assumption that we are predisposed by neither instinct nor inclination to do what we 
ought to do, even if we have the capacity to do so. Similarly, in the political sphere, our 
inclinations oppose us “to one another in the antagonism of [our] freedom”, a freedom 
which allows us to act in accordance with principles of reason, but also allows us to act 
contrary to them [TP 8:306]. Thus, even if we can forecast a possible development 
towards lawfulness, there is no ultimate guarantee that we will, as a species, act 
accordingly. Hence, a teleological approach to conflict is attractive from a Kantian 
perspective, to the extent that it makes available a purposefully directed ordering plan, 
on the assumption that nature as an agent with foresight and wisdom can shape and re-
model this unavoidable animosity.  
 
On the basis of these assumptions, we are able to articulate Kant’s challenge: a 
successful political teleology must (i) be able to identify some kind of agent – human 
beings, Nature, Providence, Reason – with the capacity to shape the antagonistic 
patterns of human behaviour, and (ii) attribute an ordering principle to this agency, on 
the basis of which we can read our actions as the result of a coherent, teleologically 
oriented plan. As Kant states in an early essay on political teleology: 
Here, there is no other way out for the philosopher – who, regarding human beings 
and their play in the large, cannot at all presuppose any rational aim of theirs – than 
to try whether he can discover an aim of nature in the nonsensical course of things 
human. [IUH 8:18] 
Some have observed “a measure of theoretical adventurousness in Kant’s 
historical teleology that might unnerve a traditional empiricist”.89 However, the way in 
which this “aim of nature” might actually be brought about, given that human beings by 
and large remain oblivious to it, needs to be examined as something more than mere 
“theoretical adventurousness”. I argue that the teleology of nature is designed to explain 
how we can channel, control, exploit or render useful the conflicts that stand in the way 
of human progress. My claim is that Kant appeals to nature as a prototypical political 
                                                
89 Wood (2006), p. 259. 
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will capable of overcoming the obstacles placed by human obstinacy, and to bring about 
the moral end which they ought, but often fail, to pursue. 
3. The ‘harnessing’ model 
The understanding of conflict I have sketched above, namely as (i) resulting from 
interaction and (ii) open to be ordered, is central to what I term the ‘Harnessing Model’. 
The term ‘harnessing’ commonly refers to fitting gear for horses which allows the rider 
to tame the animal. It is this sense of ‘constraint’ which I want to draw upon in relation 
to Kant’s teleology. The broad sense of ‘harnessing’ picks out stronger or weaker forms 
of this idea of constraint. A strong form might equate ‘harnessing’ with ‘coercion’ or 
‘compulsion’ implying that the recalcitrant element in question is controlled by force. A 
weaker sense of the term, on the other hand, could mean something closer to 
‘mobilising’, ‘domesticating’, ‘channelling’, or ‘rendering useful.’ In this dissertation, 
‘harnessing’ is a term of art I use to express the way in which I believe the teleology of 
nature operates over human conflict. In the ‘nature wills it so’ mechanism, nature 
operates along the lines of the stronger sense of harnessing as a kind of compulsion. The 
‘counter-acting’ mechanism of unsocial sociability, on the other hand, operates with a 
weaker sense of the term, namely as the channelling of opposed inclinations.  
 
Both the stronger and weaker forms of the term are present in Kant’s analysis. 
For example, Kant states that the “tense and unremitting military preparation”, as well 
as the “resultant distress” which every state feels within itself at times of war, are 
nothing but “the means by which nature drives nations” to do that which reason 
counselled them to do, namely, to “abandon a lawless state of savagery and entering a 
federation of peoples”. Here Kant attributes to nature the will to coerce states, in order 
to arrive at the peaceful condition of intra-state relations. As he puts it in Perpetual 
Peace, nature “has compelled them to enter into more or less lawful relations” [PP 
8:363, my emphasis]. 
 
In contrast to this strong sense of teleological harnessing, nature sometimes 
operates in a gentler manner. Using the example of states and war once again, Kant 
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shows that just as human beings gradually realise that the development of their talents is 
better safeguarded by a civil, rather than savage, condition, the evils of war can also 
have a “beneficial effect”. Just as nature works by means of human nature to develop 
our talents, similarly nature orients the war-like energies of states by “governing the 
actions and counter-actions of these energies, lest they should destroy one another.” 
Nature can compel states to enter into peaceful relation with one another, but it can also 
work through these tendencies by channelling their effects. [IUH: 8:24, 26; emphasis in 
the original] 
The two mechanisms 
These subtle yet significant differences between nature coercing human beings and 
states to act in particular ways, and nature channelling human nature in a manner 
beneficial to us, can be captured via two distinct mechanisms. I call the first one the 
‘Nature wills it so’ mechanism. Taking nature as a teleologically oriented agent with a 
will, nature exercises its capacity to coerce and shape events in line with the desired 
political ends of our vocation. In contrast to this coercive power of nature, I identify a 
second mechanism by which nature operates: a ‘counter-acting’ mechanism. This 
second mechanism operates not by directly forcing a state of affairs, but by making use 
of our natural “unsocial sociability”, i.e., our social and unsocial traits. With this 
‘counter-acting’ mechanism, Kant appeals to the idea of a possible counter-balance or 
corrective trade-off between the inclinations and vices which underlie conflict, “for, the 
very opposition of inclinations to one another, from which evil arises, furnishes reason a 
free play to subjugate them all and, in place of evil, which destroys itself, to establish 
the rule of good”.90 These competing principles work by means of a “principle of 
equality” between “its reciprocal effects and counter-effects, so that they may not 
destroy each other” [IUH 8:26; TP 8:312]. 
                                                
90 I trace this tradition of thinking about conflict, as a matter of ‘counter-acting’ the passions, back to a 
specific, intellectual tradition of the eighteenth century. For en extended discussion see Chapter 5, Part 
I, sec. I, ‘How to think about conflict: an appeal to a tradition in political thought’. An insightful 
account of this way of thinking, particularly in terms of the passions, can be found in Francis Bacon. 
For Bacon, opposition is the key to finding resolution and equilibrium, in science, in ethics, and, most 
importantly, in politics: “how affections are kindled and incited… how they do fight and encounter 
one with another… How (I say) to set affection against affection and to master one by another… For 
as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction against another, so it is 
in the government within” (quoted in Hirschman (1977), p. 22). 
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Making a distinction between (i) the ‘nature wills it so’ mechanism and (ii) the 
‘counter-acting’ mechanism has significant philosophical benefits which have so far 
been ignored in the literature. These two versions of the Harnessing Model are usually 
run together as Kant’s overall teleological approach to conflict in history, overlooking 
important differences between them. I will explore these differences at the end of the 
chapter, once we have offered a critical examination of their content. For now, it will 
suffice to say that the most substantive difference between these two versions of the 
Harnessing Model is their approache to the ends these mechanisms are meant to 
achieve.  
 
With the ‘nature wills it so’ mechanism, Kant locates agency in nature’s 
capacity to will order in an otherwise chaotic and meaningless chain of events. The 
crucial point here is the fact that what the will of nature wills are concrete ends which 
are pre-determined by nature’s own wisdom. These ends include a civil condition, a 
law-governed social order, and the ideal of a cosmopolitan constitution. The 
concreteness of these ends is, in turn, rooted in Kant’s claim that our species has a 
“moral vocation” to which these ends directly respond to.  
 
With the second ‘counter-acting’ mechanism, however, nature as a personified 
agent is attributed with the task of negotiating the limits imposed by human nature, by 
working out a pragmatic balance between our antagonistic and social tendencies. 
However, though nature oversees this process, it is essentially up to us what kind of 
ends will result from this internal balance of our constitution. I argue that the ends of 
this mechanism are left open: sometimes man can “threaten to break society up”, 
sometimes man displays a strong inclination “to live in society, since he feels in this 
state more like a man”. Nature certainly makes use of our antagonistic tendencies in 
order to alert us of dangers and awaken us to our true vocation. However, from the 
perspective of the individual, and not from the wise perspective of nature, our actions 
and achievements do not follow a teleological recipe. The counter-acting of the unsocial 
sociability in human nature is read here along the lines of the ‘invisible hand’ of Adam 
Smith. The result of this balancing act based on invisible incentives, is independent of a 
teleological, pre-determined, orientation. These aspects mark an important difference 
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between the two mechanisms. Moreover, I think my interpretation of Kant’s unsocial 
sociability highlights a novelty in Kant’s approach to conflict, that remains hidden 
behind the prominent role nature plays in his political teleology. [IUH 8:21, 20]  
4. A Will of Nature? Between determinism and freedom 
So far, I have argued that Kant appeals to the teleology of nature in order to resolve the 
problem of human conflict, by means of the two mechanisms of the Harnessing Model. 
However, the question remains as to how exactly a teleological approach to conflict is 
meant to solve this problem, and how the strong and weak senses of harnessing as (i) 
compulsion, and harnessing as (ii) channelling, attributed to nature can help it to 
achieve its proper aims. 
 
On my interpretation, teleology provides Kant with an explanatory framework to 
account for our moral ends. What teleology is designed to do is to counter any 
pessimism arising from the plentiful evidence regarding humanity’s unwillingness or 
inability to act in ways which ensure order rather than chaos. In adopting this 
teleological perspective, we see “what is in terms of what ought to be”.91 This latter 
definition gets right to the heart of the matter: to view something teleologically is to 
approach the nature of things in terms of their purpose, and more specifically, in terms 
of their ‘best version’. As Elisabeth Ellis suggests, from the teleological perspective 
“empirical events become explicable according to their place in the long run of history, 
even as individually willed action remains a closed book”.92  
Nature and freedom of the will 
Before critically analysing the two mechanisms of nature, I want to further develop the 
claim that Kant’s political teleology should be read as an attempt to develop an account 
of external legislation, capable of establishing the ‘best version’ of the political 
institutions where the human species can flourish and develop. To ground this claim, I 
will first discuss the difference between the will of nature and the human will in terms 
                                                
91 Fackenheim (1956) ‘Kant’s Concept of History’, p. 390 
92 Ellis (2005) Kant’s Politics. Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World, p. 47 
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of the determinism–versus–freedom issue in Kant’s metaphysics of the will. Secondly, I 
will define nature’s will against Kant’s distinctions between Wille and Willkür. 
Discussion of these two aspects will serve as a necessary preamble for the critical 
analysis of nature’s two mechanisms in the next section. 
First, it is necessary to understand the kind of relationship Kant believes exists 
between nature as a teleological agent, and human agency. To put it differently: if 
nature can both coerce and channel human agency, how are we to explain the fact that it 
is, after all, our history and our free choices and actions? How does Kant explain the 
apparent tension between a will of nature and the human will? 
 
Kant’s 1784 essay Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, 
provides us with the most appropriate context in which to explore this problem. In this 
work, Kant recalls a basic tenet of his metaphysics of the will when he states that 
“whatever concept one may form of the freedom of the will with a metaphysical aim, its 
appearances, in human actions, are determined as much as every other natural 
occurrence in accordance with universal laws of nature” [IUH 8:17].93 However, the 
fact that the empirical appearances of human actions are subject to the laws of nature 
does not preclude them from also being thought of as resulting from a will that is 
practically free, and thus subject to laws of freedom. Idea’s rational, and partly 
prospective, construction of human history is thus based on the assumption that the 
actions and choices of human beings reflect the compatibility of freedom of the will 
with the causal determinism of nature. 
 
To be sure, the compatibility of freedom and nature is a complex issue in Kant’s 
philosophy.94 All I wish to take from these basic remarks is that Kant’s political 
teleology assumes this metaphysical view, conveyed in two levels of analysis: (i) from 
the perspective of nature (understood here as the realm of physical determinism), our 
actions are read as the effects of causes in a deterministic world constrained by laws of 
nature, whilst (ii) from the perspective of nature as a teleological realm infused with 
                                                
93 I discuss Kant’s definitions of the laws of nature and the laws of freedom, in the context of a 
discussion on determinism and freedom of the will in Chapter 1, sec. I, ‘The will as a law-governed 
capacity’. 
94 On the relationship between Nature and Freedom and the so-called gulf in Kant see Guyer (2005). 
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purpose, human actions are read as part of a rational, purposeful plan, which considers 
these actions “free” even if they are subject to the will of nature. So, the purposive “aim 
of nature” Kant proposes here is not that of a system of mechanical laws. The aim of 
nature is instead to bring about the ends of our moral history, but in a way that is 
compatible with our natural history.95 
 
What I find interesting here is Kant’s attempt to make room for a different way 
of thinking about the will, under which the will is subject neither to the determinism of 
natural laws nor to a form of radical libertarianism. When Kant says that natures wills 
this or that to happen, he is carving out a conceptual space for a kind of will that cannot 
simply be captured by either of these poles. What I mean by this is that nature’s “will” 
cannot be reduced to a mere mechanism of causes and effects, nor to a will that is 
transcendentally free in the sense attributed only to a rational agent. The will of nature 
has its own lawful form, namely a purposeful form. Furthermore, it is a will that 
operates at the level of the species rather than at the level of discrete individuals.  
Nature as ‘Wille’ 
I have placed Kant’s teleology against the background of the freedom–nature gulf in 
order to suggest that Kant is attempting to find a middle way between determinism and 
libertarianism so that he may settle the moral features of a will of nature.96 Another way 
of approaching this problem is through the Willkür–Wille distinction, presented in 
Chapter 1. That Kant is thinking of the will of nature in terms different from the human 
will [Willkür], is confirmed by his insistence that whatever human beings do to appease 
                                                
95 In the section on the Analogies of Experience in the Critique, Kant defines nature as follows: “By 
nature, in the empirical sense, we understand the connection of appearances as regards their existence 
according to necessary rules, that is, according to laws.” [A 216/B 263, my emphasis] Elsewhere, 
Kant returns to this strict connection between nature and laws when he states that nature “is the 
existence of things insofar as they are determined by general laws.” The pertinent question for us is 
whether this “system of laws”, understood mechanistically (like the necessary rules informing the 
causal connection between billiard balls), is operative in his discussion of teleology, or whether he is 
instead using a different meaning of the connection between nature and lawful determination. I 
believe the latter alternative is correct if we follow Kant in treating mechanical nature from a 
teleological–cum–normative perspective within the context of his teleology [PP 8:157]. 
96 Reading Kant as an “incompatible compatibilist”, in the words of Wood, is an issue lurking in the 
background of his political teleology. However, I am here able to offer very restricted remarks on the 
relationship between his metaphysical and teleological assumptions. For an extended discussion see 
Wood (1984). For a critique of Wood’s argument see Allison (2012), pp. 41–52, 184–190. 
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conflict and achieve their moral ends, they tend to do so against “their own accord”. 
From the perspective of teleology, the individual’s Willkür is read almost like a blind 
will, which chooses and acts without a teleological plan ahead. For this reason, nature 
“has implanted the germs in our species” to develop and thrive, but we seem to 
stubbornly hold on to our freedom “without any conscious intention” to do otherwise. I 
argue that our lack of moral resolution, combined with our propensity to create conflict, 
grounds Kant’s understanding of nature’s will as closer to his notion of Wille, as a 
lawful ordering source, capable of compelling a directionality to an otherwise blinded 
human will.  
 
My claim is that Kant’s idea that nature has a will of its own, with a purposeful 
and teleological form, requires a model of determination which is neither mechanical, 
nor the available model of internal legislation defended in his moral philosophy. From 
the point of view of nature, the outcomes of political agency are explained in terms of 
nature’s own efforts to compel them. However, from the point of view of the individual, 
we are left in a somewhat strange situation: the agent will never know if the moral and 
political ends they have actually achieved are the result of caprice, moral disposition, 
accident, or of nature’s own rational plan. 
 
In sum: when trying to make sense of human freedom, Kant is faced with the 
difficulty of squaring the deterministic regularity of nature’s physical order with the 
freedom of choice of individuals. To do this, he makes room for the conceptual 
possibility of a different kind of will, which is morally informed in its aims and has the 
capacity to impose itself by means of compulsion. Kant finds such a will in nature. This 
will, I argue, embodies the feature of law-like determination and the ordering role 
attributed to reason as Wille. This approach gestures towards a nascent model of a 
political will.  
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5. The ‘nature wills it so’ mechanism 
In the previous section, I argued that Kant’s concept of Nature in the political teleology 
cannot be reduced to the idea of a physical nature subjected to natural laws. I also 
claimed that this concept, in order to carry the requisite explanatory weight, must be a 
different kind of will than will as choice [Willkür]. The closest we can come to an 
understanding to what Kant is getting at, is by appealing to the notion of Wille, or will 
as Reason, as a will that has a law-governed form, and the necessary causality to bring 
about the required moral ends. 
 
Building upon my claim that Kant develops a rudimentary version of political 
willing in attributing a will to a teleologically-understood nature, I will now investigate 
the following: how should we understand the ‘nature wills it so’ mechanism? And how 
does nature will, and most importantly, shape human affairs, in a way which responds to 
the aims of teleology? 
 
According to Kant, nature wills things – ends – for and in the name of 
individuals. To explain this, he must offer a definition of nature which is different from 
a mechanical interpretation as we discussed in the previous section. Of course, this 
expectation might be futile. As Kant notes, “the worst that can happen”, once we adopt 
this purposeful narrative, “would be that where we expected a teleological connection 
we find only a mechanical or physical connection” [A688/B716]. I argue that Kant’s 
‘nature wills it so’ mechanism emerges as a response to this challenge of determinism, 
by adopting a teleologicaly-informed notion of nature capable of infusing a purposeful 
form on events, even if our actions are physically subjected to the laws of determinism. 
A brief survey of how Kant employs this expression should help us to better understand 
how exactly Kant thinks this approach to nature can stand up to the challenge raised 
above. 
 
In Theory and Practice, Kant casts doubts on whether we can expect from 
human beings “an unending progress towards the better”. He gives up on the idea by 
stating that such a “distant success will depend not so much on what we do… but 
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instead upon what nature will do in and with us to force us onto a track we would not 
readily take out of our own accord.” [TP 8:310, emphasis in the original]  
 
The argument appears in a similar form in the earlier Idea. There, Kant appeals 
to nature’s agential power to order the external relations between individuals. Note how 
the issue of nature’s power is here explicitly presented in relation to willing: “the human 
being”, he says, “wills concord, but “nature knows better what is good for the species.” 
Willing “a perfectly just constitution” and the “development of all [human] 
predispositions” turns out to be the job of nature, “since nature also wills that humanity 
by itself should procure this along with all the ends of its vocation” [IUH 8:22]. 
 
In an equally important passage from Perpetual Peace, Kant explains how nature 
compells men to reach their moral and political ends, e.g., establishing longstanding 
republican constitutions, ends which we ought to achieve ourselves, yet often fail to 
will: 
But now nature comes to the aid of the general will grounded in reason, revered but 
impotent in practice, and does so precisely through those self-seeking inclinations, 
so that it is a matter only of a good organisation of a state (which is certainly within 
the capacity of human beings), of arranging those forces of nature in opposition to 
one another in such a way that one checks the destructive effect of the other or 
cancels it, so that the result for reason turns out as if neither of them existed at all 
and the human being is constrained to become a good citizen even if not a morally 
good human being. [PP 8:366, my emphasis] 
Here, the ‘Nature wills it so’ mechanism comes to the fore, and in direct relation 
to a problem in willing. It is particularly interesting from the perspective of the present 
thesis to see Kant mentioning the general will in the context of a teleological argument, 
and to define it as a will which is “revered but impotent in practice”. For – to briefly 
anticipate what we will discuss in greater depth in Chapter 4 -, we know that Kant will 
later attribute the capacity to establish a juridical state to the Public Will, based on the 
idea of the general will of all.97 This issue of the “good organisation of a state” is 
                                                
97 Cf. DofR 6:256; 6:312. 
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precisely the political end which comes under scrutiny here. But why is the general will 
“impotent” and unable to bring this end about? 
 
Nature, Kant suggests, “comes to the aid of the general will” by orientating the 
teleological aims which should be the proper object of willing of an appropriately 
political will, but one which remains “impotent in practice” due to our lack of moral 
resolution to bring it about.98 My contention is that at this point, Kant lacks the 
conceptual tools to account for this form of political willing, and so resorts to the 
compulsion of nature in the context of a teleological narrative. Acknowledging this 
conceptual limitation explains Kant’s otherwise questionable strategy of ‘outsourcing’ 
this form of willing to nature. 
 
The fact that nature wills, knows, and compels individuals to approximate their 
moral ends confirms our initial claim that Kant is working here with a conception of 
nature which is radically different from a scientific/mechanistic one. A system of nature 
ruled exclusively by mechanical laws could not be conceived of as expressing the 
agential capacities of willing and compulsion which Kant mentions here. To 
accommodate his aim of offering a purposeful account of human history, Kant needs to 
carve out a space for a conception of nature capable of achieving ends independently of 
the constraints of physical determinism. Yet, this nascent form of willing must, in turn, 
be open to being constrained by a different kind of determination.99 Kant refers to this 
lawful form of nature as “the plan of reason”.  
 
I conclude this section by stating the way I understand this teleological account of 
willing as political in three important senses: first, the locus of nature’s will lies in the 
external character of actions, as opposed to the intentions of individual agents. Second, 
it is based on the relational aspect of human interaction, instead of the first-personal 
                                                
98 In the later Doctrine of Right, Kant offers an argument for the legitimate use of coercion through the 
morality of the omnilateral will of the state, thereby rooting the source of lawful willing in the 
external legislation of a general will. The legitimate use of coercion remains within the precinct of 
practical reason, instead of being outsourced to Nature or Providence. I expand upon this in Chapter 4, 
sec. III ‘The moral features of Public Will: Omnilaterality and Coercion’. 
99 Recall here Kant’s working assumption in the Groundwork according to which “everything in 
nature works in accordance with laws” [G 4:412]. See Chapter 1 for an extended discussion on this 
point. 
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perspective adopted in individual moral willing. Finally, Kant attributes to nature as 
Wille a lawful form of determination, that is independent of physical determinism, 
based on the purposeful form of reason’s plan. This ‘lawful form’ is a key feature of 
Public Will, in its capacity to determine the form of law to all positive legislation. 
However, this account is not free from difficulties. Let us now turn to some possible 
objections. 
Some objections  
As I mentioned in the above, Kant’s efforts to build an account of political willing out 
of his teleology faces some problems. On a less charitable reading, Kant could be 
accused of reifying nature by attributing to it agential capacities, such as the power to 
set ends, and the causal power to achieve them independently of human intervention. 
This is problematic since as we saw in Chapter 1, Kant restricts these capacities to the 
only source which is lawful and practical, namely, reason [Wille]. 
 
In my view, this objection misses the basic orientation of Kant’s teleological 
strategy. Kant appeals to the aid of nature to achieve these ends through and with the 
intervention of individuals, who have the legitimate capacity to set ends, and the causal 
ability to pursue them. To use a metaphor: Nature does not operate over and above the 
wills of individuals, like a master in control of his marionettes, but by harnessing the 
individual’s actions and inclinations. Rather, Kant’s attribution of agent-like features to 
nature must be understood in the context of his effort to come to grips with a type of 
will which is not the human will but which can nonetheless be understood as possessing 
the agential features required by a political teleology. In other words, we must not 
confuse our discomfort with the idea of a reified nature (which is indeed present in 
Kant’s descriptions) with his efforts to conceptualise a different kind of will, capable of 
ordering ends with the required compulsion. 
 
Furthermore, the objection I expressed above raises another worry about the 
capacity of nature to set ends, an activity that Kant reserves solely to agents. To 
alleviate this problem, I suggest we turn to Kant’s own discussion of this in his 1788 
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essay ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy’. In a discussion on the 
natural history of the human races, he offers a general definition of nature as “the sum-
total of all that exists as determined by law”. The investigation of nature, Kant goes on 
to argue, can take two paths, a theoretical and a teleological path. These paths are in 
turn differentiated by the ends of their corresponding spheres of inquiry, namely, 
physics and metaphysics. As Kant explains, the investigation of nature with respect to 
physics must proceed by “using only such ends for its intention that can be known to us 
through experience”. The teleological investigation of the sphere of metaphysics, i.e., 
the sphere of human freedom, must proceed, instead, by “using for its intention, in 
accordance with its calling, only an end that is fixed through pure reason” [Telo Pri 
8:157]. 
 
 The crucial point here is that Kant restricts the end-setting capacity of a 
teleologically oriented nature to what he calls “ends of reason”. As I have suggested, 
nature is here thought of as a kind of will, in the sense of causal Wille. When natural 
ends are exhausted, the only path which remains is that of the teleology of an “end that 
is determined a priori through pure practical reason”. If all ends were determined 
empirically, there would be no room to think of human purposiveness, beyond the limits 
of physical nature, and of historical determinism. [Telo Pri 8:157-8] 
 
It is for this reason that Kant is not susceptible to the objection raised by 
hardened anti-teleologists, i.e., those who deny that there is any agent-like nature 
pursuing ends in this world independently of human purposes. As Taylor observes, 
critics of teleology “resist strenuously a move that Kant, at least, did not make: the 
argument that this real God or Nature has purposes or ends for man that it will impose 
upon him in the course of time”.100 As we have seen, Kant’s talk of ‘compelling’ 
individuals must be taken metaphorically, and the ends that nature sets itself to pursue, 
are properly understood as ends of reason, achieved with and through the aid of human 
beings. 
 
                                                
100 Taylor (1966), p. 183. 
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There is a second set of worries, however, which cast doubt on whether this 
teleological strategy is warranted. These worries relate to the difficulty of locating the 
source of motivation to order human conflict solely in nature’s oversight. As Katrin 
Flikschuh has noted, Kant “apparently allows nature to take over”, viewing the inner 
motivations of individuals to will themselves to have good constitutions, and to solve 
the fundamental problem “of external relations among persons”, as irrelevant. Flikschuh 
rightly points out the under-developed ideas in Kant’s political teleology that later 
become the crux of his argument in the Doctrine of Right. This latter argument is 
concerned with the specifically juridical and external character of what she calls the 
“coordination problem” between “persons who come into unavoidable contact with one 
another on the spherical sphere of the earth”. 101 But to whom do these underlying 
motivations, which drive the solution of this coordination problem, belong?  
 
Part of the difficulty is explained by Kant’s explicit rejection of individuals’ 
inner motivations as the means to achieve the ends of its vocation. As we will see in 
Chapter 4, he has not yet drawn the strict separation between internal and external 
legislation, which in turn explains how human beings achieve what they ought to 
achieve regardless of having the right set of moral reasons. However, we know two 
things at this point: (i) that Kant dismisses individual intentions to advance his 
arguments in the teleological essays, and (ii) that he attributes the role of completing 
these ends to nature as Wille [IUH 8:30] It is remarkable to see, from the perspective of 
the systematic concerns of this thesis, how committed Kant is at this early stage of his 
thinking, to understand the solution to “the coordination problem” as one which must 
respond to the constraints of the external political morality of a will [Wille]. 
Nature’s ‘despotic’ will 
These qualifications hopefully allow us to better understand Kant’s peculiar remark that 
nature has a “despotic” will. In Perpetual Peace, Kant writes that 
In taking care that people could live everywhere on the earth, nature at the same time 
despotically willed that they should live everywhere, even if against their inclination, and 
                                                
101 Flikschuh (2007a) ‘Duty, Nature, Right: Kant’s Response to Mendelssohn’, p. 233. 
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without this ‘should’ even presupposing a concept of duty that would bind them to do so by 
means of a moral law; instead it chose war to achieve this end it has. [PP 8:364; italics in 
the original, my emphasis in bold] 
How are we meant to understand the idea that nature can will despotically? A 
despot illegitimately wills in the name of others, when he imposes his motives and ends 
over those of the individuals. Given the fact that within the context of Kant’s 
teleological argument there is no straightforward moral justification for why Nature can 
and must adopt the role of our agent-representative to bring about moral progress, the 
outsourcing of willing to nature is indeed, in this sense, despotic. It is despotic in the 
sense that the constitution of this kind of will, acting on behalf of the whole species and 
of our humanity, has not been legitimately established. I make this claim, of course, 
from the vantage point of Kant’s later account of Public Will, as the legitimate and a 
priori idea of a general will, rightfully capable of speaking in the name of all.  
 
That Kant is aware that there is a problem with the justification of this ‘nature 
wills it so’ argument is, I argue, evidenced by his reference to a despotic will in 
Perpetual Peace. Here, Kant explains that nature, in contrast to practical reason, does 
not have the power to impose a duty on human beings, for example the duty to enter the 
state, which we will examine in the next chapter. For this reason, it must appeal to a 
despotic form of coercion to force us to act in ways conducive to our moral interests 
“whether we will it or not”: 
When I say of nature, it wills that this or that happen, this does not mean, it lays 
upon us a duty to do it (for only practical reason, without coercion, can do that) but 
rather that nature itself does it, whether we will it or not (fata volentem ducunt, 
nolentem trahunt. [PP 8:365, italics in the original] 102 
So far, I have defended a plausible reading of the ‘nature wills it so mechanism, 
and surveyed some of the difficulties surrounding it, by placing it within the context of 
                                                
102 Seneca writes that “Fates lead the willing, and drive the unwilling”. I find this sentence an eloquent 
expression of Kant’s point here: Nature, acting as the ‘Fates’, both leads and drives the otherwise 
dormant intentions of human beings to willingly bring about their moral ends. In the case of the 
“Nature wills it so” argument, as I have argued so far, human beings are “led” and “driven” 
unwillingly since, as Kant puts it, nature wills “that they should live everywhere, even against their 
inclinations” [PP 8:364, my emphasis]. 
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Kant’s larger project of political willing. Nature has an important role to play to the 
extent that it can: 
[B]e put to use in human beings in order so to arrange the conflict of their 
unpeaceable dispositions within a people that they themselves have to constrain 
one another to submit to coercive law and so bring about a condition of peace in 
which laws have force. [PP 8:366, my emphasis] 
These two ends – the rule of right and the security of peace – would remain mere 
ideals, if the conflict of our “unpeaceable disposition” was given free rein. Nature thus 
“wills irresistibly that right should eventually gain supremacy”, in order to bring about 
what we would have otherwise neglected as our proper aim. This process, Kant admits, 
will be achieved “with great inconvenience”, since “reaching the end cannot be 
expected simply on the basis of a free agreement of individuals.” [TP 8:367] 
 
To conclude: a will with the capacity to coerce the limits of human interaction, as 
Kant well knows, requires a justification of the kind offered in his account of public 
willing (based on a duty to state entrance). With regards to nature, the fact that Kant 
himself describes its will as despotical in character suggests that he was aware that such 
a justification was still in the making. 
 
In a revealing passage in Part III of Theory and Practice, however, Kant shifts 
from discussing nature to focusing on human nature in the context of teleology. 
Discussing the “unending progress towards the better”, he writes that it is 
soon seen that this immeasurably distant success will depend not so much upon 
what we do… and by what methods we should proceed in order to bring about it, 
but instead upon what human nature will do in and with us to force us onto a track 
we would not readily take of our own accord. [TP 8:310, italics in the original, my 
emphasis in bold] 
I now turn to the role of human nature in the context of Kant’s notion of unsocial 
sociability.  
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6. The “counter-acting” mechanism 
Unsocial sociability 
According to Allen Wood, “no interpretation of Kant’s view on any aspect of human 
psychology, sociology, or history will get matters right as long as it ignores the theme of 
unsociable sociability”.103 I believe that Wood is correct here, both because of the 
influence of this notion in Kant’s work104, and because of the role the notion has played 
beyond Kant.105 However, what exactly is unsocial sociability? Is it a mechanism which 
we are in control of? Or is there an agent other than us, e.g., nature, for whom unsocial 
sociability serves as means to some end? 
 
This mechanism is first introduced in Idea as a means of explaining a conflict at 
the heart of human nature. In a famous passage worth quoting in full, Kant writes: 
The means nature employs in order to bring about the development of all its 
predispositions is their antagonism in society, in so far as the latter is in the end the 
cause of their lawful order. I understand by ‘antagonism’ the unsocial sociability of 
human beings, that is, their tendency to enter into society, a tendency connected, 
however, with a constant resistance that continually threatens to break up this 
society. This unsociable sociability is obviously part of human nature. Human 
beings have an inclination to associate with one another because in such a 
condition they feel themselves to be more human… But they also have a strong 
tendency to isolate themselves, because they encounter in themselves the 
unsociable trait that predisposes them to want to direct everything only to their own 
ends and hence to expect to encounter resistance everywhere, just as they know 
that they themselves tend to resist others. [IUH 8:20–1; my emphases] 
So unsocial sociability is a basic predisposition of human nature, in the form of 
opposing inclinations. However, it is also a means which “nature employs” to bring 
                                                
103 Wood (2009) ‘Kant’s Fourth Proposition’, p. 115. 
104 According to Hans Saner, the Kantian notion of unsocial sociability must be traced back to Kant’s 
study of Leibniz, and to his specific appropriation of the notion of monads in his early Monadologia 
Physica. What we find in the Monadologia is a “conception of the monad as a unit in which two basic 
forces counteract one another and achieve the right effect only in the union – and achieve not just for 
the single monad, but for the coexistence of multiple monads”. This idea, Saner argues, is adopted 
thirty years later as a “central political notion in Kant”. Cf. Saner (1973), p. 8. 
105 For an interesting and critical piece on the role of human nature and sociability in the eighteenth 
century see Sagar (2018). 
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about ends that are in turn necessary to establish a “lawful order”, over and above these 
social and unsocial tendencies at war within us. Nature, Kant tells us, does not only 
direct us towards this lawful order, but is “the cause” of it. But how much of the 
mechanism of unsocial sociability, as a constitutive trait of human nature, works 
independently of nature’s intervention? In this section, I suggest there is conceptual 
space in Kant to explore these questions. 
 
The first thing is that, notwithstanding Kant’s attribution of unsocial sociability as 
an aspect of human nature, its effects are only manifested at the level of us as a species. 
We have also learned how this is the level captured by nature’s oversight. But how do 
things look from the perspective of the individual? My claim is that to conceptually 
distinguish between the ‘nature wills it so’ mechanism of the previous section, and the 
‘counter-acting’ mechanism of unsocial sociability we need to adopt the perspective of 
the individual. From this perspective, the balancing out of our social and unsocial traits, 
does not seem to follow a teleological orientation, nor a predetermined directionality. 
From the point of view of our nature, these antagonistic tendencies are the result of our 
contingent constitution. In other words, we cannot see our actions from the vantage 
point of a plan of nature. However, I am not suggesting that our actions are the result of 
random psychological forces within us. What I am trying to make sense of is the idea 
that unsocial sociability as a mechanism located in human nature, is not experienced as 
a teleological plan from the limited perspective of the individual. 
 
In contrast to the focus on willing of the ‘nature wills it so’ mechanism previously 
explored, what this emphasis on the individual reveals is the fact that even if nature will 
work “in and with us” to achieve the ends of our vocation, from the perspective of 
human beings, we remain oblivious to the teleological purposes of this plan. This 
suggests that individuals experience this unsocial/social aspect within them as 
something close to an invisible hand, capable of ordering our inclinations independently 
of a pre-determined plan. This allows us to make better sense of the fact that this 
mechanism can deliver both war, and a condition of peace, the impetus required to 
develop our talents, and the things that trump our capacity to evolve. The ends of this 
mechanism in human nature are thereby, open-ended, and not predetermined. 
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There is, of course, something disturbing in thinking that our opposing 
inclinations are in some significant sense not under our control, but instead subjected to 
a series of causes and effects of which we are not fully aware. This could be read as a 
lack of agency and resolution on our part over our destiny. However, I think that these 
are the necessary implications of Kant’s argument. Moreover, I argue that the idea that 
there is deep diversity of ends surrounding human agency, resulting from the particular 
choices and actions of each individual, independently of a teleological orientation, is a 
deeply engrained idea in Kant’s way of thinking about political agency in general. I will 
have more to say about this aspect of Kant’s political vision in Chapter 5. I suggest that, 
for now, we think of unsocial sociability not as implying lack of resolution on our part, 
nor as a mechanism through which the over-powering agency of nature operates over 
us, but rather as Kant’s realistic acknowledgement of the unforeseen, non-teleological, 
and open-ended nature of political agency. Let me explain this in more detail. 
An open-ended mechanism 
Agency so conceived, i.e., as a non-teleological exercise of open-ended choices, allows 
us to better understand the way human nature works independently of Kant’s moralised 
conception of nature. I hinted earlier that one particularly pertinent comparison of 
unsocial sociability can be drawn with the ‘invisible hand’ of Adam Smith, according to 
which (on its popular understanding) the competing interests of different agents are 
somehow harmonised in the de-centralised sphere of the market. Smith’s metaphor 
suggests that individuals’ conflicting interests and schemes come to an agreement 
without the intervening role of an agent, human or otherwise. There are two things I 
want to take from this idea: first, that we cannot predict how our inclinations, in 
conjunction with that of others will ultimately take place. As I said, Kant accepts that 
this mechanism can deliver both the good and the negative effects of our sometimes 
social, and sometimes unsocial nature, in a way that is similar to the unforeseen 
consequences of our interests in the market. Second, I think the notion of an ‘invisible 
hand’ succinctly captures the absence of a centralised entity, planning, foreseeing, and 
controlling the ends of this otherwise market-like process. 
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But, isn’t nature precisely taking the role of this ‘invisible hand’ in Kant? To 
address this question, let me return to Flikschuh’s objection to Kant’s solution to the 
coordination problem. According to this interpretation, Kant’s political teleology 
“sounds desperate” in its decision to appeal “to Providence as the hidden moral 
hand”.106 I disagree with Flikschuh, to the extent that her argument seems to be running 
together the two mechanisms I have tried to keep distinct, namely, the mechanism of 
nature as a teleologically-oriented agent on the one hand, and the counter-acting 
mechanism of unsocial sociability as a trait of human nature, on the other. This “hidden 
moral hand” of nature, to use Flikschuh’s words, is indeed entrusted with the task of 
overseeing unsocial sociability in us, but human beings remain free, at least from the 
limited perspective of the individual, to make use of their antagonistic tendencies, 
independently of nature’s “hand”. According to my proposed interpretation, we can say 
that it is we who go to war, and it is we who settle for times of peace, as a result of the 
counter-acting of forces and drives within us. It remains true, however, that from the 
perspective of Nature, war and peace are merely instrumental means to achieve the 
‘true’ ends of our moral vocation. This is not the case from our finite point of view. 
 
My suggestion is that we read Kant’s open-ended mechanism of unsocial 
sociability in sharp contrast to the compulsion of nature’s will in the teleology. On my 
interpretation, the mechanism of unsocial sociability is lacking in specificity in an 
important sense: Kant says very little about how exactly the competing inclinations at 
play in human nature cancel each other out, or about how the “effects and counter-
effects” of human beings’ interactions are balanced. [IUH 8:26] This lack of specificity, 
however, has a positive side to it, as I have tried to argue: it is indicative of the open-
ended way Kant envisages the resolution of human conflict, and the way he thinks about 
diversity of ends in relation to political agency. 
 
As I have tried to show, despite Kant’s teleological argument for nature, the 
notion of unsocial sociability encapsulates some of the ways in which Kant will come to 
understand the compatibility of choices and actions in political interaction in his later 
political philosophy. As I develop the issue in Chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis, Kant drops 
                                                
106 Flikschuh (2007a), p. 237. 
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teleology in favour of the political morality of a system of right that is ordered and 
legitimately established, without the aid of teleology. The source of concern of this 
system will be the limits of agency, and not the pursuit of teleologically, pre-determined 
ends. Moreover, Kant’s ‘political minimalism’, as I will call it, is based on an account 
of political willing that makes no demands on the individual –let alone on the species-, 
to will ends of reason, or an specific version of the common good.107 Rather, this 
account of willing allows for a vision of politics that protects the diversity in ends of 
what is willed, so long as it is willed in accordance with universal law.  
Moralised unsocial sociability  
As we have seen so far, the ‘counter-acting’ mechanism of unsocial sociability emerges 
from Kant’s broader teleological approach to nature. In the previous section, I suggested 
an alternative reading of the mechanism that, on the one hand, accepts the presence of 
nature working through and with the antagonistic traits of human nature, and on the 
other hand, adopts the perspective of the individual, in order to read the mechanism as 
akin to the de-centralised model of motivations in the market.  
 
This emphasis on the individual is not unique to my interpretation. As Michaele 
Ferguson explains “commentators on Idea usually interpret unsocial sociability in terms 
of Kant’s moral philosophy”. So the ‘link’ with the individual is here done by drawing 
Kant’s teleology closer to his moral philosophy. The commentators who adopt this 
approach defend a version according to which Kant’s notion must be seen through 
‘moral lenses’, reading unsocial sociability as an inner struggle between “behaviours 
fuelled by competition, jealousy, and self-interest”, on the one hand, and the categorical 
imperative on the other. This conflict forces man to choose between doing “what is 
good” and doing “what is evil (acting from our selfish desires)”.108 
 
                                                
107 For a discussion on the difference between Kant and Rousseau on this issue see Chapter 4, sec. III, 
‘What is ‘public’ versus what is ‘general’ in willing’. See also Chapter 5, Part II, sec. II ‘Kant’s 
political minimalism’. 
108 Ferguson (2012) ‘Unsocial Sociability: Perpetual Antagonism in Kant’s Political Thought’, pp. 
151–2. 
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On this reading, Ferguson informs us, antagonism is understood “exclusively in 
moral terms”, an antagonism that we must be able to “regulate, control, and perhaps 
overcome”. Note how these are the terms Kant uses to express the agential intervention 
of nature in history: nature intervenes by means of a will which regulates, controls, 
coerces, and compels the coming about of, precisely, the moral ends of our vocation. 
 
This interpretation supports the idea that individuals’ working out their “sources 
of unsociability and thoroughgoing resistance” must be understood in terms of our 
success or failure in willing in accordance with the moral law. If this is indeed the 
criterion of success –successful moral determination- the achievements or misfortunes 
resulting from our sociability has nothing to do with our human nature but with our 
capacity to act in accordance with duty.109 Wars, the institutionalisation of domineering 
practices, and the overruling of moral behaviour by our “spiteful competitive vanity” 
becomes, through this moralistic lens, the large-scale manifestation of deeper moral 
failings in the agents’ will. More generally, the negative results of the mechanism of 
unsocial sociability are a failure of the individual’s capacity “to make the moral law the 
maxim of [her] actions, and to bring into being the kingdom of ends”.110  
 
What I find questionable about this approach is the unwarranted connection it 
draws between our inner moral life, and the mechanism of balancing out the contingent 
tendencies of our social/unsocial nature. By moralising the mechanism of unsocial 
sociability, we loose sight of Kant’s efforts to allow for a space for action that operates 
independently of duty, and moreover, independently of a pre-determined orientation 
grounded in nature as reason [Wille]. 
 
However, I think this moralised approach to unsocial sociability is part of a 
broader interpretation which reads Kant’s teleological philosophy of history in close 
connection to his moral philosophy. From this perspective, the counter-acting of conflict 
in Kant in general –not only in morality but in human history- is ultimately 
instrumental to the moral duty to bring about the ends of reason. For this reason, some 
                                                
109 I take the general idea of antagonisms as a “moral failing” from Ferguson’s interpretation of the 
moral reading of unsocial sociability. However, I expand on it in ways that are not her own. 
110 Ferguson (2012), 152. 
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commentators define the goal of Kantian ethics in terms of its “progressive” and 
“apocalyptic” capacity to abolish conflict through a philosophy of history. 111  
 
What this reading cannot account for is the possibility of ‘leaving open’ the ends 
that result from our unsocial sociability. In contrast, these ends, even if they are now 
our own as moral agents, entrusted with the “collective historical task”112 to bring them 
about, these ends are nonetheless pre-determined by reason. Incidentally, this moralised 
reading of Kant’s philosophy of history in connection with this moral philosophy comes 
up again in the context of Kant’s politics, as we will see in Chapter 5.113 
 
To conclude: reading Kant’s notion of unsocial sociability through ‘moral 
lenses’seems to dismiss the fact that Kant described this mechanism as one of human 
nature. This chapter, by contrast, has shown how, (i) even in his teleological writings, 
Kant was already in the process of establishing an account of willing that is radically 
external and public, and independent from inner morality, and (ii) how unsocial 
sociability can be read as a mechanism allowing for the coming about of ends that are 
not pre-determined by a teleological orientation. If unsocial sociability were solely a 
mechanism aimed at highlighting how things go awry when we allow our natural 
desires to override the voice of the moral law, then Kant would have framed the whole 
issue as one of moral willing, and not as one of counter-acting forces within human 
nature.  
 
If we follow my proposed interpretation, the “progressive practices and 
institutions” which commentators are keen to identify as resulting from the workings of 
unsocial sociability114 can instead be read as a by-product (though of course a salutary 
one) of our human nature. Kant’s acknowledgement of the open-ended nature of human 
conflict, I argue, runs contrary to the ideal of a Kantian world radically free from 
antagonism. Competition, war, mutual love, and civil security are, from the perspective 
of Kant’s account, the inevitable result of the complex constitution of our nature. 
                                                
111 Wood (1991) ‘Unsocial Sociability: The Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics’, pp. 343–347. 
112 Ypi (forthcoming), p. 141. 
113 See Chapter 5, Part II, sec. I, ‘Politics as a Kingdom of Ends’. 
114 Cf. Muthu (2014), p. 69. 
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Amassing them under a single heading of moral failings or moral achievements does not 
do justice to the richness and complexity Kant is trying to capture under the heading of 
‘unsocial sociability’.  
 
In view of the idea of unsocial and social traits, Kant entertains the thought that 
the mechanism of unsocial sociability is morally neutral with respect to its effects. In 
this way, Kant reminds us that human nature is a mixed bag of tendencies; whilst “the 
seeds of mistrust, suspicion and conflict are forever embedded in human affairs”,115 
good is also present, and indeed, can even arise out of the bad. Merging Kant’s 
philosophy of history with his moral philosophy, therefore somewhat misses this point.  
7. Critical appraisal of the Harnessing model in 
Kant’s teleology 
In this chapter, I have argued for three claims: firstly, that Kant’s teleology must be read 
as addressing the unavoidable problem of human conflict. He sees teleology as an 
explanatory device in order to explore possible ways conflict can be ordered, harnessed, 
channelled, and limited in line with the ends reason attributes to our moral vocation. 
Secondly, I defended the view that there are two mechanisms at work in Kant’s 
teleology, namely the ‘nature wills it so’ and the ‘counter-acting’ mechanism. For Kant, 
nature wills that conflict and disorder be translated into the ordered structures of 
political and legal institutions. In contrast to this agent-based model, Kant also appeals 
to the unsocial sociability in human nature. In doing so, he enables us to view the 
development of conflict, and its potentially social and unsocial solutions, from the 
perspective of the individual. My third and final point has been to show how these 
previous claims should be read as part of Kant’s philosophical attempt to build an 
account of political willing, using the conceptual resources provided by teleology. 
                                                
115 Ferguson, p. 152. 
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An embryonic model of political willing 
To conclude this chapter, I will address the relevance of my interpretation for our 
broader interest in political willing. These two mechanisms are important because they 
highlight Kant’s interest in a form of willing which is properly political, while also 
distinct from his account of moral willing. Kant’s use of the teleological device of 
nature qua agent, allowed him to ‘test out’ some of the conditions that would be 
required for an account of political willing to be possible. 
 
Moreover, identifying the unsocial sociability proper to a human nature like our 
own, also delivered Kant with important insights. First, the teleology of nature works 
through human beings. In this way, nature exploits our contradictory drives in favour of 
our goals of sociability, political stability, and civic security. Second, from the 
perspective of the individual, the counter-acting forces of our antagonistic drives leads 
us to consider the openness of ends available to us, free from teleological constraints.  
 
There are, however, important differences between these two mechanisms. They 
seem to offer us different pictures of how human progress comes about. The process of 
unsocial sociability can lead to war, devastation, the domination of certain individuals 
over others, and so on, while at the same time leading to the growth of societal bonds, 
the recognition of others’ equality, and the triumph of peace over conflict.116 This 
openness of the second mechanism contrasts sharply with the concreteness of the ends 
in the first mechanism, which are willed by nature and determined a priori by reason’s 
foresight. From the little Kant says about the internal mechanism of unsocial sociability, 
we can nevertheless grasp how this notion works independently from the dogmatic 
implications of the ‘nature wills it so’ model (recall here Kant’s willingness to refer to 
nature as “despotical”).  
 
Despite these differences, I have also argued that Kant’s political teleology is, in 
fact, informed by both models. The concrete ends which nature wills by means of 
compulsion, and the less determinate and morally neutral ends of our competing 
                                                
116 On the positive role of resistance in bringing about progressive institutions and progressive social 
relations, see Muthu (2014). 
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inclinations, both inform the challenges Kant faced when thinking about political 
agency in history.  
 
Ultimately, these models should not be understood as competing alternatives. 
Instead, the models can be viewed as complementing each other, in that they each 
present different aspects of Kant’s political teleology. The ‘nature wills it so’ 
mechanism underlines the difficulties Kant encountered in thinking about a model of 
willing which is external to the particular will of individuals, in its coercive capacity to 
reshape and constrain human actions, offering us a purposeful approach to conflict, 
which, I argue, is absent in the alternative mechanism. The mechanism of unsocial 
sociability, meanwhile, highlights the open-ended way human nature operates, 
according to Kant. It illustrated Kant’s view that human beings are essentially a mixed 
bag of both social and unsocial tendencies, able to generate conditions attesting to our 
humanity, as well as causing us to regress, and to impede our moral and political 
development. Kant is alive to both ends of the spectrum. His political teleology is an 
attempt to explain how the political and rightful institutions which are proper to our 
vocation, ultimately have the upper hand. As we will see in the next chapter, Kant’s 
appeal to the state of nature to ground his argument for the necessity of state-entrance, 
is an example of how the aims of teleology can be achieved without a teleological 
orientation.  
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Chapter 3 
Conflict and the State (of Nature) 
Introduction  
From teleology to right via politics 
So far this thesis has explored a number of constitutive features of Kant’s theory of the 
will. My aim has been to reconstruct the steps in the philosophical development of his 
account of political willing by demonstrating the central place the idea of conflict in its 
moral and political dimensions occupies in that account. 
 
When thinking about politics, Kant is interested in actions and not in motives, 
and since this thesis is about politics, I’ll be equally focused on the external character of 
human actions. Actions highlight how the unavoidability of conflict in human 
interaction requires an account of willing that can externally coerce the limits of agency, 
thereby making the actions and choices of individuals compatible. But what kind of will 
is this that can enforce limits on human action as these affect the agency of others? And 
what are the conditions that, in turn, make this form of political willing possible? 
 
In this chapter, I address these broader questions by focusing on Kant’s 
argument for the transition from a state of nature to a juridical state. He conceptualises 
this transition as a move from a situation of moral chaos to a condition of rightful order 
via appeal to a duty to enter the state. As we will see, the fact that Kant establishes 
statehood as a duty for agents like us is significant. For Kant, people in the state of 
nature ought to “subject themselves to the coercion that reason prescribes, namely to 
public law”. This model of subjection is distinctively Kantian, because this transition to 
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state-entrance is prescribed by reason117 and is rendered intelligible to human beings in 
the form of a duty. Kant’s second distinctive move is then to show that only the 
constitution of an omnilateral and public will can make this duty binding, and the 
establishment of a juridical condition possible [TP 8:310]. 
Kant and Hobbes on the state of nature 
To achieve these two aims – namely, to ground state entrance and the constitution of an 
omnilateral will – Kant adopts a Hobbes-like framework. This framework involves an 
original condition that is pre-juridical, and hence ‘natural’, in order to motivate the 
necessity of life under state rule. This way of framing the issue arrives at a justification 
of the civil state from an analysis of the morally problematic condition of the state of 
nature. For example: this initial condition is described by Hobbes as a proclivity to war 
which originates in the passions that are characteristic of human nature, most 
prominently the desire for glory. Material scarcity, combined with a lack of security in 
the foresight of our plans and projects, furnish us with the prudential reasons that 
ultimately motivate ‘the multitude’ to unite as a ‘people’ under a powerful authority 
capable of “keeping them all in awe” (Leviathan, Chap. 13). 
 
In contrast to this Hobbesian picture of the state of nature, it is one of the main 
theses of this chapter that despite Kant’s appeal to a Hobbes-like framework of a 
conflict-ridden state of nature, and despite their common adherence to a state-based 
solution to the problem of authority by means of coercion, Kant’s picture differs from 
Hobbes’ in a crucial respect. The difference lies in their respective explanations of the 
root of the conflict human beings find themselves absent public law, and more crucially, 
in what makes this condition of lawlessness troublesome from a moral perspective. For 
Hobbes, conflict is rooted in something about us, in the way our human nature works 
when freed from the straitjacket of law and power. Kant, by contrast, thinks that the root 
of the human conflict lies not in anything about the way we are, but rather in the 
conditions of human agency, irrespective of the contingencies of our human nature. The 
                                                
117 I am using here a specific sense of reason’s [Wille] capacity to prescribe law to the human will 
[Willkür] in contrast to the idea of agents legislating law to themselves. This difference is explored in 
Chapter 1, sec. III, ‘The will and the autonomy of reason’. 
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crucial difference is this: for Kant, we are beings endowed with a will, and thus with a 
power of choice [Willkür]; the problem of the state of nature then has its source in the 
morally questionable status of our will, in the absence of a universal law. This kind of 
wrong he calls a “stato iniusto”. 
 
This Kantian insight reveals two important things: first, the conflict between 
agents in the state of nature is inescapable, given that their agency is first and foremost 
expressed through their power to choose in ways that inevitably affect one another. 
Second, this morally problematic condition necessarily gives rise to a duty to exit it for 
moral reasons; this is in contrast to the prudential reasons of a Hobbesian agent. 
 
To put it simply: the problem in the state of nature is a moral wrong that arises 
independently of any material conditions or empirical shortcomings in our 
psychological make-up. Moreover, it is the moral nature of this wrong that turns out to 
ground our right to coerce others “to enter a common lawful state along with me or to 
move away from my vicinity” [PP 8:349 fn.]. This I see as Kant’s anti–Hobbesian 
reading of what is at stake in the state of nature, and why it is a matter of duty, and not 
just of instrumental reasoning, to get out of this condition as soon as possible. 
 
To anticipate, Kant conceptualises his account of political willing as a solution 
to the morally troublesome condition he diagnosed in the state of nature. It is for this 
reason that this chapter is, in some ways, transitional: it presents the transitional steps 
Kant needs to make in order to show that entering the state is a morally necessary 
condition of our agency in general, and that such a state must be thought of in terms of 
the idea of a Public Will.  
Where are we so far 
As we saw in Chapter 1, having a will is, for Kant, what characterises our humanity and 
what gives expression to our rational nature. My interest in that chapter was two-fold: 
first, to delineate three relevant features of the moral will, namely, law-governedness, 
causality, and autonomy. This allowed me to show, second, that moral willing is defined 
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by Kant as the capacity of Reason [Wille] to prescribe the law to a will [Willkür] as a 
matter “of inner necessitation to what one does not altogether like to do” [CPrR 5: 84]. 
However, this limited view of the will in its relation to the determination of reason is re-
conceptualised from the perspective of his political philosophy. From this point of view, 
i.e., where having a will is to have the capacity to determine our choices freely against 
others, we can see an interesting political dimension to agency that was not apparent in 
the earlier focus on individual moral willing. It is the structure of this political 
dimension, introduced by the conflict between wills, that is the focus of the following 
chapters.  
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed Kant’s appeal to teleology as an explanatory alternative 
to address his embryonic concerns over the possibility of a political and external, in 
contrast to a moral and internal, form of willing. I advanced three main claims: first, the 
theory of purposiveness I called ‘teleology’ allows Kant to explain the purposeful 
ordering of human conflict in history in light of the political ends that are proper to our 
vocation as a species. Of these ends, establishing a civic condition involves a problem 
that is “the most difficult and hardest to solve” [IUH 8:20]. Second, Kant attributes to 
Nature in its teleological orientation the role of harnessing conflict into order. On this 
account, Nature emulates the features of a will, i.e., Wille or Practical Reason, and so 
can efficaciously coerce human nature to bring about its desired political ends “whether 
we will it or not” [PP 8:365]. Finally, I concluded that Kant’s arguments for Nature’s 
compulsion should be read as gesturing towards an account of willing that can be both 
external to the inner motivations of human beings, and coercive in its capacity to put 
everybody under an obligation. However, this agential understanding of Nature in terms 
of a will was missing an argument for the moral justification of why such a will should 
have the coercive power to bind us. 
 
Before turning to Kant’s account of public willing, I will explain why the state – 
as the juridical condition embodying this distinctive form of political willing – becomes 
a moral necessity for beings like us in the first place. This is the question Kant grapples 
with when he thinks about the transition from a state of lawlessness to a state of lawful 
external legislation. 
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My thesis is that the state is a moral necessity for Kant because the problem the 
state is meant to solve is also moral in nature. This structural similarity between the 
state of nature and the civic state is substantive in that both conditions manifest a moral 
dimension of the agents involved. The state of nature serves to illuminate the moral 
wrongness of the lawless relation of our will, and the threat this arbitrary standing of 
our will imposes on everybody else. The civic state must offer a solution to this problem 
by constituting an authority that can bring law to this lawless condition, and one that 
can mirror the claims of each individual will from an omnilateral perspective. I will 
show that for Kant, establishing the conditions that make political life possible involves 
addressing a problem of the will at the level of individuals in order to offer a 
correspondingly will–based solution at the level of the state. 
 
So the challenge ahead is to show that if the state is both a moral necessity and a 
solution to a problem in the state of nature, then that problem must be moral too: we 
cannot get necessity from contingency. The Kantian state, therefore, cannot be the result 
of the material conditions of human nature that are fundamental in the Hobbesian 
analysis of our passions and fears. It is rather the human will that ultimately grounds the 
moral necessity of the Kantian state.  
 
A final caveat before we proceed: my emphasis on the moral wrong Kant thinks 
is at stake in the state of nature is the result of my reading of the political texts in light 
of Kant’s final account of the Public Will in Doctrine of Right. It is only retrospectively, 
I argue, that we are able to make sense of the emergence of the idea of a Public Will as 
an a priori and necessary requirement for agency. It is the moral conflict arising from a 
lawless condition that a Public Will needs to rightfully resolve. The political morality of 
this form of public willing is meant to respond to the morally problematic dimension 
raised by a will that is not, yet, under universal law. I read Kant’s arguments for the 
transition to statehood as an effort to abandon the moral–cum–political limbo unilateral 
wills find themselves in absent public law.  
95	
1. Kant’s Hobbesian problem 
Plenty of remarks give credence to the view that on issues such as the right of rebellion, 
the negative appraisal of human nature, and the irresistible power of the sovereign, Kant 
and Hobbes are in agreement with each other.118 Some interpreters of Kant find 
discomfort in this, and try to explain it away as a ‘Hobbesian hangover’ on Kant’s part, 
deeming these ideas as “unworthy of [Kant’s] own better thinking”.119 
 
I do not share this discomfort. My working assumption is rather that a fruitful 
comparison between Kant and Hobbes allows us to better understand Kant’s own 
distinctive views on politics. But before we turn to their differences, let us turn to what 
they have in common. Much will be revealed by surveying these commonalities, and 
this survey is the aim of the current section. I argue that Kant and Hobbes share two 
fundamental commitments: first, that the state of nature is a state of conflict, and 
second, that a coercive state is the required solution to this basic problem. However, 
what this conflict is a conflict about, and how the state-based solution is justified, are 
points where Kant and Hobbes part company. These two sources of difference will be 
the focus of the rest of the chapter. 
 
What these similarities disclose is a sense of how seriously Kant takes Hobbes’s 
problem to be. This problem, I think, is none other than how to establish political 
authority. We saw that in his early writings, Kant refers to this as “the greatest problem 
for the human species” and the “most difficult one to be solved”. He describes it as “the 
achievement of a civil society universally administering right”, where the “unpeaceable 
dispositions” of those “who cannot bear yet cannot bear to leave” each other, are tamed 
by law and order [IUH 8:21-23]. 
 
In Hobbes’s version, the problem of establishing a commonwealth requires a set 
of rules that can secure, once and for all, the relation between protection and obedience. 
In the conclusion of Leviathan, Hobbes tells us that his aim has been “to set before 
                                                
118 Cf. DofR 6:316; TP 8:299. 
119 Riley (1983), p. 177. 
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men’s eyes the mutual relation between protection and obedience; of which the 
condition of human nature, and the laws divine, both natural and positive, require an 
inviolable observation” (Leviathan, ‘A Review and Conclusion’). 
Kant’s serious engagement with Hobbes 
In line with this view, Kant seriously engages with the Hobbesian problem through his 
understanding of the need to exit a state of lawlessness, where man remains free from 
juridical obligations, to establish a civil condition. Echoing Hobbes’s quest for 
protection, Kant describes this condition as guaranteeing “the most precise 
determination and protection of the limits of [each person’s] freedom so that it can 
coexist with the freedom of others” [IUH 8:23]. 
 
It should not come as a surprise, then, to find Kant’s own version of the problem 
of coercive authority expressed in terms of the Hobbesian framework. Indeed, he often 
falls into ways of speaking that are similar to Hobbes’s own, especially when talking 
about the state of nature.120 This has led some to think that Kant actually described the 
state of nature “in the most accurately Hobbesian terms”.121 According to Kant, the state 
of nature is primarily a situation where “everyone follows his own judgment”, driven by 
“the unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with his own 
ideas”. In Part III of Religion, he says that this “perilous state” can be partly explained 
not by “what comes his way from his own raw nature, so far as he exists in isolation, 
but rather from the human beings to whom he stands in relation or association”. This 
leads Kant to conclude that in a state where law is absent, men “must remain forever 
armed for battle”.122 [DofR 6:312; IUH 8:20; Rel 6:93]  
                                                
120 Richard Tuck is a good example of those who think that on issues such as the state of nature, 
sovereignty, and resistance, the difference between Kant and Hobbes is “rather slight”. Cf. Tuck 
(2011) The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to 
Kant, p. 208. 
121 Ibid., p. 213. 
122 The image of battle is used as early as the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant compares the disputes of 
pure reason with itself to the state of nature, where the claims of reason remain in a state of war 
against each other unless we “seek relief in some critique of reason itself”. Interestingly, Kant offers a 
version of Hobbes’s official view by phrasing the issue in terms of freedom, which is alien to the 
latter’s immediate concerns. “As Hobbes maintains”, says Kant, in the face of violence “we have no 
option save to abandon it and submit ourselves to the constraint of law, which limits freedom solely in 
order that it may be consistent with the freedom of others and with the common good of all” [CPR 
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Moreover, on the issue of de facto power and positive law, Kant is close to 
Hobbes in approving, as a matter of a “practical principle of reason”, that “the presently 
existing legislative authority ought to be obeyed, whatever its origin”.123 This resembles 
Hobbes’s advice to seditious subjects that “The present ought alwaies to be preferred, 
maintained, and accounted best”, especially in troubled political times. [DofR 6:319; 
Leviathan, Chap. 42] 
The problem of authority 
What none of these Kantian passages reveal is exactly what makes the state of nature a 
condition where one “remain[s] forever armed for battle”. Read in isolation from his 
more systematic commitments to a political morality, these remarks do not tell us why 
the problem of establishing a state “is the hardest to solve”. Even more pressing for our 
concerns, they do not tell us how are we to derive a justification of an authority that 
“ought to be obeyed” from this initial condition of conflict. As we will see, though, 
Kant’s answers to these questions distance him from Hobbes. 
 
But before we can turn to these answers, we must understand why the 
Hobbesian problem of authority is so important to Kant. My suggestion is that precisely 
in taking Hobbes seriously, as the above passages show, Kant was able to see into the 
philosophical deficiencies that an instrumental account of political authority is liable to 
have. From a Kantian perspective, a duty to state entrance must be grounded in 
individuals’ capacity to limit their freedom by law, and not merely to find a remedy to 
the empirical inconveniences consequent on the absence of law. This capacity for Kant 
will be embodied in Public Will [Wille], so the transition from a state of lawlessness to a 
civil state must be understood in terms of an account of the will and its operations. Only 
                                                                                                                                          
A752/B780]. It is noteworthy that even at his most Hobbesian moments, Kant is gearing the argument 
towards his own systematic concerns.  
123 Comments like this have led some commentators, such as Bader, to state that in Kant the role of 
uniting people under coercive laws "is the role of Leviathan”. I should note that Bader takes this 
“Leviathan talk” from Kant’s own Reflection notes, the text on which Bader rests most of his 
arguments. Laudable as this is as an alternative and novel source for Kant’s way of thinking, I limit 
my own arguments to the published texts. Cf.  Bader (unpublished) ‘Kant and the Problem of 
Assurance’, p. 12. 
98	
this, Kant thinks, can offer one a moral justification of the state, and thereby avoid the 
deficiencies of a merely prudential justification such as Hobbes offers.  
 
To explore these differences, I first turn to Hobbes’s official account to see how, 
notwithstanding Kant’s serious engagement with the Hobbesian problem of authority, 
he offers a distinctive understanding of the state as a will of a special kind. In adopting 
this approach, Kant is committed to offering a radically different analysis of what is 
going on in the state of nature, such that this special kind of authority – a Public Will – 
ought to be established as a matter of duty. I will show that despite Kant’s more 
empirically–driven descriptions of the state of nature as one of quarrel, envy, and war, 
he is bound to offer a different explanation of this condition, one that is not contingent, 
but rather that makes coercive authority moral necessary. I now turn to Hobbes in 
Section 2, in order to develop my own in the remaining sections. 
2. The inadequacy of Hobbes’s diagnosis 
Granting the significance of Kant’s more Hobbesian passages, the question of how we 
are to understand the distinctiveness of Kant’s own account of the transition towards 
statehood remains. This distinctiveness is best brought to light by offering a 
philosophical reconstruction of the moral wrong Kant thinks is at stake in the state of 
nature. To better understand it, I suggest we first compare Kant’s position with 
Hobbes’s paradigmatic account of the state of nature. 
 
In this section, I outline a reading of Hobbes in order to bring to the fore the 
inadequacy which Kant thinks bedevils Hobbes’s position. My strategy is two-fold: 
first, I present a fairly uncontroversial summary of Hobbes’s state of nature, and second, 
I show how his understanding of this condition commits him to a prudential 
justification of the state. However, my aim here is not to ‘get Hobbes right’. Rather, I 
present the contours of the Hobbesian position to get a grip on its differences from 
Kant’s. In this sense I should note that I am reading Hobbes from a Kantian perspective, 
with an emphasis on two specific issues: first, on the root of human conflict in the 
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absence of a common power, and second, on the way our understanding of conflict 
demands a certain kind of justification of political authority.  
 
So, from a Kantian perspective, Hobbes’s identification of the sources of 
conflict in human nature inescapably commits him to a justification of the state that is 
merely prudential, and hence, instrumental. Although Kant appeals to Hobbes’s idea of 
the state of nature, and shares the latter’s commitment to the necessity of statehood, 
Hobbes cannot give us what Kant is after: namely, a moral justification of the state. Let 
us turn now to Hobbes.  
Getting at the roots of conflict: the problem of human nature 
It is “in the nature of man”, Hobbes says, “that we find the principal causes of 
quarrel”.124 In the absence of a common authority, this quarrel is unavoidable. However, 
there are different ways to understand exactly what, according to Hobbes, makes the 
state of nature a condition of unavoidable conflict. At least two broad interpretative 
camps are possible.  
 
According to the realist interpretation, the causes of war are rooted in three 
different sources of social animosity:, competition, diffidence, and finally, the effects of 
our driving passion for glory and domination.125 According to Abisadeh’s taxonomy, 
what Hobbesian realists share in common is the fact that in the absence of a coercive 
state, war will be a universal and inevitable phenomenon.126  
 
The ideological interpretation, in contrast, focuses on the central role played by 
ideology, symbols, perceptions and disagreements about meanings in the anarchic 
condition of mere nature. These elements purport to explain the deeply social sources of 
conflict at play in the Hobbesian state of nature, rather than the psychological and 
material sources emphasised by the realist camp. The common thread of this ideological 
interpretation lies in the importance Hobbes attributed to what people think and how 
                                                
124 Elements of Law, chap. XIV 
125 On realist interpretations of Hobbes’s state of nature see Gauthier (1969) and Hampton (1986). 
126 Abisadeh (2011) ‘Hobbes on the Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory’, p. 299. 
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they think it. It comes as no surprise, then, that among the many rights of the Sovereign 
are the rights to define the meaning of tendentious words, and to ban books with 
pernicious doctrines, in such a way that all ambiguities are stripped out of our common 
language.127 
 
However, my interest here is not to adjudicate between these two interpretations. 
I see benefits in both of them, as well as an invitation to warn us against an otherwise 
simplistic view of Hobbes’s complex argument. Affirming, as I do, that Hobbes appeals 
to something about our nature to motivate political authority should not be equated with 
a ‘motivational reductionism’ on his part. These different strands of interpretation 
should make us sensitive to Hobbes’s “portrait of the human psyche [that is] actually 
rich and parsimonious”.128 The reason I do not need to adjudicate between these 
interpretations, though, is that both the realist and ideological elements in Hobbes offer 
us a prudential and instrumental justification of the state, a justification that in each 
case is based on contingent reasons underlying our proclivity to conflict: competition, 
diffidence, the fragility of a common moral language, and our human nature. 
The Hobbesian argument for glory 
This argument about human nature, and its role in the context of politics, is based on 
two claims: first, that human beings act on their desires, and second, that what they 
desire (the objects of their fancies) creates unavoidable frictions. The connection 
between action and desire in Hobbes is by means of the will. In stark contrast to Kant’s 
conception of the will as a moral capacity, for Hobbes the will is not a faculty but 
merely “the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the 
omission thereof” (Leviathan, Chap. 6)129. The most pressing appetite is the will or 
reason why we acted.130 Since our appetites are what we desire and our desires are 
rooted in our passions, Hobbes must be able to motivate state entrance by explaining the 
                                                
127 On the role of language in Hobbes’s politics see Wolin (2006) and Tuck (1989). 
128 Holmes (1990), p. 144. 
129 On Hobbes’s departure of a model of the will in terms of reason see Pink (2016), p. 186. 
130 Cf. Lloyd (2009) Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Cases in the Law of Nature., p. 
84. 
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way our passions work, and the detrimental consequences they lead to in a state of 
nature.  
Of the things that men desire, a need for glory and the “foolish overrating of 
their own worth” carry the biggest weight in Hobbes’s argument.131 This passion for 
social esteem demonstrates in the clearest of ways the empirical contextualism 
predating the entrance into civil society (Leviathan, Chap. 27). Hobbesian conflict 
stands on very muddy grounds, to the extent that it depends on the radically subjective 
judgment of individuals about how they are perceived by others, based on a never-
ending quest for social recognition. From this it follows that violence between glory–
driven agents can be sparked by the most insignificant of trifles: “a word, a smile, a 
different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue” can give rise to violence 
(Leviathan, Chap. 13). 
 
So for Hobbes, the fact that the desire for glory is so ingrained in our human 
nature is the dominant explanation for why the state is inescapable for us. This is 
problematic for Hobbes for at least two reasons: glory is the shakiest of passions, as it 
depends on the volatile perception of others, and on the equally contingent 
circumstances that give rise to these social judgments. Second, it commits us to 
Hobbes’s controversial claim that before the state there is, strictly speaking, no 
morality. This passion for glory leads to quarrel precisely because in the state of nature 
we disagree over the meaning of evaluative terms that we use to praise, but more 
importantly, to disapprove and disrespect others. What and who is good, just, and right 
are all contentious concepts. From this it follows that Hobbes’s concern with 
disagreement “is grounded directly in his account of human nature: in particular, in 
humans’ disposition to pursue glory and honour, often even at the cost of death”.132 
 
Though the Sovereign cannot radically change human nature – even if Hobbes’s 
more ideological account of the state expects that human beings’ behaviour can be 
                                                
131 Hobbes accepts that not all men are prone to glory, but the fact that some are, and specially young 
and healthy men, is enough to see this passion as a triggering factor for potential war: “The vainglory 
which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most 
incident to young men, and nourished by the histories or fictions of gallant persons; and is corrected 
oftentimes by age and employment” (Leviathan, Chap. 6). 
132 Abisadeh (2011), p. 299. 
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shaped for times of peace – his authority must settle the deep problem of disagreement 
arising from our passions. In De Cive, Hobbes says that pleasure “lies in being able to 
compare oneself favourably with others and form a high opinion of oneself.” In this 
sense, men cannot “avoid sometimes showing hatred and contempt for each other, by 
laughter or words or a gesture or other sign”.133 The likelihood of these gestures and 
signs resulting in a conflict as extreme as war is, from a Kantian perspective, a very 
fragile and fortuitous explanation of why a coercive power is needed to sort out this 
mess.134 
The inadequacy of an instrumental justification of the state  
The contingency of circumstances that give rise to glory–driven frictions on the one 
hand, and the positivism of law and moral terms on the other, are in stark contrast to 
Kant’s philosophical outlook vis-à-vis politics.135 But what is the problem with the 
instrumentality of Hobbes’ justification? If we accept, with Hobbes, that glory is the 
decisive passion fuelling conflict in the state of nature, are we not on safe grounds here 
to say that, from a Kantian perspective, mere perception and opinion and the conflict 
that they bring cannot ground the state as a necessary condition to remedy this initial 
problem? What can be shakier than the empirical circumstances of people’s perceptions 
of each other’s esteem and social status, as a justification to bring in a sovereign to 
pacify these conflicts?  
                                                
133 Hobbes (1998), 1.5, 26–27. 
134 I rely on Abisadeh’s analysis of glory to make some of my points, but I depart from his overall 
conclusions because of the narrow aim of this section as a comparative exercise driven by strictly 
Kantian concerns. 
135 This talk of glory evokes Kant’s discussion of self-love, pride, and vanity in Religion. The most 
interesting treatment of this is found in Muthu, who gives central place to Kant’s analysis of the 
effects of our need to “gain worth in the opinion of others”, and our tendency towards “hateful 
superiority” [Rel 6:27]. For Muthu, there is a positive aspect to be found in these attitudes, since to 
gain worth in the eyes of others “is part of our very humanity” and part of a requirement of our 
“socially oriented rationality and agency”. For our present purposes, two things are worth noting: first, 
that this discussion is developed in the context of Kant’s arguments in Religion, following Kant’s 
assumptions there about human nature and our moral, i.e., internal, dispositions. Second, they spring 
from Muthu’s specific aim to arrive at an empirically-sensitive and historically oriented definition of 
humanity in Kant. In this chapter, my aim is to understand Kant’s formal analysis of the morally 
problematic state of nature, assuming the external perspective required by politics in contrast to 
individual morality. In this sense, it is actions rather than intentions, and the will rather than human 
nature that is at stake for me. This, however, does not preclude us from drawing interesting points of 
contact between Hobbes and Kant, specifically regarding their shared interest in understanding the 
effects of glory and our need to be master over others. Actually, it is remarkable how Hobbesian Kant 
can be on this issue. Cf. Muthu (2014) ).‘Productive Resistance in Kant’s Political Thought’, p. 74. 
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A Hobbesian might well retort that human passions are fixed, or hard-wired into 
our nature.136 It would be a mischaracterisation of Hobbes’s position, then, to think that 
an account of human nature is solely based on the contingent passions and whims 
individuals happen to be moved by. I think that this objection is partly right in assuming 
that, for Hobbes, passion are not whims but constitutive of agency. Hobbes himself sets 
this issue straight when he states that contingency lies not in the “similitude of passions, 
which are all the same in men”, but in the contingency “of the objects of the passions 
which are the things desired, feared, hoped, etc., for these the constitution, individual, 
and particular education, do so vary.” (Leviathan, ‘Introduction’, my emphasis) 
Different men will want, fear and hope different things for different reasons; but the 
passion to long for objects of choice as such remains fixed. 
 
To be fair to Hobbes, this analysis of human nature is the route to a specific kind 
of philosophical aim. It is meant to motivate entering into a particular kind of state, and 
to establish a specific kind of sovereign, namely one who can settle radical 
disagreements between individuals, and most importantly, a state that can define the 
meaning of words to pacify the infinite variety of false perceptions, words, and 
intentions that fire up our radical enmity. Civil law addresses this disagreement of 
perceptions and opinions; it “determineth what is honest and dishonest, what is just and 
unjust, and generally what is good and evil” (Leviathan, Chap. 56). 
 
From this it follows that the state is intended to remedy the empirical 
shortcomings found in the state of nature by means of an instrumental justification. I 
explore this remedial view of the state as a solution to conflict in the final chapter of this 
thesis. For now, we need only note that this remedy is anchored in Hobbes’s 
instrumental approach to the state, represented by the “associated benefits” of living 
under a Commonwealth.137 Hobbes persuades us of the instrumental and prudential 
benefits of the state by showing all the things that are impossible if the state is absent, 
                                                
136 Hobbes seems to endorse this view under the rubric of his materialism and his theory of life as 
motion when he says in the Introduction to Leviathan: “For seeing life is but a motion of limbs… 
what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, 
giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer?” (Leviathan, ‘Introduction’) 
137 Petit (2005), p. 136 
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and the limitations that lie ahead of us in the state of war. As he famously puts it in 
Chapter 13 of Leviathan:  
In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is 
uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation… no 
commodious building… no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; 
no arts; no letters; no society.  
Life, we are expected to be convinced, would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short.” 
 
Some commentators have tried to carve an alternative route for a justification of 
the state in Hobbes. This proposal appeals to the normative character of Hobbesian 
natural laws. Here “peace” is deemed a value with normative weight, such that even if 
we adopt means–end reasoning (i.e., if peace, then comply with the content of natural 
law), it is the closest we get to a moral interpretation of Hobbes’s overall political 
project. The most refined version of this argument is found in S. A. Lloyd: she states 
that Natural Laws “normatively motivate submission to political authority, by dictating 
submission to an absolute sovereign”.138 
 
However, even if this reading could potentially meet Kant’s ambition of 
grounding state entrance on a duty, Kant could not rely on an external source of 
normativity in the laws of nature. Obligations have to emanate from the will [Wille], 
even if from a different, omnilateral will.  
 
To sum up: I suggest that the reason why Hobbes’s account of political authority 
is inadequate is to be found in his account of human nature we discussed at the start of 
the section. A question remains as to how universal Hobbes’s claim of our glory-driven 
nature is, or how universal it must be if it is to do the job it is meant to do. It is true that 
Hobbes thought that even if only one individual were driven to dominate others, and to 
                                                
138 Lloyd (2009), p. 268. 
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take arms to defend his self-esteem,139 this would be enough to ground the necessity of 
a coercive state.  
 
Notwithstanding this caveat, I have developed the arguments of this section with 
an instrumental eye to show that, despite Kant’s appeal to a Hobbesian structure of 
argumentation, an account of the state derived from an account of human nature remains 
deficient for two reasons. First, Hobbes’s emphasis on the passions, and specifically that 
of the desire for glory, does not to my mind explain what is morally at stake in the state 
of nature as a state of war, but only the instrumental consequences that arise from 
competing passions. Second, and intimately related to this point, the contingency of the 
explanation can only offer a contingent justification of the state-based solution Hobbes 
has in mind. As we will come to see in the next section, Kant has to change the terms of 
the debate: he first has to show that there is something moral at stake in the lawlessness 
of the condition of the state of nature in order, second, to derive from this condition the 
required moral justification of the state. Kant has to do this independently of 
prudentially motivated reasons to keep glory-seeking individuals under coercive 
control. 
3. What is wrong with the Kantian state of nature? 
Having sketched this richer picture, let us take stock. So far I have argued that Kant’s 
engagement with Hobbes’s problem of political authority should be taken seriously. 
This explains why some of Kant’s descriptions of the state of nature sound bizarrely 
Hobbesian. However, Kant’s deep understanding of the problem of authority allows him 
to see the inadequacy of Hobbes’s account. He understands that you cannot get 
necessity out of contingency, and so the source of a duty to state entrance cannot be 
grounded in the passions, let alone in the shaky desire for glory. Instead, Kant must 
                                                
139 That there is something that people value more than the physical preservation of their lives is 
evidenced by the way we value the status of our person in the eyes of others. Hobbes thinks that this is 
clearest in our willingness to duel. A son, Hobbes says, “will rather die than live infamous and hated 
of all world [for executing a parent]”, as most men “would rather lose their lives (that I say not, their 
peace) than suffer slander” (The Collected English Works of Thomas Hobbes [1839–1845], Volume 
II, 83, 38) 
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offer a moral justification of the state, grounded in the morally problematic condition in 
which individuals find themselves in the state of nature.  
 
To anticipate, I argue that Kant identifies in the state of nature a kind of wrong 
that both precedes and underlies the possibility of mutual equality and the requisite 
assurance to exercise our rights independently of another’s choice. This wrong Kant 
calls the “stato iniusto” as the threat represented by the condition (stato) of our will 
when it acts and chooses in a lawless manner against others. In other words, the 
compatibility of agency and the limited exercise of our rights are threatened because in 
a state of nature, merely by virtue of having a will that is not yet limited by an external 
and public law, we inevitably wrong all around us by having an equal capacity for 
choice [Willkür] free from limitations imposed by universal law. It is the lawlessness of 
my will, i.e., a mere arbitrary will, and not the lawlessness of the condition of state of 
nature, which makes this situation morally problematic in the first place. As we will see 
in due course, the more common defects found in this state, such as the lack of 
assurance and indeterminacy, are read, from the perspective of my interpretation, as 
manifestations of a more fundamental wrong. It is this existential wrong, and not these 
empirical defects, that explains why wanting to remain in this condition is, as Kant says, 
“wrong in the highest degree” [DofR 6:308]. 
The ‘defects’ of the state of nature 
Before I present my account in full, I should note that Arthur Ripstein has come closest 
to the kind of moral analysis I am trying to capture. Ripstein appreciates that Kant’s 
problem is not Hobbes’s; he casts the Kantian state of nature as a “normatively 
incoherent” situation from which right-bearers must escape. Ripstein appreciates Kant’s 
formalism when he states that Kant’s arguments for political authority do not rely on 
“focusing on the empirical defects of the state of nature”. Rather, these arguments 
remain “a priori because they are all internal to the concepts of acquired rights”.140 
                                                
140 Ripstein (2009) Force and Freedom, pp. 201, 146. 
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Taking Kant’s a priori method seriously prevents Ripstein from collapsing Kant back 
into Hobbes, in contrast to less sensitive readers.141 
 
Ripstein systematises this normative wrong of the Kantian state of nature in 
terms of three fundamental ‘defects’. This approach is common, and normally primarily 
focuses on the vulnerable condition of our rights as long as we remain in private 
dealings.142 Three defects arise in this condition of nature: First, given that we are 
agents endowed with freedom, acquired rights must be morally possible according to 
the postulate of practical reason – yet they are reduced to private rights fought 
unilaterally in the original condition. Second, since a right is by definition related to the 
corresponding capacity to coerce, the enforcement of such right is not possible in the 
condition of the state of nature. Third and finally, since rights can only be effective in a 
condition of equal freedom, the judgment over the distribution of such rights remains 
indeterminate.143 
 
Accordingly, these defects track the problems of unilateral choice, the problem 
of assurance, and the problem of indeterminacy. Kant’s solution, according to Ripstein, 
consists in designing a system of institutions with the required legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches that can, in concert, remedy the state of nature’s defects. I think 
this analysis, and the endorsement of Kant’s formalistic method I mentioned at the start, 
are salutary moves in favour of a distinctively Kantian account of the state of nature. 
However, while Ripstein sees part of the problem, he fails to see all of it. Even if he 
does not express it in these terms, I read these defects as manifestations of a yet more 
fundamental right. This right, or value, is “the right of independence” so prominent in 
Ripstein’s overall interpretation of Kant’s political project. It seems to me that it is this 
right, grounded in our “innate right to our humanity”, that is morally at stake in the state 
of nature for Ripstein. I now turn to why this is so, and to offer some criticisms of 
Ripstein’s position. 
                                                
141 Cf. Tuck (2011), Pogge (1988), and Bader (unpublished). 
142 Versions of the three defects have drawn the attention of commentators. To mention only some of 
these, the argument from unilateral action is considered in Ludwig (2002), and Flikschuh (2008). 
Assurance is central to Pippin (2006). For versions of the indeterminacy argument see Williams 
(1983). 
143 Ripstein (2009), pp. 146ff. 
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Innate right 
A possible reconstruction of this view is that given our innate right to freedom – 
understood by Kant as “independence from being constrained by another’s choice” – the 
state of nature is a paradigmatically vulnerable place for human agency. For Ripstein, 
agency is specifically determined by that “distinctive aspect of your status as a person in 
relation to other persons” to be “entitled to set your own purposes, and not required to 
act as an instrument for the pursuit of anyone else’s purposes”. This entitlement to 
independence makes you a “sovereign” over your choices and ends. According to 
Ripstein, this sovereignty is grounded in further entitlements naturally anchored in the 
innate right of our humanity. 
 
I am aware that this reconstruction is minimal, and the claims controversial.144 It 
is enough for my current purposes, however, because it raises two important questions: 
first, given the three Ripsteinian defects in the state of nature – unilateral choice, 
assurance, and indeterminacy – how are they related to this value of independence, 
which, in light of its importance, seems to be at risk in a condition of mere private 
doings? Second, if I am right to suggest that they should indeed be related to Ripstein's 
insistence on a right to independence as fundamental to our purposeful agency and 
freedom, how is this right under threat in the state of nature? 
 
Let us take on board the suggestion that the state of nature’s defects are 
troublesome only to the extent that they manifest a more fundamental wrong regarding 
the status of our innate right in the state of nature. Yet, this in itself is a problematic 
move because Ripstein does not present the matter in this way. Part of my problem with 
his diagnosis of the state of nature lies in the fact that we are left in need of an 
explanation of the kind of wrong that in turn explains why unilaterality, assurance and 
indeterminacy are defects in the first place. 
 
However, if it turns out that the defects are in fact related to the threat posed by 
others to my independence, then making this the wrong that explains the moral problem 
                                                
144 For a critique of Ripstein’s account of innate right see Flikschuh (2015).  
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of the state of nature does not actually correspond to the way Kant himself sees the 
problem. First, Kant does not appeal to any talk of innate right or of a right to 
independence from the choices of another in the context of his remarks on the state of 
nature. More importantly, he is adamant in saying that “it is not necessary to wait for 
actual hostility” and that no-one “need[s] to wait until he has learned by bitter 
experience” that we are “authorised to use coercion against someone who already, by 
his nature, threatens him”. We are then authorised to coerce others to leave this state 
along with us, regardless of any actual threat either to our innate right to freedom, or to 
our right to be independent from the choices of another [DofR 6:307]. 
 
 In contrast, Ripstein's interpretation approaches the moral troubles of the state 
of nature by means of two implicit assumptions: first, that to wrong your innate right to 
independence I must act in ways that indeed curtail your free, end-setting capacity. 
Second, what this wrong brings to light is that there is something of value, namely, the 
right to independence itself, that ultimately demands a coercive system of rights to 
ensure and protect the effective use of this right. 
 
The first point is troublesome, because actual infringements of rights cannot be 
the most morally problematic feature of this initial state. According to Ripstein, my use 
of you is “objectionable” insofar as I get what I want by subjecting to you to my 
arbitrary choice. This logic of uses and abuses of our independence requires an act, so 
Ripstein concludes that “my act is objectionable because the means I use are properly 
subject to your choice, not mine”.  
 
I agree that subjecting my choices to the choice of another is objectionable from 
a Kantian perspective. But it is not the end of the story, because Kant thinks that what 
makes the state of nature such a problematic condition is the fact that we do not even 
have to wait for any empirical act, such as me “grab[bing] you and push[ing] you out of 
the way”, to know that we must get out and settle into a civil condition.145 As he puts it: 
“It is not experience from which we learn of the maxim of violence in human beings 
and of their malevolent tendency to attack one another… thus it is not some deed that 
                                                
145 Ripstein (2009), p. 50. 
110	
makes coercion through public law necessary.” He also adds that you are wronged “just 
by being near me in this condition, even if not actively” [PP 8:349 fn., my emphasis]. 
 
Grounding this potential wrong in a literal act of infringement to your rights in 
the way Ripstein proposes, sounds to me worryingly Hobbesian. As we can see in the 
above quote, Kant is after a wrong that is independent of any specific empirical 
experience. This, of course, does not mean that there are no objectionable acts of 
unilateral choice – more specifically, of property – in the state of nature. But Ripstein’s 
limited account of the state of nature in terms of an action against my independence is 
not fully in line with Kant’s own own version of what is morally at stake in the state of 
nature. 
 
The second, problematic aspect of Ripstein’s proposal has to do with the right to 
independence as such. The central place he gives to this right, which in turn grounds the 
three defects of the state of nature, seems to me crucial. I interpret Ripstein’s three 
defects of the state of nature, i.e., unilateralism, lack of assurance, and indeterminacy as 
problematic because they manifest a deeper problem underlying the status of the 
substantive value he thinks is here under threat. From this follows that our right to be 
sovereign against the choices of others seems to enjoy for Ripstein a kind of 
independent value, conceptually connected to the three defects.146 As Flikschuh puts it 
in her own discussion of innate and acquired rights, Ripstein’s approach to 
independence and purposiveness suggests that “some substantive content does in the 
end intrude upon the analysis”.147 From this perspective, the state of nature is morally 
problematic because it threatens our capacity to be sovereign against the active choice 
of others. As Ripstein says, “each person’s entitlement to be independent of the choice 
of others constrains the conduct of others because of the importance of that 
independence, rather than in service of something else”.148 It is “the importance of that 
independence” that triggers for Ripstein the moral justification of establishing a system 
                                                
146 Flikschuh forcefully presents this objection. She identifies an interpretative trend among Kantians 
of identifying a value, in turn grounded in Kant’s innate right, as something akin to “our practically 
intuitive self-conception as rational end setters”. For an extended discussion see Flikschuh (2017) 
What is Orientation in Global Thinking? A Kantian Inquiry, pp. 37-40. 
147 Flikschuh (2015) ‘Innate Right and Acquired Right in Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom’, p. 
333. 
148 Ripstein (2009), p. 34, my emphasis. 
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of coercive rights, by resolutely abandoning this vulnerable condition.149 At the same 
time, his emphasis on independence is in tension with his insistence on Kantian 
formalism in politics, where the question of whether the choice of a plurality of persons 
can coexist was, and should remain, “a purely formal question”.150 
 
To conclude: Ripstein is right to approach the Kantian state of nature, as a 
condition where a normative wrong takes place. He is also right to read this condition 
with an eye on its formal, rather than its material features. However, I argue that 
Ripstein’s emphasis on the right to independence, and the wrong that arises from 
abusing its limits, misidentifies what is morally at stake in the state of nature. As I will 
discuss next, it is not independence from the arbitrary choice of another, but the 
structural relation of will to law what is morally at stake. 
4. The problem of the state of nature as a problem of the will 
This section presents my positive reading of Kant’s state of nature. I argue that there is a 
distinctive wrong in this state, a kind of moral wrong. It is a moral wrong for at least 
three reasons: First, it is an ‘existential wrong’, in the sense that it has to do with our 
existence as agents endowed with a will.151 Secondly, it is a moral wrong because we 
cannot avoid it, even if we were by nature benevolent or perfectly law-abiding. And 
finally, it is a moral wrong because it is carried by the lawlessness of our will, in the 
absence of the authority public law.  
 
In the previous section, I presented an alternative view according to which there 
are two sources of wrong in the Kantian state of nature. One has to do with the defects 
of such a condition, namely, unilateral choice, assurance, and indeterminacy. The other 
was Ripstein’s substantive analysis of the wrong in the state of nature in terms of the 
threat to the right of independence. I will now argue that these interpretations threaten to 
                                                
149 I read Ripstein’s emphasis on Kantian institutions as a solution primarily aimed at protecting our 
innate right to independence. The emphasis on a Kantian institutional solution to the state of nature 
has taken centre stage, largely assuming a settled, Ripsteinian, reading of why the state of nature is 
morally problematic in the first place. Cf., e.g., Sinclair (2018) and Weinrib (forthcoming). 
150 Ripstein (2015), pp. 8–9. 
151 DofR 6:231. 
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distract us from what is the more fundamental and philosophically novel moral wrong 
Kant theorised to be at play in this natural state. 
The ‘stato iniusto’ 
In a revealing passage in Perpetual Peace, Kant comes closer to explaining this type of 
wrong when he says that: 
A human being (or a nation) in a mere state of nature denies me this assurance and already 
wrongs me just by being near me in this condition, even if not actively (facto) yet by the 
lawlessness of his condition (stato iniusto), by which he constantly threatens me; and I can 
coerce him either to enter with me into a condition of being under civil laws or to leave my 
neighbourhood. [PP 8:349 fn.] 
We can see here Kant developing an important concept, the ‘stato iniusto’, which 
is a wrong that both emanates from and is done to the human will against itself. I 
suggest that the “lawlessness of his condition” or the stato iniusto is a threat represented 
by the condition of our will understood in terms of our capacity for choice, when it finds 
itself without a law that can give moral significance to its actions even as it limits them 
to the conditions of universal law.152 What Kant wants to show us is how, as soon as we 
take a step outside the inner world of our moral lives, and stand in inevitable and 
external interaction with one another, our will turns out to be lawless and, therefore, a 
moral threat to others, unless our reciprocal equality for choice is limited and 
determined under a kind of law, a law that is public and externally imposed.  
 
It is one of the basic tenets of Kant’s theory of the will that a will can only be free 
under a kind of law. As we saw in Chapter 1, at the level of individual, first-personal 
morality, this law is prescribed by practical reason in the form of an imperative.153 At 
the level of political morality, we are externally free when our actions are limited in 
accordance to universal law.154 Unless it is subjected to a public law capable of putting 
                                                
152 This principle of the will [Willkür], externally enforced by an appropriately omnilateral power, will 
turn out to be the Universal Principle of Right. Cf. DofR 6:231. 
153 On my specific understanding of reason’s self-legislation as a mode of prescription see Chapter 1, 
sec. III, ‘The will and the autonomy of reason’. 
154 “[S]o act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in 
accordance with a universal law” [DofR 6:231]. 
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everyone under an obligation, our external freedom wrongs others who have an equal 
claim to such a capacity. So, in order to make sense of the idea of having a will at all, or 
in other words, to make sense of the idea of political agency in general, we need to find 
a law that translates this stato iniusto, this “lawless condition” of our will, into the 
rightful exercise of our external freedom. 
 
It is no surprise that Kant’s way of speaking about this lawless condition involves 
expressions such as “wild freedom” and “brutish freedom”. More to the point (and in 
line with my interpretation), Kant describes the state of our will in the state of nature as 
a “state of externally lawless freedom”. What these phrases illustrate is that unless we 
abandon this condition, and constitute an external public will, our will will continue to 
be arbitrary, wild, and brutish (and possibly solitary) [DofR 6:308]. 
 
This point, that the will remains arbitrary and lawless in the natural condition, 
resonates with Kant’s own version of the Hobbesian state of nature. When presenting 
his own interpretation of Hobbes’ state of nature in a note in Religion, Kant takes some 
interpretive license, and introduces his particular concerns about the will in relation to 
the state of war: the war of all against all, he says, is “a state of continual infringement 
upon the rights of all others through man’s arrogant insistence on being judge of his 
own affairs and giving men no other security in their affairs save his own arbitrary will 
[Willkür]”.155 This assurance is morally deficient because it hinges on the arbitrary 
standing of our will. This standing is “arbitrary” in the sense I have argued in this 
section, namely, a will that chooses and acts without being subject to any law. The 
wrong for Kant lies in this “arrogant insistence” on the part of the individual to hold on 
to this arbitrary condition of her Willkür. 
 
Moreover, Kant conceptualises this wrong under a very specific moral category. 
He tells us it is a “wrong in the highest degree” to stubbornly insist in remaining in this 
lawless state, “enamoured with [one’s] unrestrained freedom.” More to the point, he 
uses the Groundwork’s language of exceptions when he describes, in Idea, the 
hardships involved in actually transitioning to the civic condition. Although man is a 
                                                
155 Kant in the Religion quoted by Tuck (2011), p. 210. 
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rational creature who “desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all, he is still 
misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law when 
he can” [IUH 8:21, my emphasis]. 
 
Making an exception for myself in the face of the duty to state entrance is a wrong 
done by the will to itself. The effects of this desire to keep our wild freedom intact will, 
surely, have consequences for others people’s equal capacity for choice, but as I have 
theorised this idea, the wrong is primarily or most fundamentally done to “the capacity 
of our will to be rightfully limited by law.” [DofR 6:312, IUH 8:23, my emphasis] 
A formal wrong about the lawless standing of will 
Understanding the moral dimension of this pre-juridical wrong is, I argue, Kant’s 
fundamental insight into the problem of the state of nature. It remains puzzling, 
however, how this wrong actually comes about. As I said before when discussing 
Ripstein, Kant thinks that this wrong occurs even absent “some deed that makes 
coercion through public law necessary” [DofR §44, 6:312]. I have also suggested that 
this wrong is, in some ways, existential. By this I mean that it is involved in the sheer 
existence as human beings who stand in inevitable proximity to each other, before 
public law is established. 
 
There is an air of paradox in these remarks: Kant seems to be saying that, in the 
state of nature there is a wrong involved in my mere standing next to you, because I 
embody a will that is lawless. Yet, how can I wrong you without acting against you? 
The only way we can explain our way out of this paradox is to hew close to Kant’s 
account of this particular situation, uniquely arising in the state of nature.156 As he says, 
                                                
156 Strictly speaking, there is no deed (factum) in Kant’s state of nature. According to his definitions in 
the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant reserves the term ‘deed’ to the kind of action that 
can be both judged (from the perspective of an authoritative judge or court) and imputed. This means 
that actions as deeds or factum can only take place, once we have entered a condition of public right, 
where actions are, strictly speaking,” under laws”. This way of articulating the matter shows that for 
Kant, there are to be sure actions in the state of nature, but not deeds, since this is still a condition 
where public law and the required institutions for public imputations are not in place, and so the law 
under which such actions stand could well be the moral law of each individual, but not the external, 
public law from which that individual will be judged. As Kant puts it in Section II of the Introduction: 
“Imputation (imputatio) in the moral sense is the judgment by which someone is regarded as the 
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the stato iniusto is a condition of my will, and not an empirical expression of my agency 
through actions. Though deeply abstract, this philosophical insight into the nature of 
willing in relation to law is deeply Kantian. For political life to be possible, the first 
thing that needs to be subjected to law – of an external kind – is the will that gives 
meaning to each individual’s agency. If the will is the source of lawfulness, as I have 
argued in this thesis, then we can easily understand why I don’t have to wait for anyone 
to push me around according to their arbitrary choices, or to infringe my right to be 
somewhere by occupying vast territories of the earth, to know that I am ‘robbed’ of my 
capacity to will [Willkür] choices, ends, and actions, unless we all subject ourselves to 
political authority.  
 
As Markus Willaschek explains in his analysis of right in contrast to ethics, 
“Kantian right is intrinsically social in a way that Kantian morality is not”. So my mere 
standing in the state of nature occupying a space ‘signals’, so to speak, a limitation on 
the right of anybody else to occupy the same space. Unless each of our limited spaces 
are clearly determined and secured by a universal law, I wrong you just by occupying a 
space that could, potentially, be yours: “The mere fact of my standing somewhere 
creates a right that limits the rights of everyone else”. This radical relational character of 
political life, and the unique wrong-doings that it brings with it, clearly contrasts with 
the isolationism of our moral lives.157  
 
If we focus on Kant’s assumptions about the will and law, the air of paradox 
quickly vanishes. Committing a wrong without actually committing any act conveys 
more forcefully the idea that the moral problem of the state of nature is, on the one 
hand, formal, i.e., not contingent on empirical circumstances, and on the other hand, a 
condition the moral significance of which is to be found in the human will and not in 
our external objects of choice. In this sense, this interpretation of the existential wrong 
departs from Hobbes’s empirical diagnosis of the state of nature, and it also departs 
from Ripstein's focus on the problems that arise from abusing our right to independence. 
                                                                                                                                          
author (causa libera) of an action, which is then called a deed (factum) and stands under laws… The 
(natural or moral) person that is authorised to impute with rightful force is called a judge or a court” 
[DofR 6:227]. 
157 Willaschek (2009) ‘Right and Coercion: Can Kant’s Conception of Right be Derived from his 
Moral Theory?’, pp. 64–5. 
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To recapitulate: I have argued that for Kant, the source of discord in political 
life, as in our moral life, lies not in the way we are, but rather with the way we will. 
Kant’s view of conflict as rooted in the lawless condition of agents embodied with a 
will [Willkür], rather than in human nature, makes the state not merely an instrumental 
necessity but a moral necessity grounded in a duty to state entrance. If my analysis is 
right, locating the source of conflict in the will and not in human nature marks a radical 
difference between Kant’s and Hobbes’s respective accounts of legitimate coercion. 
From a Kantian perspective, if what were at stake were the enmity between the strong 
and the weak, or the violence ensuing from a glory-drive passion, a mere instrumental 
justification of the state would do the job. In contrast, Kant has identified a moral wrong 
that changes the normative landscape of the state of nature altogether, demanding a 
particular kind of political state in terms of the idea of Public Will.  
5. From a lawless will towards the moral necessity 
of a Public Will 
In this final section I address two issues: first, the way Kant sought a synergy between 
the morally troubling aspects raised by our analysis of the state of nature, on the one 
hand, and the specific features an adequate form of public willing has to have in order to 
solve what was morally at stake in this initial condition, on the other. Second, I want to 
draw this chapter to a close by understanding Kant’s commitment to the state as a 
necessary solution to the problem of the state of nature. 
Moral synergy between problem and solution 
I think there is a remarkable synergy in the way Kant diagnoses the problem of the state 
of nature, and the way he conceives of its solution. He conceptualises the problem of the 
state of nature in terms of the structure of the will and its relation to law. What is 
morally at stake, then, is the arbitrary and lawless standing of the human will in a 
condition characterised by the absence of public law. Kant’s solution to this problem is 
likewise conceptualised in terms of the relation of the will to law. As we will see in 
more detail in the next chapter, he believes that the solution must be developed in the 
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same terms as those of the original problem, namely, as a transition from lawless 
willing to a condition of rightful political willing. 
  
I argue that Kant seeks to explain the transition from the state of nature to the 
civil state as a transition in forms of willing: from private and unilateral lawlessness to 
public and omnilateral lawfulness. That Kant has been working out this adequate form 
of willing to address the problem of conflict in human interaction has been explored 
from the perspective of teleology in Chapter 2. In this chapter, I have explored this 
problem in the specific scenario of the state of nature. My claims have been developed 
from the vantage point of Kant’s account in the Doctrine of Right. In this sense, it is 
only in retrospect, I suggest, that we are able to make sense of the emergence of the idea 
of a Public Will that can overcome the deficiencies of the moral wrong that initially 
necessitated it.  
 
Two important features of public will, namely, externality and a prioricity, are 
already explored in the context of the state of nature.158 For Kant, the moral problematic 
of this condition has nothing to do with the lack of moral resolution of individuals to act 
on a maxim that can be universalisable, or with ethical considerations.159 Equally, the 
wrong is independent of the a posteriori and empirical circumstances that constrain our 
agency (think, for example, of the role that scarcity plays in a Hobbesian scenario). In 
                                                
158 I discuss these two features of public willing in Chapter 4, sec. III, ‘Moral features of Public Will: 
Omnilaterality and Coercion’. 
159 Kant seems to be introducing an ethical consideration in the state of nature, and this has motivated 
some scholarly discussion. He introduces a presumption of ethics in his dictum that, when faced with 
another human being, and in the absence of public law, “Quilibet praesumitur malus, donec 
securitatem dederit oppositi (‘Everyone is presumed bad until he has provided security to the 
contrary’)” This sentence would be troubling if appealed to as a principle by which to judge the 
intentions underlying the actions of others. However, as Byrd and Hruschka explain, this presumption 
is applied only to actions, as a dictum that allows us to navigate through this vulnerable condition 
[DofR 6:307]. When rights are infringed in the state of nature, “I may presume another person did not 
steal a horse, for example, because he was afraid of being caught by the horse’s owner, not because he 
is a virtuous person. For the presumption of innocence, the person’s reasons, motivations, and 
attitudes are completely irrelevant”. To put it more systematically, what is relevant for Kant is the fact 
that both before and after a public law is established, it is the actions, and not the morality of the 
intentions determining it, that call for a law that can distribute justice in a way that I can choose, 
possess, and enjoy the objects of my choice. Byrd and Hruschka (2008), pp. 621. In a similar vein, 
Ripstein reminds us that the state of nature is a condemnable condition from a moral point of view 
“not because of any views about the ‘radical evil’ of human beings, such as those [Kant] defends in 
his Religion, but because the alternative is a merely material principle based on the particular motives 
of those you interact with” (Ripstein (2009), pp. 163–4). 
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his early analysis of the state of nature, Kant has already settled on the external nature 
of his theory of Public Right as well as on the a priori grounds of justification. This is 
why the moral wrong the resolution of which requires an external and a priori will 
cannot be rooted in anything to do either with the inner moral dispositions of our will or 
with the potential hostilities of a state of war: 
However well disposed and law-abiding human beings might be, it still lies a priori in the 
rational idea of such a condition (one that is not rightful) that before a public lawful 
condition is established individual human beings, peoples and states can never be secure 
against violence from one another… So, unless it wants to renounce any concepts of right, 
the first thing it has to resolve upon is the principle that it must leave the state of nature, in 
which each follows its own judgment, unite itself with all others… that is, it ought above all 
else to enter a civil condition. [DofR 6:312] 
It should be clear from this passage how, for Kant, a “public lawful condition” 
results from a priori considerations about what is right, and more importantly, about the 
external dimensions of our agency, in contrast to agents’ internal dispositions. In 
keeping with my analysis of the stato iniusto, by ‘external’ here I mean Kant’s concern 
over the possibility of the human will to be under an external legislation that is adequate 
to our political agency instead of our moral agency. This wrong is “iniusto” precisely 
because it is the standing of a will that stubbornly holds itself to act externally in a way 
that is lawless and arbitrary. 
The moral necessity of the Kantian state 
I want to draw this discussion to a close by turning to the issue of the political necessity 
of the state. One of the main claims of this chapter has been to show that, despite Kant 
taking Hobbes’s problem of authority very seriously, he offers a radically different 
explanation of the roots that make political authority a matter of necessity. In contrast to 
Hobbes’s instrumentalism, Kant’s morally–driven diagnosis of the state of nature leads 
him to the moral necessity of the state, as the only possible institution capable of 
embodying a will that is 
omnilateral, that is, united not contingently but a priori and therefore necessarily, 
and because of this is the only will that is lawgiving. For only in accordance with 
this principle of the will is it possible for the free choice of each to accord with the 
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freedom of all, and therefore possible for there to be any right, and so too possible 
for any external object to be mine or yours. [DofR 6:263, emphasis in the original] 
Key to Kant’s argument is his insistence that what makes this “principle of the 
will” a matter of necessity has nothing to do with human beings’ tendencies to be 
violent, selfish, or ambitious. To be sure, he does not deny that “envy, addiction to 
power, avarice, and the malignant inclinations associated with these assail [our] nature”, 
but this Hobbesian story is not what makes exiting the state of nature a necessity for us. 
As Allen Wood has extensively argued in his works on Kant’s anthropology and his 
theory of human nature, “whatever we say about human nature, its predispositions and 
its propensities, can have only a provisional character” in Kant’s philosophy; there is no 
“specific differentia” with which to compare our species, since the human species “is 
only one possible variant of rational nature”.160 
 
For this reason, I find it hard to understand why some Kantians seek to ground 
necessity out of contingent explanations when they say, for example, that “the necessity 
of the civil condition is, accordingly, explained by means of motivational 
considerations”, and in terms of the “imperfections that the threat of hostility and 
violence is due to our nature”. I suspect this has something to do with Kant’s 
assumptions about the structure of sovereignty, and the resemblance it bears with 
Hobbes’s. Pogge is a good example of this characterisation of Kant, when he says that 
the latter is unable to extricate the Hobbesian “dogma of absolute sovereignty” 
presupposing authority as the only recognised mechanism “that uniquely resolve[s] any 
conflict”.161 
 
But if the state is, indeed, a moral necessity, how is this duty grounded? 
According to Kant, “when you cannot avoid living side by side with all others, you 
ought to leave the state of nature and proceed with them into a rightful condition, that is, 
a condition of distributive justice”. This he calls the ‘Postulate of Public Right’. But 
who exactly says it is so, and how does the agent experience this postulate as a matter of 
duty?  
                                                
160 Wood (2003), p. 47. 
161 Cf. Bader (unpublished), pp. 7–8 and Pogge (1988), p. 416. 
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In the context of Kant’s account of moral willing, we learned that the law was 
experienced in the form of an imperative. If Kant had adopted this account in politics, 
he would have had to say that in order to enter the civil condition, and abandon the 
wrong of standing side by side with others in a lawless state, I would have had to make 
it my maxim to make my actions compatible with those of everybody else as a matter of 
duty. 
 
However, Kant’s radical shift to an external model of political willing shows that 
the duty to state entrance can and must be complied with, even if I do not make it my 
maxim to act in accordance with such a law. As Kant puts it in Section C on the 
‘Universal Principle of Right’:  
[A]ct externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of 
everyone in accordance with a universal law, is indeed a law that lays an obligation 
on me, but it does not at all expect, far less demand, that I myself should limit my 
freedom to those conditions just for the sake of this obligation; instead, reason says 
only that freedom is limited to those conditions in conformity with the idea of it 
and that it may also be actively limited by others. [DofR 6:231, emphasis in the 
original] 
But what grounds the obligation that says that “I myself should limit my freedom 
to those conditions”, and where does the power to bind us in this required way come 
from? This obligation is grounded in the coercive power of an omnilateral will, as the 
only legitimate source from which the freedom of each can be limited.  
 
We can now see more clearly the analytical connection that Kant draws between 
the duty to state entrance as the only condition that makes a system of political 
obligations possible, and the law prescribed by the postulate of practical reason to 
abandon unilaterality in favour of omnilateral legislation. This duty must be possible for 
beings like us since according to Kant’s theory of the will, “it would not be a duty to 
aim at a certain effect of our will if this effect were not also possible in experience”. 
From this perspective, “we are not free to turn our backs on the moral possibilities that 
the exercise of the state opens up to us”162 through the moral qualities of an omnilateral 
                                                
162 Waldron (2006), p. 183. 
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will. Kant understands this as an idea of reason since it is only from reason that “alone 
can arise any rule that is to contain necessity” [CPrR 5:20]. 
 
To conclude: this chapter explored a transitional argument in Kant’s account of 
public will. It is thus inevitable that the resolution of this transition from the state of 
nature to the civil state remains, in one important respect, incomplete. A complete 
picture requires an in-depth analysis of the way Kant thinks Public Will is constituted, 
and the role it plays in limiting the choices that cause the moral problems of the state of 
nature. I complete this picture in the next chapter by taking up the following question: 
What makes political agency possible? Kant’s complex account of Public Will is the 
issue we now turn to explore.  
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Chapter 4 
Public Will 
Introduction 
This thesis argues that there is a conflict inherent in political life, one which Kant 
understood as a systematic problem in willing. So far I have traced the steps of Kant’s 
progressive development of an account of political willing, appropriate to the kind of 
conflict it is meant to resolve. In Chapter 2, I argued that a teleological account of 
political willing in terms of Nature has serious shortcomings. In Chapter 3, I showed 
why Hobbes’s prudential solution to the conflict of the state of nature was also 
philosophically deficient from a Kantian point of view. I also argued that Kant’s serious 
engagement with the problem of political authority commits him to a moral justification 
of the state, as the only condition capable of overcoming the lawless standing of our 
will absent public law. From this it follows that Kant thinks there must be a duty to 
enter the state, and to bring all others along with us. The challenge now, then, is to get 
free of this intractable situation of the clash of unilateral wills of the state of nature, and 
to articulate the idea of a Public Will, with the omnilateral power to put everyone under 
an obligation.  
 
This chapter critically engages with Kant’s account of this form of external 
legislation. I do this by addressing two issues: (1) what is Public Will and (2) how does 
it will? More systematically, the question I want to answer in this chapter is this: What 
is the kind of will Kant thinks is morally adequate to limit human agency?  
 
I propose to answer this question by means of three claims. First, I argue that 
Kant thinks of political authority in terms of a different kind of will to the limited will of 
human beings. Public Will is different in kind, in the sense that it is constituted by 
unique moral features that human beings lack, namely, an omnilateral perspective and a 
power to coerce. Second, to show how Kant’s idea of what is ‘public’ in willing must be 
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distinguished from what is ‘general’ in Rousseau’s sense. I defend this difference by 
further contrasting Rousseau’s project of moral perfectibility with Kant’s strictly 
juridical requirements for public willing. Third, I argue that this model of legislation is 
one of subjection and not of collective legislation, as some have interpreted it.  
 
I appeal to Rousseau in the context of this chapter, given the clear relationship 
that exists between their respective views on the idea of the general will.163 This 
assimilation is even more tempting than an assimilation between Kant and Hobbes, 
notwithstanding my own qualifications of Kant’s and Hobbes’s relation in the previous 
chapter. However, as Alexis Philonenko reminds us, arguing “against Hobbes does not 
make Kant a disciple of Rousseau”.164 My claim is that Kant took Rousseau as seriously 
as he took Hobbes. As with my appeal to Hobbes in the previous chapter, my appeal to 
Rousseau is instrumental: it is a means to clarify the particularities of Kant’s own 
account of political willing.  
 
The conclusion of this chapter will be that Kant offers an account of external 
public lawgiving that is remarkably minimal in its demands. For Kant, the possibility of 
a ‘fully reciprocal’ system of obligations does not depend on an internal moral 
transformation of the individual, nor on a historical–cum–social development of our 
personal autonomy. Rather, what results from Kant’s account of political authority in 
terms of willing is a system aimed at facilitating the conditions that make agency 
through universal law possible. 
1. The limitations of unilateral willing 
Kant characterises the state of nature as a morally problematic condition. In Chapter 3 I 
argued that the originality of Kant’s diagnosis of the state of nature lies in locating the 
source of the problem, of which a lack of assurance and indeterminacy are but 
symptoms, in the lawless status of the will of unilateral wills. Being the source of 
                                                
163 I appeal to Rousseau to draw a more general contrast between their views on the role of politics in 
Chapter 5, Part II, sec. II, ‘Kant’s political minimalism’. 
164 Philonenko (1968) Théorie et Praxis dans le pensée morale et politique de Kant et de Fichte en 
1973, p. 41. 
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lawfulness for Kant, if will is the locus of moral responsibility, and equally the source 
of obligations, then the aim of establishing political authority is thus to find an adequate 
will from which political obligations can be rightfully discharged. This source is the 
Kantian Public Will. 
 
But before we turn to Kant’s attempt to establish political authority in terms of 
Public Will, it is useful to recapitulate the background against which this form of 
willing becomes the appropriate source of legitimate authority. Kant’s argument is 
simple: unless a form of public legislation is properly established, we agents endowed 
with external freedom of choice will be constrained by the unilateral perspectives of our 
will. Moreover, we are not able to move beyond a one-to-one interaction with others as 
long as we lack the presence of a third party that can adjudicate the limits between equal 
choices. 
 
These forms of constraint and limitation in willing are the reasons why Kant sees 
a model of unilateral willing as inadequate for public legislation. This inadequacy of a 
mere unilateral exercise of choice was clearer in the state of nature, where individuals 
were thought “to remain in this state of externally lawless freedom”. It is instructive 
here to see Kant distinguishing between an “externally lawless freedom” and a potential 
internal law-governed freedom. The idea seems to be that even if our will could be 
under the law-governed prescription of reason in our inner moral lives, the external 
character of our actions in our political lives remains lawless until a form of public 
legislation is rightfully established [DofR 6:308]. 
 
Hence, the inadequacy of a unilateral model of willing for external – i.e., public 
– legislation arises from two fundamental limitations: first, a will that does not stand 
under omnilateral legislation remains constrained to a unilateral point of view over her 
own actions and that of everybody else. Second, and relatedly, Kant thinks that 
unilateral wills are unsuited to discharging political obligations as they lack the required 
coercive power. To be sure, we can impose our will in an arbitrary and violent manner 
on others, but this unilateral act of coercion can never become rightful in the eyes of all. 
Advancing our rights in this way, Kant predicts, “would make every rightful 
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constitution insecure and introduce a condition of complete lawlessness (status 
naturalis)” [TP 8:301]. 
 
Another way of theorising this inadequacy is by means of a contrast between 
what is private and what is public. I already mentioned that unilateral wills have a 
restricted perspective on their own actions – indeed, a perspective restricted to their own 
desires, expectations, and needs. This perspective is, so to speak, blind to what is public, 
as it can never have an omnilateral view of the whole. Something similar animates 
Rousseau’s concern when, as Patrick Riley explains, we find him keen, like Kant and 
Hegel, to abandon the “capricious volunté particulière” in order to bring about what is 
non-arbitrary and common to all.165  
 
Kant hints at the idea of the capricious nature of unilateral willing when he refers 
to a kind of freedom that, unconstrained by the limits of public law, remains lawless, 
brutish, wild, and savage.166 This limited view on its capricious needs is coupled with 
the violence done to others when trying to actively limit their equal free agency. This 
active use of our unilateral power for choice is clearer in the case of provisional 
acquisition. The wrong of unilaterally forcing someone to give up an object they have 
claimed as theirs in the state of nature is explained by Kant as follows: 
[F]or the will of all others except for himself, which proposes to put him under 
obligation to give up a certain possession, is merely unilateral, and hence has as 
little lawful force in denying him possession as he has in asserting it (since this can 
be found only in a general will). [DofR 6:257, my emphasis] 
What a unilateral will lacks, and only a general will possesses, is the “lawful 
force” of putting others under an obligation to restrict their capricious and therefore 
violent use of their objects of choice. Kant is thinking about this problem by combining 
two distinct notions, namely, that of law and that of force or coercion. Kant’s insight 
into the nature of willing in general is that unless our wills stand under a kind of lawful 
legislation, be it internal or external (political), they lack the capacity to make claims 
against one another. Only the “will of the entire people”, where “all decide about all, 
                                                
165 Riley (2015a) ‘Kant on the General Will’, p. 334. 
166 Cf. PP 8:353, 357. 
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here each about himself”, is adequate to legislate political interaction. Kant concludes 
that “no particular will can legislate for a commonwealth”.  
 
I claim that this analysis about the moral deficiencies of unilateral willing is the 
groundwork of Kant’s distinctive account of Public Will. Moreover, that unilateral wills 
cannot settle matters of right is part of the reason why a different kind of will needs to 
be constituted. I substantiate this claim in the next section [TP 8:295]. 
2. What is a Public Will? 
To understand the different elements involved in Kant’s account of Public Will, I argue 
in this section that the Public Will is best understood by looking at its features and the 
way in which these features respond to Kant’s deeply relational understanding of 
agency. The claim I want to defend is that in order to make sense of its moral features, 
namely, its omnilateral and coercive power, Public Will must be a different kind of will 
to the human will. What makes Public Will fit for universal legislation, I argue, is 
precisely its unique moral constitution. I advance this interpretation by systematising 
the way the characteristic features of this public model of legislation get constituted, in 
contrast to a model of political authority by authorisation more commonly endorsed by 
the social contract tradition. 
General description 
If my argument in Chapter 3 is right, the idea of Public Will is a moral necessity, given 
the morally problematic condition of the state of nature. In line with this analysis, I 
focused on the moral limitations that a model of unilateral willing presents to political 
interaction in the section above. There, we saw how an agent’s unilateral capacity to 
choose and to act in the state of nature is confronted with two problems: first, as 
Flikschuh notes, “my will cannot coercively bind yours” unless we think that, granting 
innate equality, each and everyone has a right to coerce others. But how is this coercion 
to be legitimately exercised? The second problem regarding the legitimate use of 
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coercion is that given innate equality of wills, “neither can coercively bind the other”.167 
A different standpoint needs to be adopted. The emergence of a Public Will, defined as 
a moral person, is Kant’s conceptual attempt to offer a solution to these problems. 
 
Kant first hints at the idea that Public Will is a ‘moral person’ in the context of a 
discussion on contracts. He makes two important assumptions, both drawn from his 
account of external acquisition. They are, first, that it must be possible to use objects 
external to myself to make use of my own freedom. Second, he assumes that my right to 
objects of choice establishes a relation of obligation between persons and not to the 
thing itself, since talking of “having a right to a thing as if the thing had an obligation to 
me” is, as Kant rightly puts it, “an absurd way of representing it” [DofR 6:246; 261].  
 
So when we enter into a contract to acquire something externally, “what”, Kant 
asks, “is it that I acquire?” What follows from this question is a refined analysis of the 
underlying structure of a contract between two people. According to Kant, what I 
acquire through a contract is not the “external thing” in question – e.g., a loan or a piece 
of land – but rather “another’s promise (not what he promised)”. In acquiring the 
obligations underlying this contract, Kant subtly shows that my possessions somehow 
have been enlarged in a way that “I have become enriched by acquiring an active 
obligation on the freedom and means of the other” [DofR 6:274].168  
 
It is worth noticing Kant’s metaphorical use of the idea of “enriching” oneself in 
this context. From a Lockean perspective, for example, when we enter into a contract 
we literally engross our riches by acquiring a right to a thing that is external and usable 
in space.169 However, Kant is here tweaking the terminology to make room for an 
enrichment of possessions of a radically different kind: an enrichment of the scope of 
my agency, against that of everyone else. 
The connection of this experience to the requirement of a Public Will comes 
thus to the fore: to have external possession of objects of choice, I must be able to put 
                                                
167 Flikschuh (2010), p. 63. 
168 This analysis is continuous with Kant’s discussion of ‘intelligible possession’ in the context of the 
property argument in the Doctrine of Right. See DofR 6:268–269. 
169 Compare Locke (1988) Second Treatise of Government, Chap. 5, ‘On Property’. 
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the will of another under an obligation. Given the structural limitations of unilateral 
wills to do the job, the necessity of a Public Will emerges. 
The ‘moral person’  
It follows that Kant is trying to show that all contracts, and more generally, all 
“practical relations” between individuals, have to be based not in a relation between two 
unilateral wills, but in a relation of the omnilateral will of all with respect to each. The 
right to call others to perform their contractual duties is based, first and foremost, in 
[a] right against that moral person which is nothing other than the idea of the 
choice of all united a priori, by which alone I can acquire a right against every 
possessor of the thing, which is what constitutes any right to a thing. [DofR 6:274, 
emphasis in the original] 
This “moral person”, representing the idea of the general will of all, is the Public 
Will. Public Will secures the formal possibility by “which alone I can acquire a right 
against every possessor of the thing”. In the language of the Groundwork, we are meant 
to ask ourselves: Could everybody will an object of choice external to oneself as a 
matter of universal law? A conflict between wills readily emerges. How is the choice of 
each to co-exist with the choice of everybody else? And if, as Kant has just explained, 
the conflict is not one about things but a conflict between persons, is there a body 
capable of discharging the obligations that arise from universalisability requirements? 
Here we find a first interlocking in Kant between the problem of political agency and 
his account of public willing. 
 
This analysis equips us with the means to reflect on the essential attributes of the 
Kantian Public Will. The role of Public Will is to establish a juridical form of 
association, where a “general, external (i.e., public) lawgiving” can limit the scope of 
agency of each consistently with others equally valid agency claims. Kant illustrates this 
balancing act by means of an analogy: “One can compare the relations of right to those 
of the body. Every body is in a state of rest towards all others except insofar as each is 
moved by other” [Notes on Ethics 19:128]. This endless movement is concretely 
manifested in the external character of our actions and how they “directly or indirectly” 
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affect the limits and the scope of the agency of the rest. In contrast, in the realm of 
individual morality, our judgements themselves, and the correctness of our actions, do 
not affect anybody else, given the focus on the non-spatial, internal character of 
maxims.170 
 
According to Kant’s image of bodies in motion, we remain figuratively in a state 
of rest until the action of another ‘touches’ us, affecting our agency. But what aspect of 
our will is affected by the actions of others? Is it our moral standing or our legal 
standing that is relevant here – or is it both? Kant’s answer is unambiguous:  
Just as right generally has as its object only what is external in actions, so strict 
right, namely that which is not mingled with anything ethical, requires only 
external grounds for determining choice; for only then is it pure and not mixed with 
any precepts of virtue. [DofR 6:232] 
For any attentive reader of Kant, it is telling to see him attribute “purity” of 
motive to something other than the grounds of moral determination. Here Kant is 
altering his standard view of what is a pure motive by distinguishing purity in Right 
from purity in Ethics. From the perspective of Right, actions count as legally binding 
only when they are ‘purified’ of any ethical incentives or “precepts of virtue”. A “pure” 
system of Right, in contrast, has now “as its object only what is external in actions”. 
A prioricity 
This idea of a “pure” system of rights connects neatly with Kant’s attribution of a 
prioricity to Public Will. On this particular issue, Kant tends to be slippery and to use 
the idea of Public Will and the idea of the general will interchangeably, of which I will 
have more to say as this section develops. He specifically attributes a priori status to the 
                                                
170 For Kant, external lawgiving had to happen in both time and space in order to be open to the 
evaluative assessment of others. The external character of Public Will is accordingly directed at 
human actions, and not human intentions or maxims. As Ludwig states, “Merely internal actions, 
actions that are only in time (making up maxims, setting ends, and so on), cannot possibly be objects 
of an assessment by others, and thus punishment and rewards are impossible for them (since their 
application presupposes knowledge about whether the duty was fulfilled or not)” (Ludwig (2015) 
‘Sympathy for the Devil(s)? Personality and Legal Coercion in Kant's Doctrine of Law’, p. 36). 
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idea of the general will, one “that is united not contingently but a priori and therefore 
necessarily, and because of this it is the only will that is lawgiving” [DofR 6:263].  
 
I suggest there are two senses of a priori at work in this account: on the one 
hand, the idea of the general will as an a priori criterion for legislation. On the other 
hand, the general will is a priori in the sense that its “lawgiving” capacity remains 
independent of any a posteriori consequences or considerations that result from its own 
legislation. 
 
That the general will should be understood as an a priori criterion for legislation 
has been stressed by Guyer in his discussion of Kant’s “moral politician”. Guyer adopts 
the first of these two senses when he states that the general will is a criterion available 
to actual politicians who, acting as representatives of the idea of the general will, must 
be morally constrained to conform their willing to this idea. But why would politicians 
be motivated to will and to judge in accordance with the a priori requirements of this 
idea?  
 
Guyer believes that Kantian politicians cannot be ‘let off the hook’ of morality. 
Rulers “cannot be motivated solely by self-interest and coercion, but must be motivated 
by respect for morality”.171 This “respect for morality” seems to be based for Guyer on 
an independent concern about the relationship between the external character of Right in 
Kant, and the internal morality of Ethics. On my reading of him, Guyer thinks that these 
two realms must come into tension in the person of the ruler, and that this tension must 
be resolved by Ethics taking the lead:  
Rulers, that is, the executive branch, thus have a moral burden for the reform of 
governments toward the ideal of justice unlike that of anyone else even in a 
government, because they have a unique combination of moral obligation and 
coercive power.172 
To be sure, Kant would not deny that moral politicians, contrary to the political 
moralists, should take into consideration the moral burden that arises from their 
                                                
171 Guyer (2009) ‘The Crooked Timber of Mankind’, p. 133. 
172 Ibid., p. 135. 
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independent commitment to morality. However, when Kant states that Public Will is a 
priori, this should be understood as a constitutive feature of Public Will and not as a 
demand for individual ethical legislation. The moral requirement of a Public Will to 
speak in the name of all, i.e., in the name of the general will, is built into the idea of 
public willing itself, even if actual politicians, moral or otherwise, fail to measure up to 
it.  
 
For these reasons, I find it difficult to see why Guyer wants to attribute moral 
requirements that are proper to an internal legislation, given that Kant does not make 
moral motives a requirement to act in accordance with public law. The a prioricity of 
the idea of the general will is not dependent on the moral talent of the legislator. As 
Kant puts it: 
The legislator may indeed err in judging whether or not the measures he adopts are prudent, 
but not in deciding whether or not the law harmonises with the principle of right. For he has 
ready to hand as an infallible a priori standard the idea of an original contract. [TP p. 80, 
my emphasis] 
So far we have discussed the context that gives rise to Kant’s notion of Public 
Will. This context emerges from Kant’s commitment to a relational view of rights, 
similar to a sphere where bodies are affected and touched by the agency of others. This 
notion, for Kant, is a priori, in the sense that it serves as a criterion for legislation. I 
raised some worries with Guyer’s interpretation of the notion. Part of my worry is due 
to a more general, and even more problematic difficulty in the literature, one about the 
difference between external and internal legislation. 
 
Guyer adopts an interpretative strategy, shared by others, that incorporates ethical 
concerns to Kant’s strictly public conception of political authority.173 I will have more 
                                                
173 Guyer is not alone in bringing considerations of ethics into the realm of right. Whereas his example 
of the tension between the two (more commonly expressed in Kant in the form of a conflict between 
duties of virtue and duties of justice) is exemplified by the deliberations of the moral politician, 
Korsgaard famously defends a similar conflict in the person of the revolutionary. Again, a duty of 
virtue, possibly underwritten by an independent value of personal autonomy, takes the upper hand for 
Korsgaard when she says that “[t]he moment of revolution is a vindication of morality, and so of our 
humanity… The revolutionary does not become strong and free when he picks up his gun. Instead, he 
proves to us that he’s been free all along. It is because the laws of morality are his own laws that he is 
finally prepared to fight for them. The doubt created by the antinomy is dispelled. Revolution teaches 
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to say about this when I discuss autonomous models of collective legislation in Chapter 
5. For now, it is enough to keep these two models of legislation i.e. internal and external 
legislation, separate. 
Internal vs. external legislation 
Kant is determined to make his model of public willing independent of ethical 
considerations. This does not mean that the idea of Public Will is independent of a 
political morality. This morality is grounded in the role that external legislation plays 
when the fundamental law of right, i.e., the Universal Principle of Right states that one 
must “act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of 
everyone in accordance with a universal law” [DofR 6:231]. This principle, however, 
“does not at all expect, far less demand that I myself should limit my freedom to those 
conditions just for the sake of this obligation”. Rather, Kant goes on to explain that: 
Reason says only that freedom is limited to those conditions in conformity with the 
idea of it and that it may also be actively limited by others; and it says this as a 
postulate that is incapable of further proof. [DofR 6:231-32] 
On this picture, consistency with universal law is ‘built into’ the idea of external 
freedom. What it means to be externally free is to be subjected to universal law.174 
Kant’s point of departure is not the question of whether or not we are perfect or flawed 
human beings, capable of acting in accordance with the law; rather, he carves out a 
sphere where our agency can be expressed, and effectively assured, independently of 
our capacity to will the law for the law’s sake, leaving open the motivations underlying 
our external exercise of freedom.175 As Beck assures us, if the possibility of making my 
use of freedom compatible with that of everybody else depended on “the individual’s 
                                                                                                                                          
us nothing but what we have known all along: that the good person and the free person are one and the 
same” (Korsgaard (2008), p. 262).  
174 It is a fundamental idea at work throughout Kant’s practical philosophy that to have a will is 
equivalent to being under a law of some kind. To be sure, Kant entertains the idea of a lawless will, as 
we saw in the context of the state of nature in Chapter 3, but he does so solely to show how such a 
standing is morally wrong, and to derive the demand to determine our wills out of such a state [stato 
iniuto]. A “lawless freedom” for Kant is not freedom at all. For the relationship of the will [Willkür] to 
the law of reason [Wille], see Chapter 1, sec. II, ‘The will as a kind of causality’. 
175 Wood rightly identifies this as an “advantage” of Kant’s system of right, since conformity to right 
“may be motivated entirely by non-Kantian considerations – such as rational self-interest, the 
Hobbesian quest for peace, or obedience to the divine will” (Wood (2002), p. 10). 
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private and unique Willkür”, it is not clear how the maxim underlying each act of 
freedom “will meet the requirements of social uniformity and harmony or how, indeed, 
they could make any claim to be binding upon others”.176 
 
Having rejected internal motives as an inappropriate ground for a strictly external 
and public form of willing, it is important to swiftly reject another alternative ground of 
determination, namely, the general idea of happiness. The issue seems to be pressing for 
Kant. He criticises it in his political writings, for instance by advocating for a non-
hedonistic, formal conception of politics when he states that a principle of happiness has 
“ill effects in political right just as in morality”.177 The indeterminacy of this principle 
makes sovereigns into despots, and subjects into rebels [TP 8:302]. So neither the 
particularity of inner motives nor the indeterminacy of a conception of happiness can be 
the ground of public willing. 
A different kind of will: Against a model of authorisation 
I have argued that Public Will is Kant’s distinctive account of political authority. A 
question remains as to how this kind of authority gets established. One common way of 
understanding this issue is by means of a theory of authorisation. However, I argue in 
this section that this is not Kant’s way of dealing with this problem. I offer systematic 
reasons why a model of authorisation, such as one of ‘transference of rights’, does not 
correspond to the way Kant thinks the moral features of a public will get constituted. I 
will first offer a sketch of the ‘transference of rights view’, focusing on Hobbes as its 
clearest defender to, second, present a reading of Kant’s alternative account. 
 
According to the authorisation view of political authority, we ‘create’ political 
authority by authorising the sovereign to act on our behalf. We do so by transferring all 
or a set of the fundamental rights that individuals have, by means of a social contract, to 
                                                
176 Beck (1993), p. 46. 
177 He presents the same idea in the Critique of Practical Reason. What is revealing about this 
particular passage is Kant’s explicit reference to both external and internal modes of legislation: 
“Empirical determining grounds are not fit for any universal external legislation and are no more fit 
for internal lawgiving; for each puts at the basis of inclination his subject – another, another subject – 
and even within each subject now the influence of one inclination preponderates and now that of 
another” [CPrR 5:28]. 
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the authorised power to secure and protect them. Authorisation, we learn, “can be used 
to extend an author’s rights to a representative only if the author has the relevant 
rights”. It is this ‘having of the relevant rights’ that will prove crucial to Kant’s 
departure from this model. 
 
But before we turn to Kant, I suggest we consider this version of the social 
contract theory. We will consider it through looking at its most prominent 
representative: Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes’s readers tend to assume that “the purpose of 
authorisation is to enable the sovereign to act on the subjects’ rights”.178 Susanne 
Sreedhar, for example, claims that authorisation involves the transfer of “normative 
power such as the right to make a contractual agreement”179 to the newly created 
sovereign authority.  
 
This way of thinking about political authority goes hand in hand with the deeply 
ingrained way we think about rights. For Hobbes, in order to escape the perils of the 
state of war, and to put an end to the state of nature, we must transfer our rights, and 
most importantly our Right of Nature, to the sovereign in order to create a will 
authorised to secure those rights by acting and judging on our behalf. Hobbes’s 
challenge is then to show that this Person is actually nothing other than a body made up 
of our individual acts of authorisation when each of us says, “I authorise and give up my 
right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that 
thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner”. From this it 
follows that the multitude is united into one person called the ‘Commonwealth’ 
(Leviathan, Chap. 17). 
 
This model rests on two important assumptions: first, that we have the power in 
the state of nature to affirm our rights by means of violence, but lack the capacity to do 
so in a way that secures us from the threat of violent death. In this sense, Hobbes’s 
problem in the state of nature is not that we lack ‘what it takes’ to live in a political 
condition with others, but rather that the empirical and contingent conditions of the state 
                                                
178 Green (2015), p. 26. 
179 Sreedhar (2010), p. 93 
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of nature trump our rights in a way that makes political authority the most prudent and 
instrumental way out. Second, this model is based on the idea that the newly formed 
“Artificial Person of the State” is conceptually made of nothing other than the 
transferred rights of each individual to secure the means to their self-preservation. This 
Hobbes calls “the generation of that great Leviathan”, and its creation results in a 
sovereignty where Leviathan is, in some sense, us writ in large (Leviathan, Chap. 17).180 
 
There is something specific that I want to take from this tradition, namely, the 
idea that political authority is made up of, or arises from, moral features – i.e., rights – 
that are already present in individuals. These rights are what in turn account for the 
moral–cum–political powers that the newly constituted authority bears by means of the 
original act of authorisation. This picture, as we will see, does not correspond to the 
way Kant thinks of Public Will. 
 
To be sure, Kant is working within this social contract tradition.181 He shares 
with part of this tradition, particularly with Hobbes and Rousseau, a conception of 
political authority in terms of a will. However, he differs in the way he thinks that this 
authority gets formed. Kant’s distinctive account of Public Will requires a formation 
that allows for the constitution of a different kind of will, bearing a qualitative 
difference to the limited constitution of the individual will. The Kantian Public Will 
must be able to account for the lack of omnilateral authority of our otherwise limited 
unilateral wills. As we saw in the previous section, unilaterality in willing remains 
wanting in a will – a public, general will – that can compensate for the moral deficiency 
of its limited, unilateral perspective. 
 
                                                
180 Hobbes tried to capture this image in the frontispiece of his famous Leviathan. In the first edition, 
Abraham Bosse designed an etching where the small figures gathered in the body of Leviathan are all 
looking at the reader. In the second edition, a revealing change in iconography is adopted: we do not 
see the faces any more, but an undifferentiated mass of people, looking up to the head of the body 
politic. For both an iconographic and philosophical discussion on the frontispiece and the changes in 
editions, see Berger (2017) The Art of Philosophy: Visual Thinking in Europe from the Late 
Renaissance to the Early Enlightenment, and Skinner (2018) From Humanism to Hobbes. Studies in 
Rhetoric and Politics. 
181 For a defence of Kant as a social contract theorist, see O’Neil (2012) and Riley (1973). For an 
opposing view, see Flikschuh (2000). 
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I claim that Kant is departing from a model of authorisation of rights in favour 
of an approach to the problem of political authority in terms of the conditions of willing 
and agency. From Kant’s perspective, we do not create a public will by authorising it to 
do something – i.e., to “bear our person” – that we were morally capable of doing in the 
state of nature, but which we were prevented from doing due to adverse empirical 
circumstances. It is for this reason that Hobbes was not concerned with what was 
morally at stake in the state of nature, but rather with describing in the bluntest of terms 
the limitations that our human nature, our socially–driven passions, and the empirical 
conditions of a state of war. The will embodied by the Person of the State in Hobbes, 
then, is required “to repair” these limitations, but not to account for any moral 
deficiency on our part. As Ripstein rightly acknowledges, this model of political 
authority can only give you a “bilateral relationship between each citizen and the state” 
based on the act that the citizen “has transferred some right to or received some benefit 
from that particular state”.182  
 
In contrast, Kant thinks that what the morally problematic condition of the state 
of nature reveals is precisely the fact that as long as a political authority is absent, we 
are constrained by our unilaterality, wronging others by standing with a will that is not 
subjected to a universal law. This “stato iniusto” was explored in the previous chapter. 
There we showed how for Kant our will is lacking in the features necessary to make 
reciprocal interaction a matter of right and not of violence. Hence, the structural 
deficiency of our will to will politically, that is, to will from an omnilateral perspective, 
requires for Kant the constitution of a different kind of will, with the required features 
of omnilateral power and coercive authority.  
 
These features of public willing do not come to “repair” what we were morally 
capable of doing, but empirically prevented from enjoying. Rather, Kant shifts to a 
different philosophical conception of the problem of authority altogether by, firstly, 
offering a non-empirical and formal diagnosis of the moral problematic of the state of 
nature, and secondly, by departing from this tradition by arguing for a model of public 
willing that does not result from an original act of rights-authorisation of the individuals 
                                                
182 Ripstein (2009), p. 190. 
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but from the requirements that make equality of agency possible. These philosophical 
claims are what make the qualitative difference of this kind of Public Will.  
 
It is at this point that we are able to see, once again, how different Kant is from 
Hobbes. In Hobbes, the State is a will made of individuals who, like discrete atoms, 
aggregate into “one Person”.183 This Person upholds by authorisation the “Right of 
Nature”, namely the right that was causing the trouble in a state where distributive 
justice was absent. Kant sees this problem altogether differently: unilateral willing lacks 
the moral quality that is required “to serve as a coercive law for everyone”, so a Public 
Will cannot be a mere extension of our rights with the added quality of power and force. 
What is required instead is a new model of political willing that can address the 
limitations of sheer unilaterality. And I emphasise that this is a model of willing in the 
sense that it requires an omnilateral, not a merely a bilateral relationship between 
discrete individuals and the state. 
 
For these reasons I conclude this section by showing that a traditional model of 
authorisation is incapable of reflecting the task Kant thinks a model of public willing is 
meant to solve, namely, the capacity to bring the individual will under universal law by 
means of external legislation. However, if the constitutive features of omnilaterality and 
coercion could not, as I have argued, be derived from the moral stock of a unilateral 
will, two important questions remain: where do these distinctively public features come 
from? And if public will is different in kind, how can it have a normative grip on beings 
like us? To this I turn in the next section.  
The quality of being open to the determination of law 
So far I have argued that Kant’s solution to the problem of political authority requires 
the constitution of a different kind of will. However, a question remains as to where 
these qualitatively distinct features emanate from. On this issue, Kant is straightforward, 
but potentially dissatisfying to some. On my reading, Kant derives the requirements of 
omnilaterality and coercion from reason itself. Reason is here understood as Practical 
                                                
183 On the connection between Hobbes's atomism and the individualism of his political philosophy see 
Ryan (2012) and Miller (2011). 
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Reason, as an efficacious capacity with the causal power to prescribe law to the human 
will [Willkür].184 More specifically, the grounding of the omnilateral and coercive 
power of Public Will in reason is reflected in Kant’s own explanation of the origin of 
our obligation to limit our capacity of choice, and more precisely, his explanation of the 
source of our obligation to refrain from the use of objects of choice. Practical reason 
comes here to the fore when Kant says that there must be a postulate of practical reason, 
something he also calls “lex permissiva”, and which 
[g]ives us an authorisation that could not be got from mere concepts of right as 
such, namely to put all others under an obligation, which they would not otherwise 
have, to refrain from using certain objects of our choice because we have been the 
first to take them into our possession. Reason wills that this hold as a principle, 
and it does this as practical reason, which extends itself a priori by this postulate of 
reason. [DofR 6:247, my emphases] 
This passage has been much discussed (normally with a focus on Kant’s intricate 
property argument185). However, what I want to take from it, in line with our present 
concerns, are two things: first, Kant’s explicit reference to reason in terms of a will 
[Wille] capable of willing a principle that, in turn, can ground the obligation of limiting 
our use of objects in the face of everybody’s equal right to objects of choice; and 
second, Kant’s claim that this capacity of reason “to put all others under an obligation” 
is grounded in the a priori and practical character of reason.  
 
We know that Kant’s property argument gets resolved by the establishment of a 
Public Will capable of distributing property rights. From this I think it follows that the 
coercive power of this kind of public will is ultimately grounded in the capacity of 
reason to literally will that this system of property holds as a universal law. But what 
exactly is this principle that says that we are under such an obligation? Here the feature 
of omnilaterality comes to the fore: it is the principle that says “Act externally that the 
free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a 
universal law”. This law that makes the use of choice as well as the possible enjoyment 
of objects of choice compatible can only be spoken from an omnilateral voice. This 
                                                
184 See Chapter 1, sec. II, ‘The will as a kind of causality’. 
185 On Kant’s property argument, and its connection to the Postulate of Practical Reason see Flikschuh 
(2007b) and Guyer (2002). 
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voice, capable of taking an omnilateral perspective on the otherwise unilateral standing 
of individuals, is the voice of reason that says, “freedom is limited to those conditions in 
conformity with the idea of it and that it may also be actively limited by others; and it 
says this as a postulate that is incapable of further proof” [DofR 6:231, emphasis in the 
original]. 
 
I mentioned at the outset that Kant’s appeal to practical reason as the ground of 
the distinctive omnilateral and coercive features of Public Will could occasion some 
dissatisfaction. How can this crucial postulate be “incapable of further proof”? I am not 
able to offer an answer here. However, my more limited point, namely, my claim that 
Kant’s model of public willing requires a different kind of will, whose moral features 
could not be derived by authorisation from a unilateral will, still stands. The alternative 
source is found in “the coercion that reason itself prescribes” [TP 8:310]. 
 
Yet, if Public Will is grounded in reason’s capacity to adopt an omnilateral stance 
to will universal law over and above the individual, and to coerce them to fulfil their 
obligations, how does this model of legislation link up to the human will? 
Notwithstanding my arguments for reading Public Will as a qualitatively different kind 
of will, there must be some sort of moral synergy between its capacity for universal 
legislation, and the equal capacity of the human will to be determined by universal law; 
otherwise it would speak law to a moral void. 
 
It is one of the main claims of this thesis that Kant approaches politics in terms of 
the will. If this view of politics is to reflect the actual requirements of agency, that in 
turn enables our political life in common, Kant’s model of public willing must be 
capable of being normatively in tune with some aspect of the individual will. Kant 
thinks this is possible precisely because we are beings whose rationality is partly 
constituted by our capacity to be open to the determination of law. As he states at 
various points throughout his writings, rational beings “in so far as they have a will” are 
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“capable of actions in accordance with principle”, and have the unique ability “to 
determine their causality by the representation of rules”186 [CPrR 5:32]. 
 
What is novel and distinctive about Kant’s account of public willing is that in 
order to make sense of the idea of an external model of legislation appropriate to our 
political interaction, he must find some ground in the individual will that can meet the 
moral obligations that are externally and omnilaterally discharged. My proposal is then 
to think of Public Will as, on the one hand, directing law to the basic capacity of a 
rational being to be a “universally legislating will”, and on the other hand, to bear the 
exclusive capacity of omnilateral coercion [G 4:431]. 
 
In other words: if there were not a seat of lawfulness open to external legislation, 
Public Will would be a mere power in the sense of a force: something subjecting the 
individuals to a law they could never accept as rightful and legitimate. I will have more 
to say about how exactly this Kantian model of subjection works. It should suffice for 
now to understand that although Public Will has a power to coerce based on the a priori 
requirements of agency itself, it nonetheless requires the human will’s capacity to be 
determined by law. 
3. Moral features of Public Will: Omnilaterality and 
coercion 
As we have shown above, Kant’s property argument depends partly on the possibility of 
showing that the coercive power and the omnilateral character of Public Will are 
grounded in Practical Reason [Wille]. I made an instrumental appeal to this argument to 
further justify my claim that Public Will is a different kind of will, the moral features of 
which are meant to resolve the problem of the state of nature, rather than merely repair 
its empirical shortcomings. 
 
                                                
186 On the capacity of “acting in accordance with the representation of law” and the significance of 
this form of representation, see Chapter 1, sec. I, ‘The will as a law-governed capacity’. 
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Kant’s approach to the problem of political authority in terms of the will places 
him in the tradition of Rousseau and Hegel. Some have categorised this as a form of 
political “voluntarism”.187 I suggest that Kant’s particular engagement with this problem 
should be thought of in the following terms: what makes this notion of a Public Will fit 
for universal legislation? I already touched upon some of the conditions Kant thinks 
need to be in place for this kind of universal legislation, namely, the independence of 
such a will from internal motives and the a priori status of it as an idea. 
 
In this section, I will discuss the features that account for the political morality 
underlying Public Will: the omnilateral perspective that allows this model of political 
authority to discharge obligations and the coercive power that makes them legally 
binding. Furthermore, I will ask what is unique about this omnilateral perspective as a 
quality of willing, and its systematic relation to the power to coerce.  
 
To do this, I compare Kantian omnilaterality with Rousseau’s notion of 
generality as it figures in Rousseau’s theory of the volonté général. My claim is two-
fold. First, Kant’s notion of omnilateral does not wholly correspond to Rousseau’s idea 
of generality, notwithstanding the obvious influence Rousseau had on Kant on these 
matters. In contrast, I argue that the difference between them is more accurately 
captured by drawing a distinction between the public character of Kant’s omnilateral 
will, against the general character of the Rousseauian general will. In other words, what 
is public in Kant is not the same as what is general in Rousseau. The second part of my 
claim is that this substantive difference is due to the fact that Rousseau’s political 
project depends on a project of individual moral perfectibility. This means that in order 
to will what is general, the subject must transform herself internally from being an 
individual to being a citizen who is free from any particularity in willing. I claim that 
Kant’s account of Public Will is independent of this transformation. More specifically, 
Kant thinks that moral perfectibility is not only not required to make external legislation 
                                                
187 This claim has been defended by Riley. Kant, Rousseau, and Hegel are all representatives of this 
particular tradition. “Separated by whole universes as they are”, Riley argues, they “are all 
‘voluntarists’ who make ‘will’ ethically weighty (in the shape of ‘general will’, ‘good will’, and (so-
called) ‘real will’. All three are in search of a nonwillful will”. Riley (2015a), p. 334. In reference to 
the division between ‘intellectualists’ and ‘voluntarists’ about the origin of law, see Schneewind 
(1998), pp. 3–4. 
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possible, but that such an expectation would risk making a system of right something 
that it is not. I explore this claim in this section as a means to substantiate my more 
formal argument about publicity and generality. I will have more to say about the 
independence of Kantian politics from a project of moral perfectibility in the next, and 
final, chapter, so the arguments below are not the last word on the matter. For now, let 
me turn to the notion of omnilateral. 
 
One answer to the question ‘what makes Public Will fit for universal legislation’ 
is the fact that this will “is omnilateral, that is united not contingently but a priori and 
therefore necessarily, and because of this is the only will that is lawgiving” [DofR 
6:263]. There is something important to take from this rather obscure remark, namely, 
that (i) universal legislation must emanate from a source united by necessity, and that 
(ii) this unity results in an omnilateral will, in contrast to a mere sum of unilateral wills. 
But what is this feature of omnilaterality meant to add? Kant is, again, minimal on this. 
What we know is that it tends to appear in contrast to the notion of unilateral choice, 
and in addition to the idea that such a lawgiving will is also “general”, “external”, and 
“public” [DofR 6:263, 256]. 
 
I have already argued against Ripstein’s claim that the Kantian omnilateral will 
is meant to “repair each of the three defects of the state of nature” in Chapter 3. 
However, he offers us a useful way of thinking about this constitutive feature by 
distinguishing “omnilateral acts” from an “omnilateral will”. “Public acts are 
omnilateral”, Ripstein claims, “because they are not any particular person’s unilateral 
choice, but instead are exercised on behalf of the citizens considered as a collective 
body”. From this perspective, an act is omnilateral to the extent that it emanates from 
the legitimate kind of source – or public office – bearing the right to speak on behalf of 
the citizens. 
 
Ripstein’s second sense of omnilateral is more distinctively Kantian: this kind of 
will is different from a unilateral one since the latter “always has some particular end, 
some matter of choice” in view. The omnilateral will is different “because all it provides 
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is a form of choice, by providing procedures through which laws can be made, applied, 
and enforced”.188  
 
It is fruitful to think of the feature of omnilaterality in terms of a “form of 
choice”. To show this more clearly, I will, with Ripstein’s remarks in mind, add my 
own interpretation of this notion. I propose that the notion of omnilaterality in Kant 
should be thought of in two ways: in the first way, as a form of choice, it is the capacity 
of Public Will to adopt, or to formally incorporate, the idea of the compatibility of 
choices as envisaged under Kant’s Universal Principle of Right. As we know, this 
principle states a formal constraint on what can and cannot be done, once our free 
agency is subjected to a condition of public right. “So act externally that the free use of 
your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal 
law”. This principle gives a form to choice, leaving it indeterminate what the matter or 
content of such choice might be. The omnilateral form of choice makes it possible for 
Public Will to limit unilateral choices without itself adopting any particular end or 
specific matter of choice. A second way of thinking about this moral feature is in terms 
of the orientation or perspective that Public Will ought to adopt in virtue of its a priori 
constitution. What makes Public Will public is precisely its capacity to adopt an 
omnilateral perspective on the whole. This perspective includes all perspectives, 
thereby overcoming the unilateral perspective of particular wills.  
 
I think this latter way of thinking about omnilaterality, namely, as a perspective 
that includes all perspectives, comes closest to explaining what makes this will a public 
kind of will. A difficulty arises, however, from the fact that Kant tends to use the notion 
of a public will interchangeably with that of a “general will”. Are we to understand 
from this that what is public in Public Will is the same as what is general? 
What is ‘public’ vs. what is ‘general’ in willing 
The tendency to relate Kant with Rousseau on their shares use of the notion of the 
general will, is partly explained by the evident influence which Rousseau’s thought had 
                                                
188 Ripstein (2009), p. 196. 
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on Kant on this particular issue. We know how Kant’s first encounter with Rousseau’s 
writings in 1764 “set him straight” on matters of moral reflection [AK 20: 44].189 This 
influence is evident in Kant’s appeal to Rousseau’s terminology, and in thinking about 
political authority in terms of the will. 
 
For Rousseau, the political constitution of the general will depends on a particular 
kind of transformation on the part of the individual’s way of willing. In the Social 
Contract, this qualitative transformation190 is expressed with the utmost clarity:  
This passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces in man a very 
remarkable change, by substituting in his conduct justice for instinct… It is only 
when the voice of duty succeeds physical impulse, and law succeeds appetite, that 
man, who till then had regarded only himself, sees that he is obliged… to consult 
his reason before listening to his inclinations.191 
So according to Rousseau, entering a civil state requires the arduous process of 
transforming our impulses, instincts, and appetites, so that a place may be given to civic 
conduct. Rousseau anchors this process in his influential account of the general will. 
This transformation has to do with what we will by “leading us out of ourselves”,192 and 
tuning our wills to what is general.  
 
But what is exactly this form of generality? I think it is a compact of 
interconnected ideas. It reflects the (i) elimination of all residue of particularity, (ii) the 
agreement of objects of choice, and (iii) the unity of individual wills around a vision of 
the common good, of which I spoke more extensively in the Introduction. All of this 
                                                
189 A nice insight into Kant’s life in Königsberg is reported in De Vleeschauwer: “During the summer 
of 1762 the Kanter bookshop had brought to Königsberg the Social Contract, which had been thrown 
to the flames in Paris. Emile followed in the course of the same year. It was at this moment, according 
to the testimony of Herder, that Kant acquired an enthusiasm for Rousseau, that he developed a 
veritable cult for nature and of the idea of the moral value of man” (De Vleeschauwer (1962), p. 39). 
190 I am aware that this is a highly idealised characterisation of Rousseau’s project. Muthu offers a 
more sophisticated version of the Rousseau’s aims by highlighting Rousseau’s awareness of “the 
deep-seated enmity that characterised humans’ global condition” and, correspondingly, the many 
evidences of the “tragic character of mankind” (Muthu (2015), pp. 297–98). 
191 Rousseau (2012), Book I, chapter viii. 
192 Rousseau (1915), Économie Politique, in The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, pp. 
255ff.  
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falls for Rousseau under the technical notion of what is ‘general’193 in willing. This 
agreement of what different interests have in common, says Rousseau, is “what forms 
the social bond, and if there were not some point on which all interests agree, no society 
could exist”.194  
 
Ripstein also touches on this issue with acute insight. Comparing Rousseau with 
Hegel, he characterises the former’s account of willing as one of “purification”. The 
Rousseauian general will “must relentlessly seek to purify itself of any content 
whatsoever precisely because any determinate content is arbitrary in relation to its claim 
to generality. Any particular content must remain partial”. The cost of this political 
project of purification is, at least from a Kantian perspective, very high. As Ripstein 
notes, “Rousseau only achieves equality and a common vocabulary by denying all 
difference”.195 
Rousseau and Kant both share the idea that legitimate law must emanate from an 
equally legitimate source of legislation, namely, from the general will. They are also 
both committed to the claim that the general will can do no wrong. Yet this account of 
willing as one of purification and transformation does not correspond to the way Kant 
thinks about Public Will.196 Even more importantly, Rousseau’s quest for ‘generality’ in 
willing runs against Kant’s idea of what is public in public willing. To use Rousseau’s 
own terms, the ‘generality’ of the Kantian general will lies not in what we will – the 
content of our free and “purified” choices – but in the way our choices, in their infinite 
                                                
193 The discussion on what is general in relation to willing springs out of a fascinating intellectual 
background. As a political notion, the ‘general will’ evolves from a strictly theological debate over 
Paulinian Scripture. An important step in the slow secularisation of the concept is taken by Pascal, 
when he politicised Paul’s letter to Timothy in Corinthians I 2:4. According to Pascal’s reading, God’s 
general will, and its instantiation in the body of the Church, progressively transmuted into the body 
politic; the ‘generality’ of God’s will was then translated into the ‘generality of body (political) 
membership’. For an excellent discussion of this genealogy, see Riley (2015b) ‘The General Will 
before Rousseau: The Contributions of Arnauld, Pascal, Malebranche, Bayle, and Bossuet’. 
194 Rousseau (2012), Book II, chapter i. 
195 Ripstein (1994), p. 454. 
196 There are many other systematic differences between the two philosophers. I have focused on the 
one that speaks to my present concern in this chapter. O’Neill has worked an objection from the 
perspective of the issue of heteronomy in willing: “As Kant would see it, Rousseauian self-legislation 
is a form of heteronomy: it assigns authority to a conception of the general good, and claims that 
‘corrected’ wills all point in that direction… Rousseau’s account of legislation by co-ordinated selves 
resolves indeterminacy and disagreement by positing the authority of the general will. For Kant, 
despite his profound respect for Rousseau, this is heteronomy” (O’Neill (2015), p. 114). I think 
O’Neill and I are speaking of the same thing when talking about the “corrected wills” of Rousseauian 
agents. 
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variety and particularity, can be made public, i.e., externally compatible under a 
universal law. 
 
In short, Kantian publicness in willing does not depend on demanding that the 
variety that is constitutive of human agency be forcibly unified by means of collective 
willing. This is one of the aspects I find most appealing about Kant’s way of thinking 
about politics. It is one of Kant’s conditions of public willing that the content of our 
choices can and must remain private. What needs to be public is rather the fitness of our 
choices to be limited by universal law. We learnt that for Rousseau the term ‘private’ 
has a negative connotation: it signals the presence of self-love and a residue of 
particularity in the content of what we will. As I have tried to argue, for Kant the proper 
object of right is the form of choice, which must always be omnilateral and never 
unilateral. In direct contrast to Rousseau, the content of particular choices legitimately 
authorised by a Public Will is not questioned: we are free to will what we want 
politically, so long as our choices can be made compatible with others’ through 
universal law. 
 
 Notwithstanding these differences, I should mention one sense in which Kant, 
similarly to Rousseau, does indeed reject ‘private’ willing. This is in his reference to the 
unilateral violence done against others in trying to affirm our choices in the absence of 
public law. In this case, our will is ‘private’ literally in the sense of an “arbitrio 
privato”. So for Kant, “if laws are possible only on the basis of private choice [ex 
arbitrio privato] (one against all) they are violent, and therefore, despotic”. Only an 
omnilateral perspective, capable of legislating to all, and not for “one against all”, can 
overcome this [Remarks on Achenwall, 19: 346]. 
 
Let me draw this section to a close by making some final, more general remarks. 
Kant’s rejection of Rousseau’s moralised conception of willing offers us an insight into 
the way he thinks about politics more generally. I will have more to say about this in 
Chapter 5. For now, I think we are already able to see how this picture of politics, 
instead of rejecting the particularities of each agent, his desires, plans and choices, 
embraces the difference and the variety that is proper to human agency. This diversity 
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of choice does not, of course, mean that we are free to do what we want. It is at this 
point in Kant’s argument that the notion of coercion takes central place. I argue that, 
along with omnilaterality, coercion is one of the constitutive moral features of Kant’s 
account of Public Willing. This capacity “to put everyone under an obligation” is the 
means that makes the formal limitation of choice possible. In the next section, I show 
how exactly this form of limitation happens by means of a model of subjection to law. 
4. How does Public will will? A model of subjection 
Having discussed what Public Will is, by means of an analysis of its moral features, we 
are left now with the task of asking how this Kantian idea of Public Will wills in the 
name of all. This model of legislation, I argue, is better understood as one of subjection, 
akin to the way Reason [Wille] prescribes law by means of necessitation to the human 
will [Willkür] in the moral philosophy. The fundamental difference between the two, 
however, is that this model of legislation is external to the human will, and so subjects 
Willkür to public law through external coercion rather than through inner necessitation. 
My position here is unusual in the Kant secondary literature, where interpretations of 
his model as one of collective self-legislation are still dominant.197 
 
Before we proceed, it is important to distinguish this systematic question about 
how Public Will gives law to a community of subjects and the way in which, in turn, 
these subjects are apt to take over and enact the required obligations, from related issues 
which are nonetheless not the direct focus of my interpretation. These issues include, 
first, the question of what makes this law legitimate, and second, what grounds this 
relation of subjection.  
 
From the perspective of the legitimacy of law, the role of public will is relevant 
as an a priori idea of reason that “articulates a procedural normative principle for 
determining whether positive laws are just, namely the idea of an original contract to 
which all subjects are signatories”.198 Determining the legitimacy of law is thus strictly 
                                                
197 I discuss this tendency in the literature in Chapter 5, Part II, sec. I, ‘Politics as a Kingdom of Ends’. 
198 Kleingeld (2018) ‘Moral Autonomy as Political Analogy: Self-legislation in Kant’s Groundwork 
and the Feyerabend Lectures on Natural Law, p. 160. 
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related to the way the notion of Public Will serves as a criterion for limiting what 
people could consent to, or give their actual consent to.199  
 
Equally relevant to the issue of the legitimacy of law is the related, second issue 
of the ground that makes this model of subjection to law binding. Two interpretations 
are available. According to Flikschuh, readers of Kant see in the idea of a social 
contract on the one hand, and in the natural law notion of original possession in 
common, on the other, potential grounds for public legislation. On the first reading, “the 
general will is the product of contractual agreement between subjects to reciprocal 
recognition of the equal right of each to external objects of their choice”. On the second 
reading, Public Will is understood as “an antecedently given legislative authority” 
grounded in “the idea of original possession in common, and which assigns to each 
individual their rightful portion of external possessions from the common stock”.200  
 
I have expressed my own reservations about an unqualified assimilation of Kant 
to the social contract tradition, at least as a version of the theory of authorisation in a 
previous section of this chapter. However, I paused on the above, tangential issues in 
order to specify the scope of my own inquiry in this section. What I want to establish is 
which model of legislation is most appropriate, given the distinctive political nature of 
the Kantian Public Will.  
 
From the perspective of this question, and in light of Kant’s anti–Rousseauian 
assumptions about the requirements of willing, I think we have strong reasons to reject 
bringing Kant’s account of ethical self-legislation into the terrain of his political 
philosophy. In this sphere, as I have argued in this thesis, Kant is trying to carve out a 
strictly political model of public legislation. My claim is that those who bring the idea 
of self-legislation to bear on questions about political legislation – most commonly 
                                                
199 Kleingeld offers a refined exegetical analysis tracing the evolution of Kant’s position on this issue. 
She argues that a hypothetical, conditional agreement to the legitimacy of law in accordance with the 
general will was endorsed by Kant in the Feyerabend lectures, and in his works before 1790. After this 
date, he shifts to a more strident normative requirement according to which citizens must give their 
actual consent to legislation. Kleingeld concludes that for the Kant of the Doctrine of Right, we must 
add “the further requirement that the citizens also do agree to [law] through their elected 
representatives in parliament” (2017, p. 72).  
200 Flikschuh (2000) Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, pp. 145–46. 
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through the idea of the Kingdom of Ends – do this out of a more general, philosophical 
assumption, namely, that politics is not independent of morality, but rather at its service. 
I reserve a detailed discussion of this tendency in the literature for Chapter 5. 
 
It should suffice for now to say that understanding Kant’s model of public 
willing as one of collective legislation is faced with a serious problem: it overlooks 
Kant’s distinctive understanding of external legislation as akin to the idea of subjection. 
Recall the way we interpreted reason’s capacity to prescribe law to the human will in 
Chapter 1. This prescription is independent of the capacity of the individual to self-
legislate the law, and is a form of necessitation of law emanating from the autonomous 
status of reason itself. In a similar vein, Kant translates a version of this model of 
necessitation into his political philosophy, wherein it becomes a model not of inner 
necessitation, but of external subjection under the authority of Public Will.  
Public will and the model of subjection 
I argue that the relationship Kant thinks exists between the source of public law and the 
individual should be understood in terms of a model of subjection, resembling that of a 
commander and his subjects. As Kant puts it: 
Between the commander (imperans) and the subject (subditus) there is no 
partnership. They are not fellow-members: one is subordinated to, not coordinated 
with the other; and those who are coordinate with one another must for this very 
reason consider themselves equals since they are subject to common laws. The 
civil union is not so much a society but rather makes one. [DofR 6:307, emphases 
in the original] 
There are systematic reasons why an analogy between the “commander” and the 
“subject” is appropriate when talking about Public Will. As I have argued in this 
chapter, Kant conceptualises Public Will as practical reason itself, bearing an 
omnilateral and coercive power that could not possibly be found in the moral 
constitution of a will that is finite, sensuous, and dependent. The lawful relationship that 
exists between Reason [Wille] and the human will [Willkür] is mirrored in the rightful 
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relationship established between Public Will and the individuals who, by means of 
coercion, are subjected to the limits imposed by public law.  
 
A model of rightful legislation requires a relationship of subordination between 
two parts rather than a relationship between equals as ‘fellow-members.’ The fact that 
Kant rejects an egalitarian model between fellow-legislators is particularly revealing in 
light of those who advocate the idea of the Kingdom of Ends as particularly fruitful in 
the context of Kant’s politics.201 This ethical notion is based on the idea that there can 
be a systematic union of rational beings in which everybody is a lawgiver, yet where 
each is subject to no law other than his own. In this realm, “[a] rational being belongs as 
a member to the kingdom of ends when he gives universal law in it but is also himself 
subject to these laws. He belongs to it as a sovereign when, as lawgiving, he is not 
subject to the will of another” [G 4:432]. 
 
However, I claim that this ideal of ethical independence is not foreign to Kant’s 
political thinking, and it is also not a requirement in the model of dependence under law 
that Kant attributes to a system of right. This radical equality in an ideal ethical state 
runs counter to Kant’s model of external legislation appropriate to a political, i.e., 
juridical, state.  
 
Crucial to this way of thinking are Kant’s assumptions about agency. Dependency 
arises from the fact that we are agents of choice. This capacity for choice places a 
morally constraining condition on the will of everybody else. But how can I place a 
morally constraining limit on your will if I lack the required omnilateral and coercive 
power? Rightful dependency is only possible through a relationship of subjection to that 
very thing that makes agency and interaction possible. For this reason, we must enter 
the state and relinquish our lawless freedom “in order to find his freedom as such 
undiminished, in a dependence upon laws, that is, in a rightful condition, since this 
dependence arises from his own lawgiving will” [DofR 6:315]. 
 
                                                
201 Cf. Ypi (forthcoming), Reath (2006) and Wood (1994). 
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Kant picks up on this “dependency upon laws” in the ‘commander–subject’ 
analogy we quoted above. There he grants that although we are in a relation of 
subjection to the “commander”, we are in a relation of coordination vis-à-vis one 
another: “those who are coordinate with one another must for this very reason consider 
themselves equals since they are subject to common laws” [DofR 6:307]. 
 
Flikschuh endorses this interpretation when she distinguishes between 
coordination and co-legislation. For the reasons we discussed above, a model of co-
legislation, such as the ethical co-legislation of a kingdom of ends, is impossible in a 
system of external legislation. However, coordination is relevant to a system of right 
since “a just political order requires a head – an earthly sovereign – who governs in 
accordance with the idea of a united general will and who is subject to the coercive will 
of no one”.202  
 
This reading captures two of Kant’s more immediate concerns. First, it shows that 
Kant’s account of political willing is, above all, an account of legitimate coercion. This 
legitimacy arises from the very idea of a “united general will”, and the autonomy of this 
will to be independent of the “coercive will of no one”. On the other hand, it shows that 
the idea of Public Will has to be represented or embodied in a sovereign body, be it a 
single person, or a parliament capable of discharging obligations. 
 
The coherence of these claims is reflected in Kant’s subsequent theory of 
government, and of the division of powers. Public Will is a special kind of will to the 
extent that it embodies the unity of the three branches of power, namely, the executive, 
the legislative, and the judiciary. To express this, Kant appeals again to the 
‘commander–subject’ analogy, saying that the three authorities  
comprise the relation of a superior over all (which, from the viewpoint of laws of 
freedom, can be none other than the united people itself) to the multitude of that 
people severally as subjects, that is, the relation of a commander (imperans) to 
those who obey (subditus). [DofR 6:315, emphases in the original] 
                                                
202 Flikschuh (2010), p. 137. 
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“Those who obey”, I argue, are the agents who coordinate around the limits imposed by 
the rightful jurisdiction of the three branches of government. What these remarks do not 
fully elucidate is exactly how Public Will can be both a commander, which suggests the 
idea of the executive branch or that of a ruler, while at the same time represent the unity 
of all branches of legislation in their respective executive, legislative and judicial office. 
The ruler and the sovereign 
This puzzle can be solved by making a distinction between the notions of the ruler and 
the sovereign. Kant states that the “ruler of a state” is that “(moral or natural) person to 
whom belongs the executive authority (potestas executoria)”. The sovereign, in 
contrast, is defined as a people’s legislator “who cannot be its ruler, since the ruler is 
subject to law and so… is put under obligation through the law by another, namely the 
sovereign.” These definitions sound plausible, and seem to tackle the common 
difference between the executive and the legislative. But Kant attributes a crucial 
capacity to the ruler that is absent from the powers of the sovereign legislator when he 
says that the ruler can never be punished, since he has “the supreme capacity to exercise 
coercion in conformity with the law, and it would be self-contradictory for him to be 
subject to coercion” [DofR 6:316-7, emphasis in the original]. 
 
How does the idea of Public Will fit into this? It seems to me that the details of 
the relationship between Kant’s formal and philosophical account of Public Will and his 
strict theory of government are not fully worked out. One of the main claims of this 
chapter has been to show that an adequate model of public legislation required for Kant 
the constitution of a different kind of will. This qualitatively distinct will discharges 
moral features, in the form of obligations, that would be impossible for a merely 
unilateral will. The most crucial of them is precisely “the supreme capacity to exercise 
coercion in conformity with law”, which Kant attributes to the ruler in the above 
passage. But the equally important capacity “to put under obligation through law”, 
namely its omnilateral power, is attributed to the figure of the sovereign. This is 
problematic since it attributes two moral powers that can only spring from a specific 
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kind of will, to two different empirical offices: the executive office of the ruler, and the 
legislative office of the sovereign body, made of one or many men.203 
 
If we accept Kant’s official view, according to which Public Will unites in the 
idea the three authorities of government, ruler and sovereign do not seem to come into 
conflict. But a question remains about how to keep the unity not of the branches of 
government, but of the features of Public Will. I think this moral unity, where both the 
executive and the legislative come into play in a single office, is one of the basic tenets 
of Kant’s theory of the will. Moreover, I suggest Kant brings this philosophical insight 
of his moral philosophy into his theory of public will. In this sense I agree with Beck 
when he says that the idea that “the will both creates and executes obligations is one of 
the most dramatic theses in Kant’s philosophy”.204 This dual capacity of Public Will to 
both execute law in the manner of a ruler, and to legislate obligations in in the manner 
of the sovereign is, on my reading, Kant’s way of uniting public will’s moral features. 
 
This analysis yields two important conclusions. First, Kant’s model of 
legislation for public willing is one of subjection, akin to the way Reason prescribes law 
to the human will. According to Kant, “I can either be in a state of equality, and be free 
to do and suffer injustice, or in a state of subjection without this freedom”, namely, a 
condition of right. [R 9593, my emphasis] 205  Second, this model highlights the 
                                                
203 There is a similar puzzle lurking behind Hobbes’s account of the State. Hobbes makes reference to 
both the sovereign/ruler of the state, and to the “Artificial Person of the State” by fiction (Leviathan, 
Chap. 16). Skinner addresses this conundrum by proposing the existence of two different persons in 
Hobbes’s theory of the state. These two persons lacked existence in the state of nature. One is “the 
artificial person of the representative to whom the members of the multitude give authority to speak 
and act in the name of all”. This person is the sovereign. A second person is the person by Fiction 
“whom the members of the multitude bring into being when they acquire a single will and a voice by 
way of authorising a man or assembly to serve as their sovereign representative.” This person is 
named the State, the Commonwealth, or the Civitas (Skinner (2018), p. 358). Skinner’s interpretation 
has many philosophical benefits. One of them is that it allows us to understand why Hobbes thinks 
that the ‘State’ is a ‘mortal God’ that survives the test of time, whereas particular, concrete historical 
sovereigns come and go (and get their heads chopped off, as Hobbes was well aware when thinking 
about Charles I of England). I do not want to push the analogy between Hobbes and Kant on this issue 
too far. However, I do think that for Kant, the will of a Public will, since it is non-empirical and a 
priori, it is not subject to the contingencies to which governments, and their sovereign representatives, 
are subject. For a broader discussion on the issue of representation in Hobbes see also Skinner (1999) 
‘Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State’. 
204 Beck (1993), p. 43. 
205 In the original German: “Ich kan entweder im Stande der Gleichheit seyn und freyheit haben, selbst 
ungerecht zu seyn und es zu leiden, oder im Stande der Unterwerfung ohne diese freyheit” [R 9593]. 
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importance of mutual dependency in Kant’s approach to political interaction by means 
of a relation of coordination with one another. This coordination between equals is 
possible only through the subjection to Public Will. The coordination of mutually 
affecting wills is manifested in the limits that our actions and choices place on the scope 
of agency of others. Dependency, I conclude, is not a material notion for Kant, but 
rather a formal principle of willing. So when the individual enters the state it “unite[s] 
itself with all others (with which it cannot avoid interacting)” and “subject itself to a 
lawful external coercion” [DofR 6:312, my emphases]. This dependency is rightful 
when it is subjected to the coercive power of public legislation.  
 
This model is predicated on accepting some important elements of Kant’s theory 
of the will. Crucially, it invites us to accept the law-governed capacity of reason to 
legislate universal law. These requirements, however, should not be confused with 
similar references to reason and universal legislation prominent in Kant’s theory of 
moral autonomy and of moral teleology. Reading Kant’s political from the perspective 
of these latter approaches, inevitably misses the independent reasons that make Kant’s 
account of public legislation a strictly political model of willing. 
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Chapter 5 
What it Takes to Will Politically  
Part I: The intellectual roots of conflict  
Introduction 
The claim that conflict is central to our political theorising has been a recurrent theme of 
this thesis. The conflict which occurs in political interaction triggers the following 
question: is an external authority necessary? In Chapter 3, I defended the idea that for 
Kant, political authority is a moral necessity –it is rooted in the moral requirements 
embodied in human agency. An unavoidable conflict arises due to our status as agents 
endowed with wills, and the resulting claim we have against others equal capacity for 
choice and action. Kant offers a solution to this constitutive conflict of agency in the 
state of nature by offering his account of the idea of Public Will. This solution is that 
the constitution of a different kind of will (one that is omnilateral, public, and which has 
the power to coerce) is needed to resolve the conflict of equal agency.  
 
It is difficult, however, to fully grasp the centrality of conflict in Kant’s ideas on 
political authority without locating this issue within its broader context. I suggest that it 
is only against a broader intellectual background that Kant’s distinctive characterisation 
of conflict, as a problem at the level of willing, can be understood. Part I of this chapter 
will therefore position Kant within the context of an intellectual tradition which 
examines conflict and its relation to a theory of politics. I argue that defining the role of 
conflict determines, in a unique way, the purposes and aims of political authority. In 
other words, taking a stance on the nature of conflict regarding whether it is inimical or 
beneficial to social order influences the vision of our political theory. 
 
In what follows, I situate my interpretation of Kant within a particular tradition 
in the history of political thought. This tradition, championed by figures as diverse as 
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St.Augustine, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Adam Smith suggests that there is a necessary 
dialectic between (i) the fact that conflict is an inescapable reality of life in common, 
and (ii) the expectation that political authority should respond to this fact by means of 
its legitimate use of power. This dialectic rests upon two further assumptions: first, that 
this conflict is essentially intelligible to us, such that we can investigate its roots and 
motives; and second, that if political authority is to be responsive to this phenomenon, 
then conflict must be tractable, and capable of being channelled, harnessed, repressed, 
or coerced by the authority of a sovereign body or of the law. 
 
This “architectonic role” 206 played by a political theory, as Sheldon Wolin puts 
it, is, from the perspective of this tradition, explained by an initial commitment to the 
centrality of conflict. In this chapter, I will endeavour to systematise this approach in 
Kant’s philosophy. I conclude in Part I that Kant endorsed this approach in adopting the 
view that political authority is the required solution to the constitutive problem of 
agency. Although Kant can be seen as a potential representative of this tradition, I 
believe he goes beyond this dialectic by developing the idea of Public Will as the 
appropriate response to the conflict of the will. 
 
To demonstrate this, I offer an overview of different interpretations of political 
conflict and the way this notion became a central concern in the social and political 
theories between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Within this tradition, I identify 
a commitment to a theory of human nature and its systematic connection to the 
emergence of a theory of the state. I will therefore focus on specific aspects in Plato and 
Hobbes in order to illustrate how an understanding of conflict as something negative or 
inimical to order, defined the way these thinkers theorised the role of political power, 
and their picture of politics more generally. 
 
Inspired by Wolin’s interpretation of Plato,207 I claim that Plato understood 
human conflict as inimical to the pursuit of order and social harmony. According to my 
proposed dialectic, one of the aims of politics in Plato is to eradicate the sources of 
                                                
206 Wolin (2004) Politics and Vision, p. 30. 
207 Ibid. 
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conflict altogether. This approach is an instance of the “once and for all” solution to 
conflict, which maintains that there can be a “possible return to some ‘just’, ‘good’, 
‘well-ordered’ society from which conflict has been banished”.208 In Part II of this 
chapter, we will see how pervasive this ideal of a conflict-free world is in some 
interpretations of Kant’s political philosophy. In Hobbes’s case, however, the picture is 
more nuanced. I suggest that although conflict has a positive role to play within his 
theory, conflict for Hobbes is a negative source of perennial instability, and he calls for 
a remedial type of politics, capable of containing it. This dialectic is achieved in Hobbes 
by the sovereign appeal to ideological means. 
 
I appeal to Plato and Hobbes in Part I in order to highlight the presence of the 
three guiding assumptions previously mentioned, namely that conflict is (i) 
unavoidable, (ii) intelligible, and (iii) tractable. More importantly, these philosophers 
are exemplars of the tradition’s emphasis on human nature as the ultimate source from 
which conflict arises. To be sure, the scope of this overview will be limited to my direct 
concerns: political willing in Kant’s theory. However, I think there is much we can 
learn from this intellectual background to arrive at a better understanding of Kant’s 
appropriation of these issues in the context of his theory of moral and political willing. 
This appropriation is unique in at least four ways. First, the issue of whether conflict is 
inimical or advantageous to political order is irrelevant according to my interpretation of 
Kant, to the extent that such a view is grounded in the positive or negative aspects of 
human nature. As we have seen, for Kant the source of conflict is not human nature – 
this is not the source that makes political authority necessary. Second, as I argued in 
Chapter 3, Kant defends the view that conflict is constitutive of agency, since this 
conflict arises at the level of the will (as choice), and is therefore not the result of our 
contingent set of passions and inclinations. Third, in following the dialectic between 
conflict and political authority endorsed by this tradition, Kant suggests that this 
authority, understood as a Public Will, does not aim at either eradicating or solving 
conflict. This is due to the constitutive role he believes conflict possesses. Finally, 
Kant’s picture of politics treats authority in terms of an omnilateral will that is capable 
                                                
208 Hirschman (1994) The Passions and the Interest. Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its 
Triumph, p. 214. 
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of ensuring the compatible coexistence of each our wills understood as the capacity for 
choice [Willkür]. 
 
I will explore the full implications of this picture of politics as willing in Part II 
of this chapter. For now, Part I will focus on the theoretical background upon which my 
thesis rests.  
1. How to think about conflict: an appeal to a 
tradition in political thought 
The idea that conflict plays a role, whether constructive or destructive, in social 
relations has a long history. I propose that we examine the role of conflict by 
considering a question about the nature of man, and of the purpose of the state.209 As 
Hirschman suggests, historically, understanding these spheres, and the relationship 
between them, lead to the realisation that “a realist theory of the state required a 
knowledge of human nature.”210 This knowledge involved recognising man as he is and 
not as he ought to be, leading to the conviction that what he ‘is’ is defined by a set of 
inclinations and passions at work in his nature, which at times co-exist in harmony, but 
which at other times war with one another. In light of this fundamental conflict in man’s 
nature, answering the question about the purpose of the state required offering a 
response to this fundamental fact.  
 
This approach to the relationship between human nature and the state presents us 
with an interesting dialectic, one which suggests that the state should be responsive to 
the conflict intrinsic to human nature. The way in which we understand human nature, 
and the effect this has upon social relations, informs how the state must operate. The 
                                                
209 One version of the relation between these two questions is offered by the republican tradition. 
Assuming political realism and republicanism as different theoretical positions, I adopt political 
realism in this thesis as the preferred approach on these issues. The “republican claim”, in contrast, is 
that “republican and democratic forms of government cannot survive without the prevalence of certain 
virtues of self-restraint among the politically active section of the population” (Waldron (2016), p. 3). 
In this sense, the purpose of the state is dependent on the collaboration of the citizens, and the orderly 
constitution of their nature via the virtues they endorse, thereby offering a distinctively republican 
version of the relation between human nature and role of political authority. 
210 Hirschman (1977), p. 15. 
159	
unavoidable fact of coexistence is therefore conceptually connected to the question 
about the role and purpose of the state.  
 
One of the most insightful reconstructions of this dialectic is offered by Albert 
Hirschman in his book The Passions and the Interests (1977).211 As a thesis on the 
evolution of the history of ideas, Hirschman explains how a phenomenon inside man, 
namely the constitution of his passions, and the external and political consequences of 
this fact, were first addressed by means of a political solution capable of coercing and 
repressing human nature. The task was then one of “holding back, by force if necessary, 
the worst manifestations and the most dangerous consequences of the passions”. This 
task was “entrusted to the state”. However, this solution unfortunately revealed a taste 
for political absolutism, on the one hand, and “alchemical transformation”, on the other. 
The conflict of our passions had to be either transformed or repressed by means of 
questionable coercive mechanisms. This in turn raised questions about the legitimate 
use of power and its limits.212 In the eighteenth century, an alternative to the idea of 
merely repressing the passions emerged. This alternative proposed the “countervailing 
of the passions”. This task of ‘balancing out’ both the orderly and the conflict–driven 
passions was left to the “operational device” of the market and other social forces.213 
The aim was to find a solution capable of acknowledging the complexity of the problem 
at hand (human psychology and its social corollaries), and reserving political authority 
to the state.214 
 
                                                
211 To offer a reconstruction of this broad tradition, I rely in what follows upon Hirschman’s superb 
analysis of this problem (Hirschman (1977), p. 15). 
212 In the medieval tradition, it is St Augustine who dedicated most of his analysis to tracing the 
negative consequences of the passions for political order and stability. Machiavelli continues this 
realist tradition in his chapter in The Discourses entitled ‘That the dissensions between the Senate and 
Commons of Rome made Rome free and powerful’. Cf. Machiavelli (2002) and Augustine (2019). 
213 Kant adopts a version of this ‘countervailing’ strategy, so common in the philosophy of the 
eighteenth century, in the context of his teleological arguments. In place of the market, Kant attributes 
to nature the task of balancing our “natural predispositions” by means of a law of “reciprocal effect 
and counter-effect”. As he sates in Idea, the ills which arise from this development, in the specific 
contexts of the wars between states, “necessitate our species to devise to the in itself salutary 
resistance of many states to one another arising from their freedom a law of equilibrium, and to 
introduce a united power”. This law is coupled with “a principle of equality between its reciprocal 
effect and counter-effect so that they may not destroy each other.” [IUH 8:26, emphasis in the original] 
I discuss this in detail in Chapter 2, sec. VI ‘The counter-acting mechanism’. For the historical 
context surrounding Idea see Schneewind (2009). 
214 Hirschman (1977), pp. 15–31. 
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The full extent of this particular exercise in the history of political thought goes 
well beyond the scope of this chapter. What I will focus on, therefore, is a certain 
paradigm of thought present in the historical narrative. The assumptions of this 
paradigm are two-fold: first, that political conflict is comprehensible, and second, that 
conflict is malleable by political means. The idea that conflict is both comprehensible 
and malleable is the starting point of this tradition in the history of political thought, and 
presents us with “an anatomy of disorder” instead of a “blueprint for order”.215 Kant is, I 
believe, in line with this tradition. For Kant, as I have argued, the unavoidability of 
conflict, in both in our moral and our political life, is the starting point of any ensuing 
form of lawful ordering and rightful determination. Moreover, Kant’s starting point is 
not a blueprint for order but a diagnosis of the conflictive condition of agency, an 
approach which is present in his diagnoses of both moral and political experience. 
 
In the introduction, I mentioned Plato and Hobbes as clear illustrations of this 
paradigm of thought. I discuss Plato partly because he presents us with an extreme 
position, thus allowing us to see the dialectic in the best light, and partly because of an 
assumed familiarity with his political proposal in the Republic. However, the 
reconstruction I develop here is essentially one of a modern tradition. This tradition, 
entrenched in the scientific paradigm of the times, saw conflict and human nature as a 
problem akin to the phenomena of the sciences. Habermas clarifies this schism between 
the ancient and the modern tradition in terms of the questions they address. For the 
ancients, it is the question of “wherefore, and to what end” must human life be 
purposefully directed.216 In contrast, for the moderns, the question is “how and by what 
means can the civitas be ordered and made tractable?”217 This tractability of the 
recalcitrant elements in human interaction therefore becomes one of the technical 
problem of modern political theories. 
 
                                                
215 Holmes (1990) ‘Political Psychology in Hobbes’s Behemoth’, p. 120. 
216 It is interesting to see how, from the perspective of Kant’s political teleology, Habermas’s “ancient 
question” takes precedence over the “modern question”. As I argued in Chapter 2, Kant’s political 
teleology is an explanatory device, designed to make sense of the moral vocation of human beings in 
history, from the perspective of its purposiveness. Though the analysis is at the level of the species 
rather than the individual, the question of ends and purposes is more appropriate to the teleological 
concerns of Kant’s otherwise political discussion in these historical writings. 
217 Habermas (1993) Theory and Practice, pp. 49–50. 
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It should not come as a surprise that Hobbes, one of the foremost representatives 
of this line of argument, approaches politics as a matter of social science. I believe that 
Hobbes is central due to the way he assimilates the “modern question” by offering a 
complex theory of the state and human motivations.218 For Hobbes, the means to order 
the civitas is defined by the capacity of the sovereign to eliminate “the untamed political 
struggle”, and to “pacif[y] and neutralis[e]” this struggle “for the sake of a rational 
organisation of society.” Hobbes’s anti-Aristotelianism, lies in an argument against the 
teleological approach to politics characteristic of the ancient questions regarding he 
“whereof” and “to what end”. This teleological approach is further dismissed by the 
modern paradigm.219 
 
Although this tradition converges on the idea that conflict is essentially negative, 
more contemporary versions of this problem have sought to understand conflict in more 
positive terms. In an effort to conceptualise conflict from the perspective of democracy 
and democratic theory, Hirschman provides us with two useful ways of thinking about 
conflict in the social sciences.220 Conflict, he says, can be understood as “glue and as 
solvent”. Viewed as glue, human conflict appears as a constructive means for 
integration and cohesion in free societies. Conflict brings us together after all. Viewed 
as solvent, however, conflict is a destructive force, requiring systematic interventions, 
most commonly on the part of the state, in the manner of “illegitimate impositions” 
from above.221 Both of these positive and negative forces are most probably at play in 
our modern societies. This approach encourages the glue role of conflict over its solvent 
role, when conflict is considered from the perspective of democracy as the favoured 
political system.222 This short digression serves only to show that conflict has not 
                                                
218 Hobbes answers the question of the role of the civitas in ordering an original condition of war and 
disorder, by addressing four specific issues: an account of the “causes of war”, of the “potential 
antidotes to the causes of war”, a proposal of the “potential solutions to war”, and finally, an account 
“of the obstacles to these potential antidotes and/or solutions” (Abisadeh (2011), p. 301). 
219 Habermas (1993), p. 57. On Hobbes’s scientific rationalism and its political consequences, see 
Miller (2001). 
220 Conflict was considered to have democratic potential, especially in the development of the social 
sciences of the 1970s and ‘80s. Cf. Gauchet (1980), pp. 116–17 and Hirschman (1994). 
221 Hirschman (1994), p. 206. 
222 I am aware that conflict is too broad a notion when discussed in relation to democracy. Social, 
political, ethnic, environmental, domestic and international conflict are some of the many versions of 
conflict that speak directly to our modern, democratic societies. However, I think it is important to 
highlight how the modern tradition I am interested in exploring here did not conceive of politics in 
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always been seen as a negative force. However, this notion was alien to the interests and 
temper of the modern tradition. 
 
Before we turn to Kant’s appropriation of this tradition, we should first examine 
how this paradigm is illustrated by Plato and Hobbes. Their theories share two 
assumptions: first, that conflict is presupposed as the matter of politics, due to the 
political consequences that arise if there is no established power to curb its effects. 
Second, that human conflict is amenable to a political solution, aimed at either its 
eradication or constraint, as implied by Habermas’s “modern question”. I will put 
forward some initial reasons why I think we can assimilate Kant to this paradigm in Part 
I. The discussion will be continued in Part II in order to reinforce that this assimilation 
is appropriate. 
2. Eradication and containment: Conflict in Plato 
and Hobbes 
Plato 
In this section, I explain Plato’s and Hobbes’ contributions to the dialectic between 
conflict and politics, previously identified. To unpack these issues in Plato, I have 
adopted Wolin’s interpretation as defended in his Politics and Vision (2004). I focus on 
Wolin’s interpretation because he is chiefly concerned with the notion of conflict in 
Plato, as I am. I appeal to it because of its intellectual affinity with the interpretative line 
advanced in this thesis, because, as with Hobbes and Rousseau in previous chapters, 
they are interlocutors that speak directly to Kant’s problem as presented in this thesis. 
 
According to Wolin, Plato is most paradigmatically a thinker for whom political 
theory is tasked with radically transforming the human condition into something closer 
to an ideal. This transformation is intended to cleanse the foundations of human 
                                                                                                                                          
terms of political systems or regime types, but more generally in terms of the novel and emerging 
notion of the state. Moreover, the meaning of ‘conflict’ in this tradition is, as I have argued thus far, 
limited to the conflict of human nature. Cf. Skinner (2009). 
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interaction of conflict. Using Athenian democracy as his case study, Plato sought to 
“transform a diseased polity into a thing of beauty and health”. His account in the 
Republic could be interpreted based on three claims: (i) that conflict and frictions are 
equivalent to what is base, contingent, and disordered in our nature;223 (ii) that ‘order’ 
stands for the subordination of what is un-ruled and disordered to knowledge of what is 
good and perfect; and (iii) that Plato’s theory of the forms is meant to ground this 
transformation.224 Following this programme, the central task of the ideal Republic is 
the eradication of conflict in order to make room for a system of classes, ruled by their 
roles and guided by their virtues.225 
  
This political response to the problem of conflict is developed in Plato by an 
appeal to a set of ideals which in turn take geometry and beauty as paradigms of 
perfection. As he states in Book VI of the Republic, he who theorises about the city and 
its happiness must have “its outlines drawn by the painters who use the divine 
patterns”.226 Just as politics is a science for Hobbes, for Plato, politics is akin to 
geometry in the way it seeks to establish the necessary conditions capable of shaping 
harmony out of disorder. The political cost of this is, of course, high and 
questionable.227  
 
What is relevant for our purposes, however, is the direct connection that exists 
between an understanding of the nature of conflict and the type of political response this 
understanding seems to demand. In this sense, I agree with Wolin in reading Plato as a 
paradigmatic, albeit extreme example of someone for whom “the nature of politics was 
to be viewed as manipulatable, as a bundle of forces from which order could be 
fashioned”.228 For Plato, conflict could not be harnessed or channelled by means of 
legislation or institutions appropriate to its character. Neither could conflict be 
contained within a political system that allowed for the presence of some residual 
frictions. For Plato, conflict had to be eradicated outright. In offering this radical 
                                                
223 Cf. Plato’s analysis of the types of soul and regime-types in Book 8 and 9 of  The Republic. 
224 Wolin (2004), p. 30. 
225 On Plato’s city–soul analogy, see B. Williams (1999). 
226 The Republic, Book 6, 500e. 
227 Think here of the most extreme criticism to Plato’s political rationalism in Popper (2013). 
228 Wolin (2004), p. 30. 
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solution to the problem, Plato allows us to see, in a most extreme form, how our stance 
on conflict defines our approach to politics.  
Hobbes 
That conflict is at the heart of Hobbes’s project is evident, yet his views are hard to 
pigeonhole. In Hobbes’ philosophy, the conflict which results from human nature plays 
a dual role. Its negative role lies in its capacity to generate diffidence, competition and 
war when the law is absent. However, Hobbes acknowledges conflict’s positive role to 
the extent that it provides the instrumental reasons for entering the state. 
 
There are two aspects of Hobbes’ political philosophy that require him to think, 
unlike Plato, that conflict should not be completely eradicated. The first difference is 
Hobbes’ commitment to some form of political liberalism, according to which the 
unavoidable frictions of competition and social strife remain as necessary conditions for 
gaining the benefits of civilisation, which only a Commonwealth can ensure. This 
commitment to liberalism is also manifested in Hobbes’s understanding of individual 
freedom as the space where the law is silent. The law, says Hobbes, must “determine 
what the representative may lawfully do in all cases where the letters themselves are 
silent”. The remit of the law is therefore not all-encompassing: it leaves significant 
spheres where conflict can, potentially, run free. (Leviathan, Chap. 22) 
 
The second difference to Plato has to do with Hobbes’s theory of human 
psychology and human motivation. In Chapter 3, I discussed how the Hobbesian 
passion for glory, and its central role in our psychological makeup, is an ever-present 
source of social discontent. Social perception is driven by opinion, “and in the well 
governing of opinions consisteth the well governing of men’s actions in order to their 
peace and concord.” (Leviathan, Chap. 18) The governing of men’s opinions, and for 
that matter of their actions, is the programmatic task undertaken by Hobbes. The point 
here, however, is that conflict is entrenched in our nature, and as such, may be 
contained but never eradicated. As Hobbes is keen to remind us, he who goes to sleep 
“locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows 
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there be laws and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him.” 
(Leviathan, Chap. 13) This ever-present tendency towards conflict is well grounded in 
Hobbes’s reasoning, and is a threat which remains even after political authority has been 
established. As Hobbes states in Chapter 28 of Leviathan: 
For those men that are so remissly governed that they dare take up arms to defend 
or introduce an opinion are still in war; and their condition, not peace, but only a 
cessation of arms for fear of one another; and they live, as it were, in the procincts 
of battle continually. (my emphasis)229    
Against the background of these assumptions, Hobbes develops his political 
solution to the problem of human conflict. He appeals to the mechanisms of persuasion 
and the exercise of strong authority to enable a project of socialisation, requiring heavy 
ideological machinery on the part of the sovereign. Hobbes also had in mind the 
proliferation of religious doctrines and the radical political tendencies that were taking a 
hold of his time. His solution is directed at controlling the focal points from which 
conflict arises, namely, the sources of ideological influence. 
 
In this way, Hobbes advances a solution which aims at containing conflict within 
the precinct of the state. The political ruler must have both the means and the power to 
‘nudge’ our thoughts and actions in ways which are conducive to peace. As Kateb 
explains, “it is not a matter of inducing belief for the sake of civil peace, but of 
                                                
229 Milton also appeals to the idea of “procinct” in his Paradise Lost, when he says:  
 
Reflecting blaze on blaze, first met his view. 
War he perceived, war in procinct, and found 
Already known what he for news has thought 
To have reported. Gladly then he mixed 
Among those friendly Powers who him received 
With joy and acclamations loud, that one, 
That of so many myriads fallen yet one, 
Returned not lost. On the sacred Hill. 
 
Sixth Book, line 20. Milton, J. (1909).  
    
In his essay ‘Leviathan: A Myth’ (1975), Oakeshott comments on the intellectual relation between 
Milton and Hobbes as “custodians of the dream” of a world of disorder, that could be transformed into 
one of order. According to Oakeshott, this myth “received at the very moment when Hobbes was 
writing Leviathan a fresh, if somewhat eccentric, expression [also found] in the two epics of Milton” 
(Oakeshott (1975), p. 161). 
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regulating belief so that it does not become a pretext for civil war”.230 The emphasis 
which Hobbes places on the inevitability of conflict calls for certain responses – these 
are provided, in my view, by the ideological characteristics we see attributed to the 
figure of the sovereign in his theory. When the sovereign judges “what opinions and 
doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace”; when he examines “the doctrines of 
all books before they be published”; and when he is entrusted with the power to prevent 
“discord at home, and hostility from abroad”; then, he is addressing the sources of 
conflict from their roots. Through this approach, Hobbes is in fact offering a particular 
solution to a long-standing problem in the tradition (Leviathan, Chap. 18). 
 
It is possible to see in this Hobbesian strategy the ultimate realist solution to the 
ultimate realist problem: we are quarrelsome, selfish, and glory-seeking beings, so a 
power over and above us must tame these passions by means of coercion.231 In this brief 
summary, I hope to have shown that Hobbes’ position is more complex and subtle. This 
is because two conclusions follow from my interpretation. First, Hobbes’s political 
solution to the problem of conflict is remedial: it purports to address the empirical 
deficiencies of a condition where political authority is absent. Second, this approach 
acknowledges that conflict can never be fully eradicated from our social predicament – 
that it can, at best, be contained within the ideological mechanisms Hobbes ascribes to 
the sovereign. To provide a metaphor: Hobbes’s picture of politics is akin to a fenced-
off enclosure in which the individual can develop and evolve, but within certain 
limits:232 
                                                
230 Kateb (1989) ‘Hobbes and the Irrationality of Politics’, p. 368. 
231 Part of this unqualified realist reading of Hobbes is explained by the fact that we tend to focus on 
the arguments of Leviathan, and to neglect the arguments of Behemoth. This later work represents 
Hobbes’s mature understanding of political breakdown, full of realism yet filtered with nuances about 
human psychology and human motivation. As Holmes explains, Behemoth’s account of civil war 
describes “the way human beings behave – not the way they might behave under ideal conditions, but 
the way they actually did behave in England between 1640 and 1660”, with all the complexities and 
particularities proper of human history. Cf. Holmes (1990), p. 120. 
232 As we will see in Part II, Kant also appeals to an image of bodies in motion in order to explain the 
way in which political interaction occurs. He also, at times, talks about constraining something in our 
nature, but from the perspective of his teleological writings. He refers in Perpetual Peace to “the 
malevolence of human nature, which can be seen unconcealed in the free relations of nations (whereas 
in a condition under civil laws it is greatly veiled by the government's constraint)”. It is also 
interesting to note here how Kant, just like Hobbes, thinks of the “malevolence of human nature” as 
being at its peak in the international sphere between competing states, similar to the condition of 
nature, which according to Hobbes persists between nations even if it is resolved at the domestic level 
[PP 8:355].  
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[N]ot to bind the people from all Voluntary Actions, but to direct and keep them in 
such motion, as not to hurt themselves by their impetuous desires, rashness of 
indiscretion, as Hedges are set, not to stop the Travellers, but to keep them in the 
way. (Leviathan, Chap. 30) 
3. The dialectic of conflict and politics in Kant 
I have so far reconstructed elements of the evolution of the notion of conflict in political 
thought. I explored this notion in terms of a ‘dialectic’ between two chief claims: a 
claim about the nature and role of conflict on the one hand, and a claim about the 
purpose of political authority in light of this ineluctable fact of conflict, on the other. 
Furthermore, I illustrated ways in which an intellectual connection emerged between 
conflict and politics, generating one of the most fundamental problems modern political 
theory addresses.  
 
In this section, I focus on Kant and the first of the two issues involved in the 
dialectic: the nature and role of conflict. As I have previously argued, taking a stance on 
the nature and the role of conflict structurally influences the way we define the purpose 
of political authority. I address this latter, independent problem of the purpose of 
politics for Kant in Part II. We must first address the issue of conflict. This is for two 
reasons. The first is to make use of the historical and theoretical background given in 
previous sections, and to apply it to Kant’s thought. The second reason is to prepare the 
ground for my discussion of Kant’s politics in Part II. I do this by identifying a certain 
tendency in the secondary literature on Kant’s moral philosophy; this tendency 
illustrates that a lack of consensus regarding Kantian politics is often due to profound 
disagreement surrounding Kantian morality. Assumptions about Kant’s ethics (and 
specifically about the moral conflict that takes place within the human will) seem to be 
extended as legitimate assumptions about his politics, and the conflict that arises in that 
sphere.  
 
To demonstrate this, I focus on Korsgaard, who provides us with a clear 
example of interpreters who suggest that individual moral agents experience a kind of 
conflict of will that must be resolved. At first glance, this approach seems useful, since 
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it accords conflict a central, philosophical role when thinking about Kant philosophy. 
Although Korsgaard correctly identifies an experience in the human will as the locus of 
conflict for Kant, her interpretation implies a solution whereby the “civil war” between 
our passions and our reason i.e., the source of this conflict, must be eradicated, or at 
least contained, under a model of “volitional unity” and “integrity”.233 This model, I 
conclude, rightly adopts a moral version of the dialectic involved in the tradition, i.e., 
the dialectic between conflict and an authoritative solution, but it commits Kant to an 
ideal solution based on a value of personhood, unity, and integrity. This solution, in my 
view, is alien to Kant’s way of understanding conflict as (i) constitutive of, and (ii) 
incapable of being fully eradicated from, human agency, under the guise of a radical 
sense of personal unity.  
 
Another reason why I engage with Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant is that she 
identifies Plato as a precursor to this model. Although I find an assimilation of Plato 
with Kant problematic, it does allow us to draw certain political implications.  
Kant’s version of political conflict  
Against the background of this intellectual tradition, Kant can be read as taking up two 
different positions regarding the issue of conflict: on the one hand, he diverges from the 
tradition in terms of what is established as the locus of conflict. As we saw when 
moving from Plato to Hobbes above, the locus of conflict was identified in human 
nature, and specifically in our passions and inclinations and in their variously 
favourable and adverse combinations.234 In contrast, Kant maintains that the locus of 
                                                
233 Korsgaard (1999) ‘Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant’, pp. 28–29. 
234 As I have previously mentioned in Chapter 2, Kant defends a version of this approach in his 
political teleology. I explored the issue in detail by means of a defence of my account of the ‘Counter-
acting mechanism’ of nature. This mechanism of nature works with and through the mixed bag of our 
human nature to achieve the ends of our vocation. Kant shares with this intellectual tradition of the 
eighteenth century that this alchemical mixture of the passions can sometimes create good out of bad. 
However, I also argued that Kant leaves open the possibility that what results from this teleological 
process of nature can be also bad and harmful to the species in the form of wars, devastations, 
famines, etc. In this sense, the ends of our vocation are subject to the indeterminacy is constitutive of 
the process of unsocial sociability. As Kant says, nature comes to our aid to arrange these forces in 
our nature “in opposition to one another in such a way that one checks the destructive effect of the 
other or cancels it, so that the result for reason turns out as if neither of them existed at all and the 
human being is constrained to become a good citizen even if not a morally good human being” [PP 
8:366]. An insightful account of this way of thinking about the passions can be found in Francis 
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conflict lies in the human will. In my interpretation, which I have defended in Chapter 
3, the conflict of the will in Kant is a conflict regarding the way our will relates to law. 
Given equality of agency based on the fact that we are all beings endowed with a will to 
choose and to act against the will of another, our will as choice must be subjected to an 
external law; otherwise it will remain a threat to the equally arbitrary use of choice of 
other individuals.  
 
Kant’s understanding of conflict therefore leads him to depart from the 
intellectual tradition I have here portrayed. What he does share with it, however, is the 
way in which conflict is systematised in relation to politics. Whilst for Kant, the locus 
of conflict is the human will rather than human nature, he assumes alongside Plato, 
Augustine, Machiavelli, and Hobbes that it must be possible to solve it – or in Kantian 
terms, it must be possible to rightfully legislate conflict by appealing to political 
authority. But what makes this conflict particularly political? I discussed in Chapter 1 
how conflict, for Kant, is also a central concern in moral experience, and that he calls 
for a kind of resolution by means of the prescription of law by reason [Wille]. As I 
mentioned in the Introduction, the type of conflict I am trying to systematise here is 
distinctively political in at least two senses:235 it is focused on the (i) external character 
of actions, instead of the internal motivations of the agent, and (ii) it is relational, in 
contrast to the limited, first-personal experience of moral conflict. Once we step beyond 
our inner moral life, we stand in an unavoidable relationship with others. 
 
First, conflict is political for Kant due to its external nature. It manifests itself in 
the external character of our actions, and consequently in the way these actions, and the 
choices that ground them, affect the sphere of agency of others. When focusing on our 
                                                                                                                                          
Bacon. For Bacon, opposition is the key to finding resolution and equilibrium, both in science, in 
ethics, and most importantly, in politics: “how affections are kindled and incited… how they do fight 
and encounter one with another… How (I say) to set affection against affection and to master one by 
another… For as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction against 
another, so it is in the government within” (quoted in Hirschman (1977), p. 22). Cf. Chapter 2, sec. 
VI, ‘The counter-acting mechanism’. 
235 When I say that political conflict is not moral, I do not mean that it is not capable of having a 
political morality of its own. The contrast I am drawing here is one between individual morality on the 
one hand and political morality on the other. This distinction tracks the division between Kant’s 
theory of Right and his theory of Ethics. I assume both spheres fall under the general rubric of 
‘morality’, broadly understood. For an extended discussion of this debate cf. Willaschek (1997). 
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political interaction, Kant maintains that we should focus on how our actions affect 
others as opposed to our intentions. For this, the realm of right is concerned with “the 
legality of an action”, in contrast to its “morality”. This “external use of choice”, as 
Kant refers to it, involves conflict to the extent that it triggers a relation between agents. 
Life in common is conflictive since it takes place within the context of the “external and 
indeed practical relation[s] of one person to another” [DofR 6:214, 230]. 
 
This brings me to the second defining feature of political conflict in Kant, 
namely its relational nature. In contrast to the self-regarding and intrapersonal 
experience of morality, the fact that we are agents embodied with the equal capacity for 
choice [Willkür] inevitably places us within a system of relations with others. Kant’s 
model of political willing is entrusted with the task of the rightful ordering of these 
relations, as discussed in Chapter 4. Meanwhile, this “reciprocal relation” is defined in 
terms of the relation of one’s “power of choice to others’ power of choice and not 
immediately to objects of the power of choice” [DofR 6:233; Notes to the Metaphysics 
of Morals, 23:227]. 
 
I find the richness of Kant’s analysis of conflict compelling. In some ways, he 
makes an important step in understanding the nature of conflict from the perspective of 
the tradition we have discussed so far. As suggested in the introduction, the meaning of 
Kantian politics comes to light once Robinson Crusoe encounters Friday.236 If we were 
to remain in isolation, the experience of political conflict would never arise. 
 
Having qualified Kant’s specific understanding of the nature of conflict, I want 
to show how close he is to the tradition of political thought I sketched at the beginning 
of this chapter. I argue that Kant’s way of thinking about political conflict, namely as 
something both external and relational, commits him to three assumptions also made by 
this tradition, namely, that conflict is (i) unavoidable, (ii) intelligible, and (iii) solvable. 
 
                                                
236 I borrow the idea from Hruschka (2003), p. 210. 
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I have provided reasons why conflict is unavoidable according to Kant,237 some 
of which follow from its external and relational nature discussed above. The principal 
thing to bear in mind here, however, is to avoid the idea that the unavoidability (arising 
from the reciprocal relations between agents) is a result of mere physical proximity. The 
moral necessity of establishing political authority, and hence to require a solution to the 
problem of conflict, has nothing to do with the fact that “we cannot avoid living side by 
side with all others”. It is a constitutive requirement of agency, and not an empirical fact 
about physical life in common, which makes politics necessary, and conflict 
unavoidable.  
 
The second assumption is that conflict is intelligible. For conflict to be a concern 
of our political theorising it must be comprehensible to us. But what is it that we are 
meant to comprehend? Kant’s answer is straightforward: what conflict renders 
intelligible, through its various manifestations in clashes of interests, property claims 
and judgments is the fact of our equality of agency. What our will as choice makes 
manifest is the extent to which our actions provide evidence of this radical claim to 
equality of choice. This is why conflict is intelligible and also why it is unavoidable. 
 
The final assumption is that conflict is solvable. I have claimed that Kant is 
working in the spirit of a long tradition when he endorses this claim. It is worth noting 
that when he speaks of a ‘solution’ to the problem of conflict, Kant is explicitly 
referring to the state. He states that “the problem of establishing a state, no matter how 
hard it may sound, is soluble even for a nation of devils” [PP 8:366]. He goes on to 
qualify this solution, by saying that it is “the last to be solved by the human race”, and 
therefore “the most difficult of all tasks” [IUH 8:23]. Public Will is Kant’s particular 
version of this solution, and is one of the many alternatives available in the tradition.  
 
I suggest that we should consider Kant as a clear, albeit unique, representative of 
this tradition. However, even if he takes part in this paradigm of thought by discussing 
the issue of conflict and its nature, he departs from the kind of political solution 
endorsed by other representative figures. This solution, championed by Plato and 
                                                
237 Chapter 3, sec. IV, ‘The problem of the state of nature as a problem of the will’. 
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Hobbes, assumes that if conflict is solvable, it should be either constrained within the 
precincts of absolute sovereignty, or eradicated from the social structure of the polis. In 
contrast, my interpretation of Kant sees conflict as constitutive of agency. It follows 
logically from this claim that conflict cannot be eradicated, since it is constitutive of us 
as equal agents with a will. Neither can it be constrained: it has nothing to do with the 
empirical aspects of our nature manifested in our passions and inclinations. 
 
Interestingly, the centrality of conflict in Kant has led to opposing conclusions. 
Some commentators who, like me, also focus on Kantian understandings of conflict 
hold that the centrality of conflict requires its eradication or containment. Hans Saner, 
for example, maintains that Kant’s thought “proves time and again to be the turn from 
diversity to unity”. As a “peacemaker” both in metaphysics and in politics, Saner goes 
on, Kantian politics asks: “[H]ow is it possible, despite the antagonistic forces of the 
passions that always work in politics, to unify the state-building will” and achieve “long 
lasting peace”.238 This search for a unity and harmony arising from conflict and 
antagonism is shared by Patrick Riley, for whom the process of going from a state of 
“empirical politics” to the “sublimely metaphysical” idea of a perfect Republic requires 
“the sublimation of conflict.”239 This sublimation tastes of alchemy, echoing the 
solution of harnessing the passions found in the tradition.240 
 
I find it difficult to derive from Kant’s account of public willing, the ideal of a 
condition of peace and unity in which all sources of friction have been eradicated or 
sublimated. To be sure, Kant’s political teleology, especially his theory of peace 
encourages us to strive towards this admittedly unattainable ideal of “the highest 
political good, perpetual peace” [PP 6:355]. However, as I have tried to argue in this 
thesis, Kant’s political teleology presents a different line of argumentation from the 
assumptions of his political philosophy.241 However, I argue that the conflation between 
these two lines of argumentation have to do with deeply entrenched assumptions 
                                                
238 Saner (1973), pp. 4, 41. 
239 Riley (1983), p. 123 
240 Cf. Section I of Part I of this chapter. 
241 For an extended discussion on the difference between Kant’s teleological arguments about 
Nature’s ‘will’, and his later development of a strictly external and political model of willing refer to 
Chapter 2. 
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regarding Kant’s moral philosophy, and the way these assumptions permeate our 
independent approach to his politics. On the specific issue of conflict, it is Kant himself 
who gives support to this impression when he speaks of the conflict of the human will 
as requiring a radical resolution, as the type a teleological orientation of human nature 
and its vocation would demands. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant explains 
how reason [Wille] can take control of the human will [Willkür] and produce “mastery 
over one’s inclinations, hence of independence from them, and so too from the 
discontent that always accompanies them” [CPrR 5:119]. This mastery over the unruly 
conflict of our sensuous nature is comparable with “the liberation of the will from the 
despotism of desires” [CJ 5:431–2].  
 
This talk of “mastery” and “liberation” from “despotism” seems to lead to the 
idea that Kant is after the elimination of conflict in all of its manifestations, both moral 
and political. The rest of this chapter is aimed at debunking this idea. In this sense, we 
are left with the task of establishing how these assumptions about conflict and its 
resolution in morality are woven into an account of the political legislation of conflict. I 
reserve this task for Part II of this chapter. First, I want to close this section by focusing 
on one particular example of this tendency, as defended by Christine Korsgaard in her 
‘Constitutional Model’ of conflict resolution. 
A moral version of the dialectic: conflict versus volitional unity 
For Korsgaard, conflict is a chief element of moral experience. To act morally is to 
adopt a specific “deliberate standpoint”. This standpoint requires a certain kind of unity 
of the person, specifically, a conception of the self that it is only possible to embody by 
undergoing a process of self-constitution.242 This model of action “starts off from the 
experience of inner conflict”. This experience, Korsgaard informs us, is similar to one 
of combat. To engage in combat, we must act against something or someone. In this 
case, it is a battle against those inclinations and reasons for action which undermine the 
unity which is required by the deliberative standpoint.  
 
                                                
242 For my own criticisms on this value of personhood in the context of Kant’s ethics see Chapter 1, 
sec. III, ‘The will and the autonomy of reason’. 
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This conflict takes place within us as a kind of “civil war”. As long as you 
remain on the battlefield, you experience “a human soul in ruins” which is “unable to 
act”.243 What I find most revealing about this picture is the way Korsgaard thinks of this 
constitutional model of the soul: for her, it is a version of a model of human action more 
generally, and as one shared by both Plato and Kant. What these two philosophers 
share, notwithstanding their radical differences, is the sense in which “deliberative 
action by its very nature imposes unity on the will”,244 and makes us “unify [ourselves] 
into a person”.245 
 
I concede that the above reconstruction fails to do justice to the details of 
Korsgaard’s Constitutional model. However my interest here is limited to illustrating 
how Korsgaard’s approach is a clear example of those who maintain that conflict (at 
least in its moral version) must be fought against and resolved, if we are to arrive at 
unity and personal integrity. Korsgaard sees the clearest appearance of this “volitional 
unity” in Plato’s Republic.246 As a work in political philosophy, and assuming Wolin’s 
interpretation of Plato presented earlier in the chapter,247 we can begin to see the 
political implications this model might have. For one, it is easy to see the political 
flavour of some of these Korsgaardian notions when she speaks of “combat”, “war”, 
“legislation”, “constitution”, and “unity”. But even more to the point, this model of 
moral constitution can be writ large in the political constitution of the state (think here 
of Plato’s city-soul analogy). We can only speak of a state properly when it has been 
“defined by its constitution and deliberative procedures”. We have a state, says 
Korsgaard, “only where the citizens have constituted themselves into a single agent. 
They have, that is, adopted a way of resolving conflict, making decision, interacting 
with other states, and planning together an on going future”.248  
 
What I think Korsgaard is doing here is drawing an analogy between (i) the way 
an individual constitutes herself into a person, through properly ruling over her 
                                                
243 Korsgaard (1999), p. 28. 
244 Ibid., p. 7. 
245 Ibid., p.27. 
246 Ibid., p. 28. 
247 See Part I, sec. II, ‘Eradication and containment: conflict in Plato and Hobbes’, 
248 Korsgaard (2009), p. 114. 
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inclinations, and combating “inner conflict”, and (ii) the way the state constitutes itself 
into a “single agent” with the equivalent requirements of ordering its conflicts and 
internal frictions. It is uncertain whether Korsgaard is explicitly interested in drawing 
out these political implications of her theory, but I suggest that these implications are 
present. Plato’s presence in the argument seems to hint at this conclusion, particularly 
when Korsgaard interprets Plato’s ideal republic as a city engaging in “deliberative 
actions”. This city “is not just a place to live, but rather a kind of agent which performs 
actions and so has a life and a history”.249 
 
Part II of the chapter will explore how these assumptions about Kant’s moral 
philosophy have had a defining influence in the way some commentators interpret his 
politics. I will present my own interpretation of what I call ‘Kant’s political 
minimalism’. I defend a portrait of Kant’s politics that on the one hand, retains the 
centrality of conflict, and on the other, remains faithful to its political implications. 
Conflict makes politics a fragile business, but it is also necessary to bring and keep us 
together.  
§  §  § 
Part II: Kant’s vision of politics  
Introduction 
In Part I of this chapter, I developed the argument in two stages: First, I sketched the 
contours of a tradition in the history of political thought which maintains that conflict is 
central to our political theorising. I explained how for this tradition, the question of the 
purpose of a flourishing human life was replaced by the question of the means available 
to the state to harness, repress, coerce or counteract the passions of human nature. By 
focusing on Plato and Hobbes, we engaged with two political solutions to the problem 
of conflict, namely, its eradication and its containment within the strict structures of the 
                                                
249 Korsgaard (1999), p. 7, my emphasis. 
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polis or the state. In the second stage of my argument, I turned to Kant, who I claimed 
endorsed a view of conflict as (i) unavoidable, (ii) intelligible, and (iii) solvable. I 
specified how these assumptions underlie his approach to political conflict as external 
and relational. I concluded by appealing to a particular interpretation of moral conflict 
in Kant to demonstrate how assumptions about his moral philosophy commit Kant to 
the view that conflict must be eradicated, or at least contained and sublimated. I 
suggested this interpretative tendency underlies some interpretations of Kant’s politics, 
and it is to this we now turn. 
 
It is the aim of the rest of this chapter to defend the view that Kant holds a 
‘minimalist’ conception of politics, based on the equally minimal requirements of his 
account of political willing. My claim is that the conditions which make political 
willing possible, and the demands which these conditions present to us as agents, do not 
depend on the eradication of conflict from our political interaction. Furthermore, the 
possibility of political willing is not predicated on the progressive moralisation of our 
political institutions. This political form of willing emerges, instead, from two basic 
commitments: first, that conflict is a central and constitutive feature of agency; and 
second, because we are beings endowed with a will, we are capable of willing a system, 
i.e. a Public Will, capable of coercing the limits that make equal agency possible. This, 
in short, is the conclusion of this thesis. 
 
My argument in Part II is divided in two sections: first, I engage with a set of 
authors who read Kant’s politics through the lenses of his political teleology and moral 
philosophy. I identify an interpretative thread that renders politics instrumental to 
morality, and which thereby obscures Kant’s distinctive account of public will. This 
approach rests upon three claims: (i) that political life must aim at a condition akin to 
the kingdom of ends; (ii) that our moral vocation requires the eradication of conflict and 
frictions; and (iii) that in order to be a fully moral–cum–political community, we must 
become collective legislators of our own laws. Second, I offer a series of images which 
Kant employs to illustrate his views about political life and a political system, for the 
purposes of explaining why I think Kant’s politics should be defined as ‘minimalistic’ 
in its requirements. I argue that the images of free bodies in motion, and the way Kant 
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sees this as analogous to the political interaction of individuals, stands in contrast to the 
moralised picture of politics I diagnosed above. This background will lead to my 
Conclusions section, where I systematise the conditions of possibility of political 
willing, which I have progressively defended throughout this thesis.  
1. Politics as a kingdom of ends 
It is common to find commentators committing Kant to the view that in order to achieve 
both the metaphysical and political ideals of his philosophy, the problem of conflict 
needs to be approached head on. “All of Kant’s philosophising”, says Saner, “is a 
removal of contradictions, controversies, and debates… It is a political removal of 
antagonisms, a conquest of the state of nature and of war”.250 This approach tends to be 
expressed through an appeal to some of Kant’s ethical notions, most prominently that of 
the kingdom of ends. This notion, as an ideal of co-legislation of ends in harmony, 
assumes the possibility of the eradication of conflict. For example, a representative of 
this approach says that, for Kant, “the achievement of unified external willing via 
universal reciprocal coercion is thus the developed juridical analogue of the 
intellectually unified willing of pure intelligences in the moral kingdom of ends”.251 
 
In Part I, I suggested by focusing on Korsgaard’s ‘Constitutional Model’ of 
agency that this tendency to assimilate certain assumptions about Kant’s moral 
philosophy, and in particular, assumptions related to his description of the experience of 
moral conflict, distort his account of political willing. In this section, I want to take up 
this problem again to establish how this connection between morality and politics is 
further developed. More precisely, I argue that this connection is more clearly drawn by 
taking the idea of self-legislation from Kant’s moral philosophy and to treat it as his 
model of political legislation. This argumentative move is most commonly carried out 
via an appeal to the Kantian notion of the Kingdom of Ends. From this perspective, 
politics is seen not as independent of morality, but at its service.  
 
                                                
250 Saner (1973), p. 307. 
251 Hunter (2012), pp. 185–6. 
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On this approach, political institutions are instrumental to the moral 
improvement of the individual and of the species. If this form of human perfectibility 
were to be possible, interpreters conclude, “there would be no Kantian politics to 
study”.252 I believe, though, that this ‘politics in the service of morality argument’ 
prevents us from seeing Kant’s account of Public Will in its own terms. Moreover, it 
hinders us from making sense of Kant’s efforts to justify a model of political legislation, 
as one of subjection to the law, rather than one of co-legislation.253 Consequently, 
Kant’s moral notions develop into “a normative blueprint for a moral-political order”.254  
 
Patrick Riley, for example, develops the details of this instrumental relation 
between politics and morality. For Riley, “Kantian public legal justice is instrumental to 
morality in two senses”: 
[I]n a slightly weaker sense, it simply creates conditions for the safe exercise of a 
good will; in a somewhat stronger sense, it legally enforces certain ends that ought 
to be (e.g., no murder), even where good will is absent and only legal motives are 
present. But, whether in a weaker or stronger sense, politics remains the instrument 
of the sole ‘unqualified’ good.’255 
I find there to be problems with both the weak and strong understandings of Kantian 
politics. I address these concerns by focusing on three versions of this approach: 
Andrew Reath’s, Lea Ypi’s, and Allen Wood’s, with an emphasis on the social and 
historical perspectives adopted by their respective readings. 
 
These approaches share a commitment to two ideas, illustrating the connection 
they think exists between politics and morality in Kant: (i) the notion of autonomy as 
the unique capacity to be subject “only to laws given by himself but still universal”; (ii) 
Kant’s “fruitful notion” of a Kingdom of Ends, an ideal according to which rational 
beings are both members and sovereigns of a “systematic union” of ends through 
common laws. [G 4:440, 433, 443; emphases in the original]. Part of what makes these 
                                                
252 Riley (2015a), p. 345. 
253 For a defence of this model of subjection in Kant’s account of public willing see Chapter 4, sec. 
IV, ‘How does Public Will will: a model of subjection’. 
254 Flikschuh (2010), p. 121. 
255 Riley (201a5), p. 343. 
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notions attractive is their capacity to speak to a political model of direct democracy, or 
of collective legislation, where the gap between the will of the people on the one hand, 
and the law emanating from it, on the other, is finally bridged.256 
 
In order to see how these ideas take shape as an interpretation of Kant’s politics, 
I should note that authors such as Reath and Ypi do not explicitly engage with the 
systematic concerns which drive my thesis, namely concerns regarding Public Will and 
political legislation. However, what they do explicitly express are their considered 
views on the social, political and teleological implications of Kant’s ethics. What I want 
to suggest is that in adopting this approach, these authors endorse a model of collective 
self-legislation which is alien to Kant’s view. Even more importantly, in line with my 
emphasis on the role of conflict, such a model requires the progressive eradication of 
conflict by teleological means.257 This latter claim is more clearly defended in Wood. 
 
According to Reath, Kant’s notion of autonomy leads to a conception of a realm 
of ends in which “autonomy is exercised by enacting principles that could serve as law 
for a community of agents”. Reath says that he is interested in exploring the idea of a 
“consensus implicit in the idea of a Realm of Ends”. He expands on this idea of 
                                                
256 This problem is directly related to the issue of political representation. In a discussion on the role 
of Parliament during and after the Civil English Wars, Henry Parker developed one of the most 
detailed and literal defences of popular sovereignty. For Parker, the “whole universality” of the people 
must be virtually represented by Parliament since “the real body of the people is too bulky and 
awkward to be capable of acting for itself”. Rousseau avoids this problem by advocating models of 
popular sovereignty in small states –like Geneva-, where the collective body of the people could 
gather and come into literal being as a unitary body in parliamentary debates. Parker’s solution, in 
contrast, was to appeal to the virtual representation of the body of the people. As Quentin Skinner 
explains, the suggestion is that “what invests these assemblies with their sovereign right is that they 
constitute a representation –an image or likeness- of those who have authorised them.” The trick, 
Parker thought, is to “reduce in an artful way the real body of the people”, such that Parliament 
becomes “virtually the whole kingdom itself”. Parker (1642) in Skinner (2018), pp. 203–5; 351–2. A 
humourous example of this view is captured in Lord Cornbury. As colonial governor in New York 
and New Jersey of the Crown, because “he was acting as a representative of Queen Anne, he is said to 
have considered it his duty to open State Assemblies wearing female dress.” The joke, Skinner thinks, 
lies not in his incapacity to impersonate the part, but rather in his misunderstanding of what it means 
to represent someone. Cf. Skinner (2018), p. 203. 
257 I explored this teleological reading of conflict in Chapter 2, by means of the ‘Harnessing Model’. 
An extreme version of this model of ‘harnessing’ is present in Kant’s argument for the discipline of 
reason, as it appears in the Critique of Judgment. I do not think that the full eradication of all 
contradictions by reason is Kant’s aim in the earlier teleological essays. However, from the 
perspective of the discipline of reason, a dilemma arises. As Fackenheim explains, the more we 
develop our reason, “the more it seems to increase the rage and fury of human conflict”. To escape 
this “fearful development”, man must progressively employ his reason “not to serve instinct but to 
master it” (Fackenheim (1956), pp. 394–5). 
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consensus, by appealing to Kant’s discussion of the verdict of reason in the first 
Critique. What is revealing about this strategy is that in the Critique, Kant does not refer 
to individual agents but rather to “the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be 
able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, without holding back” [CPR A 
739/B 767, my emphasis]. This talk of agreement between “citizens”, public vetoes, and 
“community of agents”, in my view, strongly indicates a political approach to an 
otherwise ethical discussion.258 
 
Reath’s aim is to draw attention to the social dimension of Kantian autonomy, 
but the question still remains of what role Kant’s Public Will plays here and how this 
“community of agents” gives itself the law. Reath does not provide an answer to this 
question. He instead highlights “the deeply egalitarian aspect of Kant’s conception of 
the form that authority must take place among agents with autonomy”. Kantian 
autonomy ultimately takes shape in the “active participant[s] [of] a public life”. 259 An 
ethical–cum–political authority, Reath concludes, is exercised among equal agents with 
the capacity for critical reason. 
What is clear from these brief remarks is how authority, broadly understood, is 
defined in terms of the autonomous, self-imposed legislation of laws that have been 
critically and publicly scrutinised by human reason. We see here a clear illustration of 
how basic Kantian notions can be employed beyond the remit of Kant’s moral 
philosophy.  
 
Lea Ypi is another interesting representative of this approach. Ypi asserts that 
the relationship between the moral and the political must be read through the 
teleological orientation of Kant’s views on progress. Ypi defends an alternative, 
teleological assimilation of autonomy and self-legislation within the context of Kant’s 
account of reason. The Kantian Kingdom of Ends is interpreted by Ypi “as a concrete 
historical imperative”. The realisation of this imperative requires “conscious human 
actions that seek to progressively realise the coordination and continuation of moral 
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efforts”. These actions and efforts are understood in line with the architectonic and 
systematic unfolding of reason itself.260  
 
On Ypi’s account, political institutions – the ones which only the constitution of 
a Public Will makes possible – are regarded as evidence of our historically driven task 
to progressively achieve the proper ends of our vocation. This teleological conception of 
politics prioritises the pursuit of morality as a collectively oriented enterprise. For Ypi, 
the task becomes one of seeing “men and women who devote their entire lives to shape 
institutions and practices that embody that freedom”. In so doing, we come to 
understand “how morality binds us”. 261 I have flagged how on this account there is no 
direct reference to self-legislation as the appropriate model of legislation of these 
“institutions and practices”. However, I think we have reasons to infer from Ypi’s 
“historical imperative” that individuals in this picture will have an active, direct, and 
non-mediated role in shaping institutions, which politically accords with the imperative 
to bring about the Kingdom of Ends.  
 
In a similar vein to Ypi, Riley emphasises the importance of this historical task, 
and explicitly connects it with the political task of Kantian republicanism. Just as Ypi 
endorses the instrumentality of politics for moral purposes, Riley concludes that for 
Kant “one ‘ought’ to move on to a universal Kingdom of Ends or (failing that) at least 
to universal republicanism and eternal peace”.262 Even if we accept that these strictly 
political ends are subordinate to moral ends, it is remarkable that there is no discussion 
regarding the kind of will, or the appropriate model of public legislation, required for 
these political ends. Despite its significance, Public Will remains only in the 
background of this discussion.  
 
I close my discussion by focusing on Wood’s version of this approach. Wood’s 
interpretation is particularly important to me for three reason: First, there is a point of 
contact between Wood’s interpretation and my own, namely, our shared interest in the 
role of conflict in Kant’s system in general. Moreover, I believe Wood is correct in 
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placing Kant’s interest in conflict against a broader concern about our historical 
development by calling for a “historical urgency to all Kant’s ethical concerns”. This 
relation between conflict and history in my view, is a beneficial one, as it increases our 
sensitivity to the political implications of Kant’s thinking. I suspect, however, that 
Wood’s appeal to history relies on teleological underpinnings to a greater extent that the 
interpretation advanced by myself. Wood’s account and mine share another common 
interest, namely, that of establishing how conflict ought to be addressed on Kant’s view 
(although we arrive at different answers to this question). 
 
Before examining the differences between our accounts, I will summarise 
Wood’s account. Taking moral philosophy as his starting point, Wood defines Kant’s 
ethics as a “radical moral philosophy aimed at abolishing conflict”.263 This radical 
project is grounded in a teleology of history. For Kant, this history develops in epochs, 
starting with the “epoch of nature” and finishing with the “epoch of freedom”, in which 
men, and not nature, establish their own “autonomous ends”. According to reason’s 
“conscious and collective plan”, the natural antagonism between human beings “will 
gradually be overcome, vanquished by reason’s free concord”.264 
 
But, how does politics fit into this picture? For Wood, there is a tension between 
politics and morality, since politics belongs to the “epoch of nature”, and morality is 
found only in the “epoch of freedom”. These two conflicting realms are bridged by 
history. The philosophy of history acts as a pacifier for the tension Wood thinks exists 
between these two realms. When Wood does refer directly to politics, he notes the 
tension which arises between Kant’s version of “classical liberalism” and his 
commitment to a progressive moral philosophy. The solution to this tension is achieved 
by a teleological approach to morality, for which politics is just a stage. As Wood 
concludes: “whereas right is to control social conflict in the interest of nature’s ultimate 
purpose, morality is to abolish it in order to actualise the final human ends”.265 
 
                                                
263 Cf. Wood (1999), p. 244ff. 
264 Wood (1991) Unsocial Sociability: The Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics’, p. 343. Cf. 
Anthro 7: 322. 
265 Ibid., p. 344. For a moderate version of the use of Kant’s teleology see Muthu (2014), pp 70–71, 
93–95. 
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In Part I, I offered systematic reasons why conflict in Kant cannot be controlled 
or abolished, but instead only regulated under universal law. However, I want to raise a 
further set of criticisms of the above view. First, I believe that Wood interprets conflict 
in Kant as a problem in human nature, thereby losing sight of Kant’s distinctive 
approach to conflict as a problem of the will in the absence of law [stato iniusto]. 
Instead, Wood sees the “historical urgency” of conflict as located in our passions, and in 
their “empirical social significance”.266  
 
This brings me to the second point of disagreement between Wood and myself. 
The fact that Wood understands conflict empirically and as a condition in our nature 
which is malleable and able to be controlled explains why he reads Kant’s political 
philosophy as involving the “historical task of controlling it externally by achieving 
peace with justice, through cosmopolitan republicanism”.267 A very different picture of 
Kantian politics emerges from this set of assumptions: if conflict is defined as the 
empirical consequences of our passions, political authority is assigned the role of 
controlling these tendencies. To be clear, the present dissertation does not defend such a 
view.  
Finally, there is a problem with the instrumental connection Wood draws 
between the role of Kant’s philosophy of right in controlling conflict, and the role of our 
moral vocation to achieve “the final end of abolishing [conflict] altogether, through 
realising the ethical community or realm of ends”. I refer to the connection as 
‘instrumental’ because following the teleological progression of the epochs of man, the 
political control of conflict is a prior and necessary requirement for a conflict–free 
world in the Kingdom of Ends.  
 
Unsurprisingly, although each account has a different point of departure, Wood, 
Reath and Ypi all arrive at the same conclusion. The Kantian ideal of the kingdom of 
ends as a sphere free from conflict, whether political or moral, is, at least from the 
perspective of these interpretations, an ideal which rests upon three pivotal assumptions. 
First, there is an instrumental relationship between Kant’s politics and his ethics. 
                                                
266 Wood (1991), pp. 344-5. 
267 Ibid., p. 345, my emphasis. 
184	
Second, political conflict is something which must be eradicated, or at least controlled, 
if the moral aims of our vocation are to be achieved. Finally, the Kingdom of Ends 
reduces Kant’s philosophy of right to facilitating the conditions for our moral vocation. 
The conjunction of these three assumptions ignores the distinctiveness of Kant’s 
account of Public Will, as one which responds directly to the conditions of our political 
agency, and to the challenges involved in our life in common. In short: these various 
approaches, though interesting in their own right, are flawed to the extent to which they 
fail to integrate Kant’s complex and official account of Public Will. Both the value of 
autonomy and the historical task of bringing about progressive political institutions 
indicate an attempt to introduce the normativity of ethical notions into a political ideal. 
As such, these interpretations of Kantian politics face serious problems. 
 
To conclude: I can make little sense of a conflict–free world in Kant – at least 
once we accept that public willing has a specific role to play in his political thought. An 
understanding of Kant’s philosophy as aimed at “abolishing conflict altogether” fails to 
recognise (a) what it means to have a will, and therefore (b) what it means to be an 
agent in a world where others have equal claims to choice. What would political life be 
reduced to if the ideal of a world free of all conflicts were, indeed, attainable? 
 
To demonstrate that Kant does indeed have a political picture of our life in 
common, I will examine some images he uses to convey his views of a political system. 
Kant’s political picture retains the centrality of conflict, and remains independent of the 
view that the pursuit of moral ends depends upon establishing a conflict-free world. 
2. Kant’s political minimalism  
There are a number of revealing passages in Kant’s texts in which he outlines his view 
on political life by means of particular analogies. I have argued that Kant’s account of 
politics, as a problem in willing, places him in a unique position within the tradition of 
political thought that stretches from Plato to Rousseau. This is even more evident when 
we ask: what does this picture of politics as public willing demands from the 
individual? I argue that, in contrast to the Rousseauian model of moral perfectibility on 
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the one hand, and the ideological containment of the passions and human nature of Plato 
and Hobbes on the other, Kant’s demand for political willing are minimal. I will 
develop in the rest of this section what exactly I mean by Kant’s political minimalism, 
as an argument leading to my conclusion in this thesis.  
 
In the Prolegomena, Kant draws an analogy between relations of right and the 
interactive relations of forces in physics in order to demonstrate how both operate 
according to the idea of mutual influence and reciprocity: 
There is an analogy between the legal relation of human acts and the mechanical 
relation of human forces. I can never do anything to anybody without giving him 
the right to do the same to me under the same conditions; likewise no body can act 
on another with its moving force without causing the other to act reciprocally by 
the same amount. Right and force are quite dissimilar things, but in their relation 
there is complete similarity. [Prol 4:358] 
In a similar vein, Kant compares Newton’s law of the conservation of energy in a 
collision to “the relations of right to those of the body” in his Notes on Ethics, where he 
states that “every body is in a state of rest towards all others except insofar as each is 
moved by other” [Notes on Ethics 19:128]. What is important to note here is how these 
ideas, originally developed in writings devoted to metaphysics and to ethics, appear 
again in Kant’s systematic work on politics. In the Doctrine of Right, we read that 
“reciprocal coercion” is analogous to the “possibility of bodies moving freely under the 
law of the equality of action and reaction” [DofR 6:233]. It has been one of the main 
claims of this thesis that Kant’s account of political willing is what makes this kind of 
freedom under law possible. 
 
I find these analogies deeply illuminating. Our task, here is to systematise the 
picture of politics Kant derives from these analogies. I argue that there are three basic 
ideas furnishing this picture: (i) politics should be understood as a system which enables 
us to influence and affect one another through the free exercise of agency; (ii) politics 
requires a system which can rightfully limit our sphere of action (given that we are 
bodies endowed with forces, capable of affecting the will of others through our 
choices). Finally, and most crucially, (iii) this system is a system of freedom of agency 
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under law. This law is the following: “act externally that the free use of your choice can 
coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” [DofR 6:231]. 
 
To put this more systematically: for Kant, politics involves (i) a system of mutual 
influence (ii) with required limits on the equal scope of agency, which (iii) operates via 
subjection to a universal law. This, I argue, outlines an altogether different and 
distinctive view of the role of political authority within the context of the exercise of 
free agency. In Part I, I defended Kant’s endorsement of a dialectic which views 
political authority as the means to bring about conflict’s resolution. This specific role of 
political authority is best understood in Kant’s description of a system of right, as a 
space for the “equality of action and reaction” under law. 
 
I have characterised this version of Kantian politics as ‘minimalist’. By 
‘minimalist’ I mean two things: on the one hand, Kant makes minimal demands upon 
the individual to become part of this system of reciprocal equality. I expand upon this in 
the next section where I present the conditions Kant thinks are necessary to achieve this 
system. For now, suffice it to note that these minimal requirements follow from the 
analogies discussed above. On the other hand, Kantian politics is ‘minimalist’ in that it 
lowers the stakes of political cohesion from an idealised view based on strong bonds 
and shared commonalities to a view in which diversity in choice and willing. As I 
mentioned in the Introduction, Kant departs from both a ‘common good view’ of 
politics, and from a ‘teleological view’, which makes politics subordinate to the 
teleological aims of reason and of our moral vocation. 
 
More specifically, what I have in mind here is a contrast between Kant and the 
demanding requirements of Rousseau’s views on what willing in accordance with the 
general will requires. In Chapter 4, I discussed the difference between Rousseau’s 
notion of ‘generality’ and Kant’s version of what is ‘public’ in willing. There I argued 
that for Rousseau, a moral transformation in the way we are is required in order to will 
what is general and demanded by the common good. In contrast, Kant does not base a 
system of right on this kind of transformation. Even more significantly, this ethical 
transformation would run counter to the concern for externality, which underlies Kant’s 
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account of public willing. The differences between Rousseau’s and Kant’s accounts are 
instructive, as they provide us with an even clearer picture of Kant’s thought. Compare, 
for example, Kant’s analogy of politics with a system of bodies moving freely in space. 
Rousseau, for his part, draws upon a medical analogy (or rather, disanalogy): while 
doctors, he says, believe that ulcers can be treated separately in the body of the sick, one 
must not think that a body politic can be made healthy by treating each of its ‘ulcers’ 
individually. Politics involves “purifying the whole of the blood that produces all of 
them”.268 This transformation, a process of purification, requires “changing human 
nature; of transforming each individual who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole 
into a part of a larger whole from which that individual would as it were receive his life 
and his being”.269 Moreover, this change in human nature presupposes that these 
“natural forces” in us “are dead and destroyed, [so] the greater and more lasting are the 
acquired ones… the more solid and lasting is the institution”.270 
 
Kantian politics does not feature this type of political and ethical transformation. 
As long as we limit our actions in the way the law requires, what it takes to will 
together, from a Kantian perspective, is minimal in its demands. As Wood says, 
conformity to right “may be motivated entirely by non-Kantian considerations, such as 
rational self-interest, the Hobbesian quest for peace, or obedience to the divine will… 
This is a large advantage of Kant’s theory of right, as applied to a society in which 
many people are not Kantians”.271 I would also add that Kant’s theory has a definite 
advantage over more demanding views of politics, such as the one we found in 
Rousseau, albeit the enormous influence the latter has had in our political theorising.   
                                                
268 Rousseau (1969) Émile, in Oeuvres Complètes, p. 851.  
269 This process of transformation by means of purification can also be seen in Wolin’s interpretation 
of Plato. For Wolin Plato’s political philosophy possessed knowledge of “a true pattern for the whole 
life of the community”, it would be able to “transform a diseased polity into a thing of beauty and 
health” (Wolin (2004), p. 30). See my own discussion of Plato in light of these assumptions in Part I 
of this chapter, sec. II ‘The dialectic of conflict and politics in Kant’. 
270 Rousseau (2012), Book II, chapter 7. This is what Michael Sandel would call a “constitutive 
community” in contrast to a “sentimental community” [cite], because it is a community that makes 
each person into what she really is. Interestingly, Korsgaard also uses this idea of ‘constituting 
oneself’ in her ‘Constitutional model’ of agency. As we saw, this results in the search for a kind of 
authentic, agential unity she attributes to both Kant and Plato. I suspect Rousseau would be a fair 
representative of this way of thinking about agency in general, and political agency specifically. Cf. 
Chapter 5, Part I, sec. III ‘The dialectic of conflict and politics in Kant; Sandel (1982), pp. 111–32.  
271 Wood (2002), p. 10. 
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Conclusion: The Conditions of Possibility 
of Political Willing 
The principal aim of this thesis has been to trace the development of Kant’s account of 
political willing. I have argued that Kant’s distinctive way of considering politics as a 
problem of the will presents systematic challenges to his political philosophy. This 
approach to politics as willing, further positions him as a distinctive representative of a 
tradition in political thought going from Plato to Rousseau. I addressed some of these 
challenges by focusing on five stages of this development:  
 
In Chapter 1, I presented a reconstruction of Kant’s account of moral willing by 
examining three aspects of his theory: (i) law-governedness; (ii) causality; and (iii) 
autonomy. These elements furnish Kant’s understanding of reason [Wille] as 
prescribing universal law to the human will [Willkür], in contrast to the idea of an act of 
self-legislation on the part of the agent. Opening my discussion with Kant’s moral 
philosophy allowed me to draw the necessary distinction Kant thinks exists between 
internal and external models of legislation of the will, and further enabled me to take a 
first step out of the realm of Kantian moral philosophy into the sphere of Kantian 
politics. 
 
Chapter 2 focused on Kant’s political teleology. I defended the view that 
teleology, as a theory of purposes and ends, allowed Kant to explore some embryonic 
thoughts regarding the possibility of an external and coercive kind of will, capable of 
ordering conflict. I systematised this idea through my ‘Harnessing model’ of conflict 
resolution. This model worked by means of two mechanisms: (i) the ‘nature wills it so’ 
mechanism and (ii) the ‘counteracting’ mechanism. Nature, as a teleologically informed 
agent, embodied the characteristics Kant sought to attribute to a distinctively political 
will, thereby raising a question about the status of human freedom against the 
teleological interference of Nature in human affairs. 
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Chapter 3 left my concerns about individual morality and the teleology of nature 
behind, to focus on Kant’s strictly political interests. I defended a particular reading of 
the Kantian state of nature, which is in contrast to Hobbes’ paradigmatic account. I 
developed an interpretation of the kind of moral wrong Kant think arises in this 
‘natural’ state, a wrong which in turn required the moral necessity of a duty to enter the 
state. This moral wrong is a conflict of the will in the absence of law, and not a conflict 
about human nature. The lawlessness of the human will in the absence of public 
legislation raises an existential threat [stato iniusto] against others, requiring the 
establishment of public law.  
 
Following on from this analysis, Chapter 4 dealt with Kant’s idea of Public Will, 
as his unique resolution to the problem of conflict diagnosed in the state of nature. I 
argued that this had to be a different kind of will, one capable of embodying the moral 
features which the individual human will lacks, namely, an omnilateral perspective and 
the coercive power to put all others under an obligation. This form of public legislation 
does not depend upon a model of collective legislation, but rather upon Kant’s account 
of subjection under law, akin to the subjection of individual subjects under the power of 
a commander.  
 
In the final chapter of this thesis, I focused on the intellectual tradition which, in 
my view, better illustrate the concerns at the heart of Kant’s politics. What Kant takes 
from this tradition of political thought is the idea that conflict is (i) central to our 
political theorising and (ii) open to resolution. Though this dialectic between conflict 
and its political resolution appears as a problem in Kant’s works, I argued that we ought 
to resist the tendency to assimilate Kant with the solutions of, for example, Plato and 
Hobbes, for whom conflict can be eradicated or contained under the power of political 
authority. I suggested that Kant’s political minimalism, and his account of political 
willing does not expect, far less demand, the eradication of conflict from human 
interaction. In contrast, it is a view of politics that keeps conflict right at the centre. 
 
In my concluding remarks, I aim to piece together Kant’s account of political 
willing into a cohesive whole. I systematise the claims so far discussed in this thesis by 
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emulating Kant’s own way of thinking about human experience in terms of ‘conditions 
of possibility’.272 To put it in terms familiar to readers of Kant, I want to engage with 
the following question: what are the conditions which make political willing possible?  
 
Kant’s narrow answer is, of course, the idea of Public Will. But as this thesis has 
attempted to show, this question can only be understood by addressing a constellation of 
related issues to Public Will.  My claim is that in order to answer the question of ‘what 
it takes to live together’, we must examine the distinctive way Kant thinks about: (i) the 
nature and role of political conflict, (ii) the reciprocal exercise of agency by beings who 
are endowed with a will to choice and action [Willkür], (iii) politics as a system which 
facilitates the conditions for these practical relations, and, most importantly, (iv) the role 
of Reason [Wille] as the source of lawfulness which grounds this form of political 
willing. 
 
A unique feature of Kantian methodology is that it sees experience in terms of 
conditions of possibility. There are two advantages to this approach: First, it allows us 
to deliberate about complex social and political phenomena without having to draw on 
first principles.273 In contrast to Hobbes, for example, for whom political conclusions 
result from the inference of “good reckoning”,274 Kant does not view the state as a 
logical necessity derived from principles, but rather as a moral necessity, which 
facilitates political life in common. Second, it acknowledges that no human experience 
is the result of a single explanation. Political experience, in particular, is viewed from 
this perspective as the result of an amalgamation of conditions complexly woven 
together to shape the field of experience of the “external and indeed practical relations 
                                                
272 What I intend to emulate here is Kant’s method of ‘recursive justification’ in the broader context of 
his practical philosophy. To be sure, this method highlights the first–personal perspective of all of 
Kant’s practical questions. The question I am proposing here, however, could not be answered from 
the perspective of a single agent. As I argue in the main body of the thesis, the answer to this question 
results from Kant’s multi-faceted and complex analysis of political agency. However, I believe that 
considering ‘political willing’ in terms of its ‘conditions of possibility’ is a deeply useful, and 
Kantian, way of thinking about politics. For an excellent discussion on Kant’s methods of 
justification, see Flikschuh (2017), pp. 42–50; Cf. also Ameriks (2003). 
273 It is O’Neill who has offered the most refined analysis of the way reason in Kant finds its own 
vindicating principles by means of self-critique. O’Neill is keen to emphasise the anti-dogmatic stance 
of this kind of methodology, particularly against Cartesian rational certainty. For Kant’s method of 
reason and critique in his practical philosophy see O’Neill (2012). 
274 On the difference between good and bad reasoning, or ‘reckoning’, see Leviathan, Chapter 5 on 
‘Reason and Science’.  
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of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have (direct or indirect) 
influence on each other” [DofR 6:230].  
 
More specifically, Kant’s understanding of the conditions of possibility of us 
willing together a system of law is rooted in his understanding of what it means to be an 
agent amongst other agents. It is this deeply relational aspect of Kantian politics that (i) 
raises the kind of conflict that makes agency a problem for us and (ii) makes the 
solution to this problem a priori and morally necessary. This kind of necessity, as 
argued in Chapters 3 and 4, is moral in the sense that it assigns an inescapable duty to 
us, i.e., a duty to enter the state and to subject our individual freedom to a universal law. 
To put it slightly differently: in order to make sense of the fact that we are agents 
endowed with a will to choose and to act [Willkür], we ought to guarantee the 
conditions that make this form of political agency possible. The unity of these 
conditions falls under Kant’s notion of Public Will. This normative subjection of the 
human will [Willkür] to Public Will as Practical Reason [Wille] becomes embodied in 
the institutions of the state and enacted through the power of positive laws. 
 
I have identified and defended a series of conditions of political willing 
throughout this thesis. In this way, they form an overall view which is difficult to 
express in a one-go narrative. However, assuming that the reader is now familiar with 
the overarching arguments of this thesis, I will close my dissertation by offering a 
systematised version of my interpretation. I will refer in the course of this interpretation 
to the specific chapters in which these ideas have been thoroughly developed. 
 
To return to our question: what are the conditions that make political willing 
possible?  
 
I. That we are beings capable of being determined by universal law, based on 
the lawful relation that exists between the human will or Willkür, as capacity 
for choice, and the will as practical reason, or Wille. Practical reason [Wille] 
was here interpreted as a causal power capable of prescribing universal and 
necessary laws. This form of universal legislation is possible to the extent that 
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human beings are capable of acting in accordance with the representation of 
these laws which they take as their own. Though these laws are not self-
legislated, their obligatoriness lies in the autonomy of reason itself. [Chapters 1 
& 4] 
 
II. There is a systematic difference between a moral and political legislation in 
Kant. Moral legislation is grounded in an account of internal lawgiving 
whereby the moral law is prescribed by reason [Wille] to the human will 
[Willkür]. The agent experiences this internal form of determination of her will 
as an imperative. Political legislation, in contrast, requires as a condition 
external lawgiving through a will which is appropriately constituted, i.e., a 
public, omnilateral will. Individual agents, as members of a political 
community, fall under a model of subjection to law, experienced through the 
impositions of positive laws. [Chapters 1 & 4] 
 
III. Political conflict is open to lawful ordering by means of a will that is public 
and capable of exerting a power of coercion. Moreover, political conflict is 
for Kant: (i) unavoidable, due to the basic fact of equal agency; (ii) intelligible 
in its manifestations; and (iii) solvable by means of the power of political 
authority to set limits on the scope of freedom of each and place everyone 
under an obligation. [Chapters 4 & 5] 
 
IV. An account of political willing must be independent of a teleological 
orientation. A political teleology operates at the level of the species, based on 
an appeal to Nature as a teleologically informed agent. Kant’s account of 
political willing is derived from the constitutive features of agency at the 
individual level. This account of political willing is based on the capacity of a 
different kind of will, free from teleological trappings, to will universal law 
omnilaterally. This law is established by means of the coercive power of this 
kind of Public Will. For this reason, the source of lawfulness of a system of 
right cannot be outsourced to Nature. The form of public willing upon which 
this system is based has to emerge from the constitutive requirements of 
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agency. These requirements state that in order for equal agency to be possible, 
one must “act externally that the free use of [my] choice can coexist with the 
freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law”. [Chapters 2 & 4]  
 
V. To establish a condition of right where freedom as coexistence has been 
made law, we ought to leave the state of nature as a matter of duty, and 
resolve the moral wrong of the “stato iniusto” of our lawless will. This duty is 
based on one of the most fundamental claims of Kant’s practical philosophy, 
namely, that we are able to act in accordance with our duties since ought 
implies can. Political authority is a moral necessity because it results from a 
requirement of agency, and not from the empirically contingent needs of 
human nature. The conflict in the state of nature which triggers the moral 
necessity of the state is rooted in a wrong in the condition of our will. Our will 
remains in a “stato iniusto”, a form of lawlessness, until public law is 
established. This condition is a threat to everybody’s equal right of choice and 
action, independently of other empirical defects of the state of nature. [Chapter 
1 & 3] 
 
VI. Political authority in the form of a Public Will is based on the subjection of 
our lawless will to external law. The inadequacy of unilateral willing is 
overcome by the omnilateral character of public legislation. This form of 
public legislation does not require the collective and direct legislation of the 
law by individuals. A condition in which we are both legislators of the law and 
subject to the law – such as that of the Kingdom of Ends – is a moral ideal, 
which is found only within the strict limits of Kantian moral philosophy and 
his philosophy of history. [Chapter 4 & 5] 
 
VII. Kant’s political minimalism does not require the moral transformation of the 
individual. This ethical requirement assumes uniformity in what is willed, 
based on a notion of the common good. Kant instead accepts the diversity in 
what is willed, as long as these choices are limited by others equal right to 
choice and action, under universal law. [Chapters 4 & 5]  
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§  §  § 
I conclude that Kant’s unique approach to politics as a problem in willing, is based on 
his commitment to the centrality of conflict in political life. Kant’s vision of politics 
thereby emerges from his acceptance of conflict as an ineludible fact of human 
interaction. As I have tried to show in this thesis, political willing is essentially a way of 
living together, by limiting our agency in a manner similar to the way forces interact in 
Newtonian-space.
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